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Since the inception of the Palestinian National Authority (PA) in 1994, leadership has 
struggled in its role to create a safe environment conducive to economic and social prosperity, and to 
negotiate an end to the Israeli occupation and recognition of an independent State of Palestine. 
Following a violent Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation from 2000 to 2005, the 
Palestinian legislature crumbled after there was international fallout with the PA over Hamas 
winning a majority of the legislature seats. Since 2007, Hamas has ruled in the Gaza Strip largely 
independent of the PA and a Fatah-dominant Palestinian caretaker government has ruled in the West 
Bank. There have been substantial differences between the trajectory of their economic, geopolitical, 
legal and social development. In the West Bank, PA leaders unveiled a series of state and institution 
building plans anchored in a commitment to security that garnered broad international support. 
This thesis provides a historical account of the development of the PA institutions and the 
limits of its authority in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The primary research aim of this thesis is to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the state and institution building plan, Ending the Occupation, 
Establishing the State, in the West Bank during the 2009-2011 period in regards to the security 
landscape, judicial system, and economic development in the West Bank, as well as the attempt to 
end the occupation and solidify recognition as a sovereign Palestinian state. Underlying pressures on 
state building in Palestine are identified and this thesis presents a strategy for Palestinian leadership 
so that when it comes to the negotiating table with Israel, it will be as a respected, organized and 
united body that has enacted all measures possible to guarantee the degree of peace and prosperity 
that are within their control. While Palestinians’ ultimate aim is statehood recognition and an end to 
the Israeli occupation, this thesis argues that reforming the Israeli-Palestinian economic framework is 









Introduction and History 
 
The primary research aim of this thesis is to evaluate the effectiveness of the state and 
institution building plan, Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State, in the West Bank during the 
2009-2011 period in regards to the security landscape, judicial system, and economic development in 
the West Bank, as well as the attempt to end the occupation and solidify recognition as a sovereign 
Palestinian state. 
Understanding the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is paramount to understanding 
and analyzing current efforts. An account of the historic developments leading up to the modern-day 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is detailed in the thesis. Currently, the West Bank is one of the two 
territories that make up the contended Palestinian state that have been occupied by Israel since the 
1967 Six-Day War.  
Upon the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands, which in the years prior to the Six-Day War 
had been controlled by Jordan and Egypt, Israel annexed East Jerusalem and Israelis began moving 
onto the land and establishing settlements in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Notably, the 
Government of Israel (GoI) insisted that the West Bank and Gaza Strip were captured in a defensive 
war and therefore the GoI had legitimate claims to ownership and should not accommodate 
Palestinians claims to the land. Relative calm prevailed for the first twenty years of the occupation 
and then unrest between Palestinians and Israelis erupted in 1987 into the first Palestinian uprising 
against the occupation, known as the First Intifada. A few years into fighting, Israel was willing to 
cede some control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip to Palestinians. By 1993, the GoI and 
representatives of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) officially brought the conflict to an 
end with the signing of the Oslo Accords. The parties agreed to a temporary framework for their 
relations during an interim period lasting five years, during which time, the sides would agree on 
important issues such as borders, refugees, Jerusalem, and settlements through bilateral negotiations.  
The Accords resulted in the creation of an interim Palestinian governing body known as the 
Palestinian National Authority (PA). The PA assumed some of the responsibilities of a typical 
governing body in parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS), while Israel retained other 
powers and overarching control over security. One of the key documents produced in the Oslo 
Accords was the Protocol on Economic Relations (PER), which governed economic relations 
between the PA and the GoI.  
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The development process was slow and complicated, and was further challenged by inept and 
corrupt Palestinian leaders. Both the GoI and the PA showed a reluctance to implement the terms of 
the Oslo Accords, which had negative repercussions on the lives of Palestinians in the WBGS. 
Palestinians grew frustrated with Israeli policies, such as the expansion of settlements and restrictions 
on Palestinian movement. These frustrations, along with an interim period much longer than 
expected during which time the PLO and GoI failed to reach a peace agreement, culminated in the 
Second Intifada in 2000, which had a strong negative impact on Palestinian and Israeli lives and 
stalled important state building work in Palestine. The Second Intifada came to an official end in 
2005, and the PA found a more competent leader in Mahmoud Abbas, who replaced the deceased 
Yasser Arafat as president. The rise of Mahmoud Abbas ushered in a new type of Palestinian 
leadership. Abbas set out to reform the PA, to strengthen Palestinian institutions, and to engage 
diplomatically with Israel to improve living conditions for Palestinians and advance Palestinian 
goals.   
 However, when the political party Hamas won a majority of the Palestinian Legislative 
Council (PLC) seats in 2006, the situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip quickly deteriorated. The 
international community, especially the United States (U.S.) and GoI, boycotted the election results 
and cut funding to the PA because the winning political party, Hamas, was designated as a terrorist 
organization in these countries. A series of contentious events followed, resulting in a sharp divide 
and armed conflict between Hamas and Fatah and the dissolution of the PLC. In 2007, Abbas 
appointed the American-trained and former International Monetary Fund (IMF) economist Salam 
Fayyad to serve as Prime Minister of a caretaker government in the West Bank, which gained 
legitimacy and wide international support for its proposed reform agenda, while the majority of the 
international community increased the intensity of the boycott and sanctions on the Hamas-led 
government in the Gaza Strip. Under the leadership of Fayyad and Abbas, the PA set out to 
implement a state and institution building plan that it believed would help end the Israeli occupation 
and advance Palestinian national aspirations including widespread recognition of an independent 
Palestinian state along 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. 
 
Judiciary Reforms and Performance 
 
During the Oslo era, the PA assumed responsibility for legal jurisdiction in areas of its 
control through the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement on May 4, 1994, and the subsequent 
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creation of the PLC. The Palestinian judiciary was responsible for interpreting and helping enforce 
laws and beginning in 2002, it was guided by the Palestinian Basic Law (an interim constitution). 
The nascent Palestinian judicial system largely performed poorly during the 1990s, being marked by 
corruption, fixed trials, and a lack of enforcement of court decisions.  
The PA, through the caretaker government in the West Bank, committed to reforming the 
justice sector by delivering on promises of an independent and impartial judiciary, which was 
mandated in the Palestinian Basic Law and reaffirmed in the 2009-2011 Ending the Occupation, 
Establishing the State plan. The PA advanced many of its broad judiciary goals during the reform 
years 2009-2011, some of which included promulgating and implementing laws to protect citizens’ 
fundamental rights and freedoms, improving justice sector performance through legal reforms, and 
making small advances towards ensuring the separation of powers. A few notable reforms include the 
creation of the Palestinian Penal Code and the Palestinian Juvenile Justice Law; the establishment of 
a Customs Court; banning military courts from prosecuting civilians; the recruitment and training of 
judges; more cases being tried and enforced in a timely manner; and making the judge selection 
process more transparent in addition to rotating them to reduce conflict of interest. Public perceptions 
of the justice system improved and participation in the courts increased. It will take time for many of 
the PA’s judiciary reforms to make a wide impact with regards to improving the rule of law in the 
West Bank.  
Corruption and nepotism have long been commonplace in Palestinian courts, and the PA and 
other bodies took bold steps to curb its prevalence during the reform years. Building on existing 
legislation, the PA passed the Anti-Corruption law, created an Anti-Corruption court, established an 
Anti-Corruption Commission, and developed a code for political parties. The PA also allowed 
Transparency International to establish chapters in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which have been 
instrumental in changing perceptions towards corruption and in engaging the public in combating 
corruption.  
The PA is responsible for two critical failures in relation to the judiciary during the reform 
years. The PA did not hold presidential and legislative elections as prescribed by law and the PLC 
was never in session. One of the PLC’s responsibilities is to provide important oversight and checks 
and balances to the Palestinian executive branch, which includes approving the annual budget. The 
executive branch has not had its budget approved by the PLC since it last convened in 2007 and in its 
absence, the PA has relied on controversial presidential decrees to make legislative changes. 
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In order to carry out elections and resume the PLC, Palestinians must first end the internal 
factional divide. The PA will then be able to unify judicial processes in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip and streamline overall processes. Advancing these aims should be part of a larger strategy by 
the PA to address internal and external obstacles to sustainable long-term social and economic 
prosperity for Palestinians.   
Once the PLC convenes, one of its first orders of business should be to create legislation to 
clarify roles and responsibilities, especially within the Ministry of Justice, the High Judicial Council, 
the Attorney General’s office, and the Supreme Council. These changes should reduce overstaffing 
and reduce the inflated and financially unsustainable PA wage bill. The PLC should also establish an 
independent mechanism to oversee the Palestinian Security Forces, ensuring all forces are following 
the rule of law.  
 
Security Reforms and Performance 
 
In 1995, the newly formed Palestinian Security Sector began assuming responsibility for 
security in the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank. Eventually, it assumed full responsibility for 
internal security, public order, and civil affairs in the Gaza Strip and 17.2 percent of the West Bank, 
known as Area A, which included densely populated cities. In 23.8 percent of the West Bank, known 
as Area B, the PA assumed full responsibility for civil affairs and public order while the GoI 
maintained responsibility for security. The GoI maintained full control over security, public order, 
and civil affairs in 59 percent of the West Bank, known as Area C, which contained agricultural land, 
nature reserves, Israeli settlements, designated military reserves, the Jordan Valley, and large tracts 
of land where Bedouins roamed. Israel retained responsibility for security in and surrounding Israeli 
settlements, as well as overarching control over security in the West Bank.  
The security arrangements made through the Oslo Accords promised to protect Palestinian 
welfare and the ability of Palestinians to move freely within the WBGS and between the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip. However, the security agreements related to Palestinian welfare and freedom of 
movement were overridden by critical caveats built in the Accords that gave priority to Israeli 
security interests. Hence, since the inception of the Oslo Accords, Palestinian security and movement 
within the WBGS have been subject to change, based on Israel’s perceived security needs. 
Enactment of the 2002 Palestinian Basic Law led to the abolishment of the unconstitutional 
Palestinian Security Court and the practice of trying Palestinian civilians in military tribunals. In the 
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Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State plan, the PA pledged to hold its security apparatus 
accountable to an independent judiciary and other oversight bodies and to provide its security forces 
with the training, equipment, and infrastructure it needed to improve their performance.  
Overall, security improved remarkably in the West Bank because of the PA’s initiatives 
during 2009-2011. Daily policing improved, crime was reduced, and discontent with the occupation 
was increasingly channeled through the nonviolent resistance movement. At the same time, the 
operational area of the Palestinian Security Forces (PSF) was expanded and the economy was 
growing, both of which had a positive impact on Palestinians’ sense of security and reduced the 
likelihood of renewed conflict. In light of improved security and in an effort to support Palestinian 
economic growth, Israel removed hundreds of roadblocks and dozens of checkpoints to support 
Palestinian business activity and economic growth during the reform years. 
Security challenges persisted, however, particularly by some members of Hamas who were 
committed to using violence against Israelis. The GoI reported sustained high levels of Palestinian 
terrorist activity against Israeli targets in the West Bank and the Jerusalem Area in 2009 and 2010, 
the majority of which were occurrences of stone throwing by Palestinian youth and adults.  
While security improved considerably in the PA’s jurisdiction within the West Bank, security 
was not extended to all Palestinians, and largely excluded those who challenged the PA or were 
affiliated with Hamas. Those Palestinians faced ill treatment by the PSF and the legal system, despite 
guarantees of freedom of opinion and affiliation in the Basic Law and a commitment to stem human 
rights abuses by the PA in its Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State plan. Further, Israeli 
Defense Forces (IDF) forces carried out operations in areas under PA jurisdiction, revealing that it 
was not fully confident in the ability of the PSF, and reduced Palestinians’ sense of security.  
The GoI, the U.S., and the European Union provided planning, financing, and training to the 
PA to help it achieve its security aims, and the heavy external influence is evident by the priorities of 
the PA’s security reform agenda. The U.S. was particularly keen on financing and training the PSF, 
as part of an overall strategy to provide enhanced security for its strongest ally in the region, Israel. 
U.S. budgetary security assistance to the PA totaled US$150 million and U.S. military aid to Israel 
totaled US$3 billion in 2011. Cooperation between the IDF and the PSF rose to unprecedented levels 
during these reform years. 
The responsibility for security was shared between the GoI and Palestinian forces. The GoI 
administered security in the majority of the West Bank and all of East Jerusalem, sometimes jointly 
with the PSF; Hamas controlled security in the Gaza Strip with unwanted incursions by GoI forces 
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on the basis of mediating security threats; and the PA administered security in Area A. The security 
situation outside of the PA’s control during the reform years could be described as perilous at best.  
Palestinian leadership in the Gaza Strip allowed and even encouraged violence towards 
Israel. Those violent actions have been a serious impediment to social and economic progress and 
prospects for peace with Israel, and they undermine the PA’s security achievements in the West 
Bank. Palestinians faced ill treatment—either physically or to their property—by the GoI and Israeli 
settlers, and were afforded few protections by the Israeli justice system. Further, despite the reduction 
in barriers to movement, the GoI maintained an expansive system of restrictions on Palestinian 
movement, including the separation barrier between the West Bank and Israel, to provide increased 
security particularly for the 650,000 Israelis living in settlements in the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem as well as to Israelis throughout Israel. The separation barrier continued to be built during 
the reform years, despite a ruling by the International Court of Justice in 2004 deeming the separation 
barrier illegal and calling for its removal. The system of restrictions to movement reduced 
Palestinians’ sense of freedom and personal security as they prevented them from accessing their 
land, engaging in commerce, and carrying out daily activities.  
While the PA security establishment improved in many ways, the PA’s security reform 
efforts in the West Bank were short-sighted. The mistreatment of Palestinians by Palestinian and 
Israeli security forces and their inadequate legal systems, along with actions by Israeli settlers, all 
negatively impact Palestinian livelihood and sense of security, which threaten to undermine security 
gains and incite discontent amongst Palestinians. The PA should offer the people under its 
jurisdiction more protections and should seek further influence or control over security in all parts of 
the WBGS and extend protection to all Palestinians. It should start by taking steps to moderate 
Hamas, end the factional divide, hold elections and reinstate the PLC, and ultimately renegotiate the 
security arrangements with the GoI so that it assumes more control over the security and well-being 
of all Palestinians in the WBGS and East Jerusalem. 
 
Economic Reforms and Performance  
 
Economic Trends 
The PA identified a strong, sustainable, active, and efficient economy as the foundation of a 
capable, independent Palestinian state and it aimed to create such an economy through the 
implementation of its Ending the Occupation; Establishing the State plan. It aimed to improve fiscal 
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management and create an environment conducive to creating job opportunities in the private sector 
and curb the PA’s exceptional dependency on foreign aid.  
The West Bank experienced impressive economic growth, which was largely a rebound from 
the depressed level caused by the Second Intifada and a byproduct of aid and an abundance of jobs in 
Israel and the settlements that may not be sustainable. Growth during the reform years in the West 
Bank was 12 percent, 9.5 percent, 7.6 percent, and 5.8 percent in 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 
respectively. Some of the other factors contributing to GDP growth during 2009-2011 include a lack 
of significant conflict, a reduction in Israeli restrictions on movement, an improvement in Palestinian 
courts, expedited property registration within the PA’s jurisdiction, faster contract enforcement, and 
new measures to protect investors.  
  The types of economic activities were gradually shifting in the West Bank during the reform 
years. Traditional agriculture continued to become less viable as Palestinians had increasingly less 
access to land amidst growing Israeli settlements in Area C. Manufacturing experienced a slight 
rebound but was largely stagnant after years of relative decline while jobs in the construction, 
transportation, and communication sectors experienced growth. Many construction jobs were held by 
Palestinians who commuted to Israel or the settlements in the West Bank. Employment of 
Palestinians in those areas constituted ten percent of all Palestinian employment in 2011, down from 
16.2 percent in 1995.There, they earned on average more than double the pay of PA employees in the 
West Bank. Another source of construction jobs was in the first Palestinian planned city, Rawabi. 
During the reform years, approximately 2,500 Palestinians workers were employed there. 
Unemployment in the West Bank fell slightly during the reform years yet remained high, falling from 
19.7 percent in 2008 to 17.3 percent in 2011.  
Palestinian information and communications technology (ICT) businesses were a small but 
growing part of the private sector in the West Bank. The Palestine Telecommunication Company 
(PalTel) served as the largest private sector employer in Palestine during the reform years, with 3,000 
employees and US$800 million in assets in 2011. The Middle East Venture Capital Fund supported 
the ICT sector, providing it with financing and exposure to international markets through the 
Palestinian venture capital fund it created in 2011. Israeli restrictions limiting frequencies for existing 
and potential wireless networks, and import and building restrictions hampered ICT expansion 
efforts.   
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The micro, small and medium-sized enterprise (MSME) sector dominated private sector 
employment in the West Bank during the reform years. External technical assistance helped many 
MSMEs engage in trade for the first time, and these efforts should be increased.  
 
PA Economic Policies 
 
Many PA policies and reforms had a positive impact on the Palestinian economy during the 
reform years. The PA adopted wide-ranging reforms to its public financial management system and 
the Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics, the Ministry of Finance, and the Palestine Monetary 
Authority improved transparency by providing more quality data in a timely manner. 
The PA encouraged local and foreign investment in Palestine by an amendment to the Law 
on the Encouragement of Investment in Palestine in 2011, which provides incentives for smaller 
businesses and the service sector, including tax breaks for investments. The law created the 
Palestinian Investment Promotion Agency, which works with investors and formulates investment 
policy. 
 The World Bank’s Doing Business reports consistently ranked the WBGS favorably with 
regards to the ease and cost of payment of taxes and protecting investors. The 2012 Doing Business 
report noted that the PA was making strides in the realms of property registration, court processing 
times, the ease of starting a business, and securing financing. For example, the PA reduced the 
average court processing time from 700 days in 2009 to an average of 540 days in 2012. However, 
this processing time is still far too long and remains an impediment to business. Overall, the WBGS 
ranked 131out of 183 economies surveyed in 2012 in the Doing Business rankings. The World Bank 
only began providing rankings for the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 2011, so a long-term observation 
of Doing Business ranking trends in the WBGS was impossible. Further, the report does not 
distinguish between practices in the West Bank and Gaza Strip or identify how Israeli policies impact 
the rankings. 
 
PA Shortfalls and Future Economic Opportunities 
 
During 2011, it became clear that the economic reforms envisioned in the Ending the 
Occupation; Establishing the State reform plan were far from being met. The international 
community indicated its willingness to finance PA efforts throughout the reform years for strategic 
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development, infrastructure building, and operational costs so that the PA could expand its capacity, 
particularly in the judicial and security sectors. The PA’s initial development plan aid requests were 
much larger and more easily met in earlier reform years, yet by 2011 it faced a very different reality. 
The PA was able to cover its financing gap of US$1.9 billion in 2008 largely through donor monies 
and partly through borrowing from banks. In 2011, however, it was difficult to obtain the US$1.1 
billion it needed to cover the financing gap, in part because regional socio-economic factors created 
an environment in which many of the pledges that were previously financing the reform and 
development process suddenly went unfulfilled. The PA resorted to borrowing large sums of money 
from domestic banks to avoid a large scale default to its employees and suppliers. The private sector 
was not yet developed enough to shoulder any of the burden caused by funding shortfalls. 
While the PA made strides towards fiscal retrenchment during the reform years, in 2011 it 
remained solidly reliant on external assistance and it had not substantially replaced its dependency on 
external assistance with revenues from a burgeoning private sector. Delays in border clearance 
transfer revenues from Israel exacerbated the PA’s financial strains. One of the strains on the PA 
budget during the reform years was the wage bill for public sector employees, which grew during the 
reform years, notably in the security and education sectors. While the nominal wage bill fell as a 
percentage of GDP from 21.8 percent in 2009 to 18.2 percent in 2011, it constituted an unsustainable 
portion of employment in Palestine at wages twice the level of an underdeveloped private sector.  
  The PA should implement further policy changes to create a more inviting investment 
environment to stimulate private sector growth. It can do this by reducing the costs to start a 
business; enforcing contracts; developing a system for businesses to resolve insolvency; 
strengthening the business legal environment by reconvening the PLC; increasing access to reliable 
electricity; ensuring clear titles to property; lowering the price of state land available for purchase; 
and expanding efforts to curb rent-seeking and corruption.  
 
Other Influences on the Palestinian Economy 
 
In addition to the PA’s efforts to attract investment in Palestine, Palestinian agencies 
promoted and enabled investment during the reform years. These agencies include the Palestine 
Investment Fund, which provides loans to businesses and banks and invests in industrial zones; the 
Middle East Investment Initiative, which provides business and home loans along with risk insurance 
to businesses; the Middle East Venture Capital Fund, which provides tech companies with risk 
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capital and access to international markets; and the Palestinian Securities Exchange, which promotes 
investment in Palestinian companies. The work of these agencies helped the PA achieve a strong 
Doing Business rating of 46 out of 183 economies in 2011with regard to protecting investors. Recent 
PA efforts and the initiatives of the aforementioned organizations should lead to increased 
investment in Palestine and employment in the coming years.  
  The Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization (PNGO) sector had a large and important 
role in the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the reform years and attracted hundreds of millions of 
dollars annually from the international community, especially from Europe and the U.S. PNGOs 
provided employment and served public needs but their prevalence presented some significant 
challenges and threats to the economy in Palestine. PNGOs are largely foreign financed, and 
employers often provided salaries higher than what the private sector could offer, constituting 
another impediment to private sector growth.  
  The PA and PNGOs in the WBGS are vulnerable because of their high aid dependency. This 
unsustainable situation could quickly deteriorate without continued financing, resulting in the 
collapse of the Palestinian economy. Further, the role of of external actors in Palestinian state 
building has not been neutral or always positive. While some actors in the international community 
are driven to provide external assistance in the WBGS by a belief that they are supporting the peace 
process, some critics of aid argue that the funds may have a limited impact on the peace process, and 
actually contribute to subsidizing and enabling an illegal Israeli occupation. 
 
Limitations on the Economy 
 
The Palestinian economy remains fragile and vulnerable to Israeli as well as Palestinian 
government policies. During the reform years, the World Bank consistently argued in its Economic 
Monitoring Reports to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee that the main constraints to private sector 
investment and sustainable economic growth are Israeli restrictions on natural resources and markets 
and Israeli-imposed restrictions on movement in the WBGS that increase the cost of doing business 
for investors, especially in Area C. 
Israeli settlements, outposts, and surrounding land; military bases and closed military areas; 
Israeli-declared nature reserves; and related infrastructure constitute 38 percent of Area C , and are 
largely off limits to Palestinians. While Area C was never highly populated by Palestinians (with 
approximately 150,000, or six percent of West Bank Palestinians living in Area C in 2012), more and 
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more Palestinian Bedouins and agriculturists are moving off the land because of the general 
insecurity and instability associated with living there. Proving ownership of land, avoiding land 
confiscation for Israeli public needs, being able to access and work on land owned, obtaining 
building permits, having sufficient access to water and other resources, and limited protection in the 
Israeli justice system all constitute significant challenges to Palestinians’ continued presence in Area 
C and have contributed to their displacement or relocation to other areas of the West Bank. 
Within Area C, the Jordan Valley is an area ideal for agriculture and Dead Sea mineral 
extraction for cosmetics, industries already developed by Israeli settlement communities that have 
benefitted the Israeli economy. Israeli restrictions have prevented Palestinians from developing this 
land. In 2012, Oxfam estimated the land’s economic contribution “could be US$1 billion a year to 
the Palestinian economy, or 9 percent of gross domestic product.”   
Further, Israeli settlements on West Bank land have a mixed effect on the Palestinian 
economy. While much of the land is no longer available for Palestinian-led development, with a 
permit, Palestinians can attain well-paid jobs in one of the 136 Israeli settlements in the West Bank 
and East Jerusalem.  
Constraints relating to the Protocol on Economic Relations severely limit the potential of the 
Palestinian economy. The GoI has not followed through with some of the key commitments it made 
through the PER, which negatively affected the Palestinian economy during the reform years. The 
GoI denied the PA the right to be present at border crossings; failed to notify the PA before making 
changes to Israeli import policies including tax rates; denied the PA full authority to implement its 
own import policy at international border crossings; restricted the PA’s right to set its own petroleum 
products policy; delayed the approval of goods at borders that are already approved for trading; and 
discriminated against Palestinian importers. These policies, along with the GoI’s decision not to 
recognize PA trade agreements with international bodies and states aimed at reducing barriers to 
trade, resulted in delays and added costs for Palestinian traders. In 2010, the WBGS had about seven 
times more imports than exports, reflecting restrictive policies by the PA and GoI, and the copious 
aid inflows.   
One of the central features of the PER is the system it set in place for the collection and 
transfer of taxes on goods entering the West Bank. The GoI collects these taxes and transfers them to 
the PA monthly. These revenues are critical to the PA’s budget and in 2011, they constituted 70 
percent of the PA revenues and 46 percent of the budget overall. However, this primary PA revenue 
source has proven to be a source of financial instability to the PA because of the way in which the 
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transfers have been implemented. While the PER arrangement clearly stipulates that Israel will 
transfer the taxes and clearance revenues in a timely manner, the GoI delayed the transfer of funds to 
the PA multiple times during the reform years for political reasons. Further, leakages at the borders 
have been a consistent concern by the PA, GoI, IMF, and World Bank. During the reform years, the 
Ministries of Finance of the PA and GoI identified actions to reduce leakages. Many of these actions 
involve the implementation of aspects of the PER. Palestinian traders have notoriously underreported 
declarations to avoid value added taxes (VAT) and the GoI has had a poor track record of 
questioning dubious declared values on WBGS-bound goods. Allowing PA officials to be present at 
border crossings will enable the PA to more vigorously collect copies of receipts for imports from 
traders, which the PA is required to share with the GoI in order to get VAT funds the GoI collects at 
borders. Increasing the amount of real time data on trade between Israel and the WBGS shared by 
Israel through electronic interfaces will also reduce leakages. The implementation of the Ministries 
of Finance plans was stalled once Palestinian political factions reached a controversial reconciliation 
agreement in 2011. Implementing these changes to the collection system could result in big increases 
in revenues for the PA. The IMF reported that a five percent increase in clearance revenues would 
have increased the PA’s 2012 budget by US$75 million.   
 
Summation and Suggestions  
 
Through the implementation of the state and institution building plan, improvements in the 
security and judicial sectors in the West Bank from 2009-2011 have enabled noteworthy social, 
political, and economic progress including increased participation in the justice system and increased 
implementation of rulings; the promulgation of legislation that has resulted in accountability for 
politicians engaged in corruption; reduced crime; steps taken towards reconciliation between the 
primary political parties Hamas and Fatah; and economic growth and a reduction in unemployment.  
The resulting reforms to security in the West Bank have given the PA credibility as a capable 
government. Inter-state bodies and states have acknowledged the competence of the caretaker 
government, while in 2011 the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) joined the list of member state organizations that have granted recognition of Palestine as 
an occupied State, including the UN Asia-Pacific Group, the UN Economic and Social Commission 
for Western Asia, and the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. 
Most notably, the UN General Assembly admitted the PLO as a nonmember state in 2012. 
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During the reform years, a burgeoning ICT sector, aided by domestic and international 
support, revealed an area of great potential for the Palestinian economy. Investment in the tech field 
and entrepreneurship is critical to Palestinian economic growth and should be highly encouraged 
with a domestic campaign involving early education skills development around fields such as 
software engineering and website design. Considering that web and software design fields are an 
opportunity to create a national brand with an export that is not subject to checkpoints and export 
controls, taking actions to support this industry is an innovative way to circumvent the controls that 
Palestinians face while gaining national attention and respect. 
Moving forward, the PA should focus on creating a policy environment that will attract 
investment in sectors such as ICT and simultaneously work to address the critical underlying 
constraints to state and institution building efforts in the West Bank that were revealed during the 
evaluation of the PA’s effort from 2009-2011. Many of these constraints relate to the antiquated Oslo 
Accords agreements that continue to govern the PA’s modus operandi. For example, limitations on 
use of land, restrictions on movement, a Palestinian and Israeli justice system that often do not 
protect the rights of Palestinians, and a trade regime dominated by Israeli interests reflect Israel’s 
overarching  powers over the Palestinian economy and security sector and threaten Palestinian state 
and institution building efforts. Palestinian leadership failures have also placed major constraints on 
the Palestinian state and institution building process.  
In addition to the aforementioned influence of aid and the influence of PNGOs, the following 
examples illustrate the exceptionally high levels of involvement and influence in Israeli-Palestinian 
issues by the international community. College campuses and civil society groups worldwide are 
participating in and advocating Boycott, Divestments Sanctions (BDS) as a means to put economic 
pressure on Israel to end its occupation of Palestinian lands. Further, the 2006 boycott of a 
Palestinian government that included Hamas played a significant role in the internal fraction of the 
Palestinian political groups Hamas and Fatah, which continues to plague Palestinian efforts to end 
the occupation and gain recognition of a State of Palestine. The UN and its agencies have had a 
central role in Palestinian and Israeli statehood recognition and member states have exerted influence 
on the evolving conflict and peace process since its inception in 1945. Certain countries such as the 
U.S. and Britain have had a strong role in the historical development of the modern-day Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and their governments insert their own agenda on the peacemaking process. For 
example, the U.S. has prevented efforts that would bring about accountability to actors in the conflict 
or promote an end to the conflict through its veto power in the United Nations Security Council. It 
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insists the PLO and the GoI should resolve the conflict through direct, bi-lateral negotiations, while 
the U.S. government simultaneously maintains a controversial mediator role between the parties. One 
of the most critical ways the international community has had on Palestinian state and institution 
building is through its role in deciding Palestinian statehood status. In 2012, 138 out of 195 
independent countries recognized a State of Palestine, with many of the most powerful countries 
withholding recognition. The acceptance of a State of Palestine to member state organizations such 
as UNESCO has also made an impact on Palestinian statehood status and recognition. 
While Palestinians’ ultimate aim is statehood recognition and an end to the Israeli 
occupation, reforming the Israeli-Palestinian security and economic framework is a critical first step 
to advancing Palestinians’ national interests and state and institution building aims, which require 
negotiations with the GoI. The PA should adopt a strategy so that when it comes to the negotiating 
table with Israel, it will be as a respected, peaceful, organized, and united body. 
In order to earn the trust and respect of Israelis, Palestinians must provide Israel with security 
by continuing efforts in the West Bank and holding Palestinians in the Gaza Strip accountable for the 
violence they allow and enable. Reigning in violence in the Gaza Strip will require the caretaker 
government to earn the respect and partnership of Hamas. One of the ways it can do this is by 
implementing measures to extend protection and freedom of speech to Hamas members living in the 
West Bank. Once Hamas commits to nonviolence, the PLO should seek to establish a peace council 
made up of key representatives, including those from Egypt, Israel, the U.S., and the EU, with strong 
representation from Palestinians including Hamas to show the international community and Israel 
that Palestinians are serious about nonviolence and peace. The PA’s leading role in the creation of 
the Council would give it positive public relations (PR) and it would humanize the PA leadership in 
the eyes of the primary supporters of Israel. The Council is an easy way to utilize international 
pressure to bring the primary supporters of both sides to the table so that they feel like they can trust 
their counterparts.    
Upon the creation of the peace council, the PLO should hire an international PR firm. The PR 
firm can assist Palestinians in developing a rebranding strategy, emphasizing the (to be) reformed 
Hamas and long-standing peace efforts by Palestinian groups. 
The PR strategy should involve a PR campaign and engage diplomats and domestic leaders. 
Palestinian diplomats could reach out to constituent groups that have traditionally viewed 
Palestinians negatively or as a people not wanting peace with Israel and that provide political and 
financial support for Israel. The Palestinian diplomats could embark on what could be labeled as an 
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“information and idea seeking” campaign to engage stakeholders, especially those in the U.S., and to 
humanize the Palestinian cause. This step would put pressure on the U.S. political leaders to support 
Palestinian peace efforts, which would in turn create an environment where both the U.S. 
government as a primary military and strategic partner, and the Western Jewish community as a 
primary fundraising and economic support partner, would be encouraging Israel to actively and 
seriously engage in the Palestinian initiated peace efforts.  
At this point, Palestinian leadership, in conjunction with the efforts of the PR firm, should 
seek the removal of a reformed Hamas from the terrorist group list maintained by the U.S. and Israel 
and Hamas should formally join the PLO. Simultaneously, Palestinian leadership and the PR firm 
should endeavor to ensure that the PLO, with Hamas’s inclusion, does not get reprimanded or 
negatively labeled. The PA should, at this point, agree to form a joint caretaker government for all 
Palestinian-ruled areas. Then, the PA should hold presidential and legislative elections open to all 
political parties.   
These actions may culminate with the objective of bringing Israel to the table to renegotiate 
the Oslo Accord agreements, especially  the PER, in a serious and meaningful way to address 
underlying security and economic concerns that will give the PA more control over its own security 
and economy. Palestinians should aim to gain economic freedoms that allow Palestinians to increase 
economic independence and prosperity, which is necessary to guarantee Israeli and Palestinian 
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Introduction to the Thesis 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
“The establishment of an independent, sovereign, and viable Palestinian state is fundamental for 
peace, security and stability in our region. Palestine will be a peace-loving state that rejects violence, 
commits to co-exist with its neighbors, and builds bridges of cooperation with the international 
community.”1 
---Salam Fayyad, Palestinian National Authority Prime Minister 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Central Objectives of the Thesis 
Following the second Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation from September 
2000 through early 2005, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) participated in the Palestinian 
Legislative Council elections in 2006 and won a majority of the seats, upsetting decades of Fatah 
political dominance.2 A series of contentious events followed, resulting in a sharp divide and conflict 
between Hamas and Fatah.3 In the new era of Palestinian disunity, Hamas ruled in the Gaza Strip 
largely independently of the Palestinian National Authority (PA) and Fatah ruled through a 
Palestinian caretaker government in the West Bank.4 Map 1 includes a large map of the West Bank 
and a smaller map that includes Israel, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank.5 
                                                 
1
 Excerpt in Foreword of the Palestinian National Authority’s Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State 
Program of August 2009. 
Palestinian National Authority. Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State. Program of the Thirteenth 
Government, Palestinian National Authority, 2009.  
2
 For a brief history of the Palestinian political groups Hamas and Fatah, see Appendix A. 
3
 In 2007, the main Palestinian political factions fractured. The president declared a state of emergency and formed 
an interim caretaker government to lead the Palestinian National Authority in the West Bank. A detailed account of 
the fracture and its consequences are included in chapter three.   
4
Pursuant to the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Liberation Organization formed the Palestinian Authority (later 
renamed Palestinian National Authority).  The PA was to serve as an interim body to govern parts of the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip and exist no more than five years while a final peace agreement between Israel and Palestinians was 
negotiated.  The term Palestinian National Authority and Palestinian Authority are used interchangeably throughout 
this thesis.  
2 
 
Map 1: Palestinian West Bank, February 2011 
 
  Source: UN OCHA. “West Bank: Area C Map.” United Nations OCHA, February 2011. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Khan, Mushtaq H. “Introduction: State Formation in Palestine.” In State Formation in Palestine: Viability and 
Governance during a Social Transformation, edited by George Giacaman, Inge Amundsen, Mushtaq H. Khan, 11-
12. London: Routledge Curzon, 2004. 
5
 The West Bank is one of the two Palestinian Territories that make up the contended State of Palestine that has been 
occupied by Israel since the 1967 Six-Day War. It is located on the west bank of the Jordan River and on its west, 
north, and south is Israel. Jordan lies to its east. The Gaza Strip is the other Palestinian Territory and it lies on the 
Eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea. The Gaza Strip borders Egypt on the southwest and Israel on the south, east, 
and north. The West Bank and Gaza Strip have a combined population totaling 4 million, with approximately 2.6 
million Palestinians residing in the West Bank and 1.6 Palestinians million residing in the Gaza Strip as reported in 
2012. While the IDF and Israeli settlers are prevalent in the West Bank, Israeli settlers and the IDF left the Gaza 
Strip in September 2005, though the IDF maintained control over its borders, maritime and airspace. Therefore, the 
United Nations Security Council, some countries and humanitarian organizations continued to consider the Gaza 
Strip occupied by Israel. Annex B discusses Palestinian statehood.   
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With the support of the international community but independent of the Hamas-led 
government in the Gaza Strip, the caretaker government for the PA crafted and unveiled a series of 
plans that outlined goals and policies aiming to “restore good governance, the rule of law and socio-
economic stability” and bolstering its claims to statehood.6 
Crafted with the help of international financial institutions, the caretaker government 
contended that implementation of its state and institution building endeavor would advance 
Palestinians’ goals of ending the occupation and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and result in 
recognition of an independent, sovereign and viable Palestinian state on the pre-war 1967 borders, 
also known as the Green Line, with East Jerusalem as its capital.7 The PA’s efforts to strengthen its 
statehood claims through a state and institution building endeavor while still under occupation 
proved to be a newsworthy and ambitious goal that attracted both proponents and opponents 
worldwide. For an account of the evolution of Palestinian national aspirations, see Appendix A.  
The status of Palestinian statehood is a contentious issue, and states and member-state bodies 
disagree over its status. An entity is considered a state when it gains recognition as a state by other 
states. Those states loosely base their decision on whether an entity is a state by criteria laid out in 
the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. The Montevideo criteria for a 
state holds that an entity must have: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) 
government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states to be a state. The majority of 
the world’s states recognize Palestine as a state and many important international bodies have 
                                                 
6
 See Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (2008), Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State (2009), 
Homestretch to Freedom (2010) and Establishing the State, Building our Future (2011). 
IMF. West Bank and Gaza. Overview Note, International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2011. 
Turner, Mandy. “The Power of ‘Shock and Awe’.” International Peacekeeping 16, no. 4 (2009): 572. 
In the Armistice Agreements of 1949, Israel and neighboring Jordan and Egypt set demarcation lines between Israel 
and the occupied territories, which are known as the “Green Line.” The Green Line continued to be referenced after 
Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967. The demarcation line is not a permanent border, but is 
referenced as a starting point for negotiations of a border for a State of Palestine. 
7
 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been ongoing at varying intervals since the end of the nineteenth century and 
has centered on claims to the same land. The majority of Palestinians and Israelis advocate a two-state solution 
resulting in a mutual recognition of a Palestinian and Israeli state as a means of resolving the conflict. 
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accepted Palestine as a state. Based on these criteria, it seems that a State of Palestine exists, though 
this contentious issue is ultimately left up to individual states to decide. In November 2012, 138 of 
the world’s 195 independent states recognize a state of Palestine and voted to recognize Palestine as 
a non-member sovereign state of the United Nations (UN). Other states have given implicit 
recognition by engaging in diplomatic relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization.8  
Throughout this thesis the terms West Bank Gaza Strip (WBGS), Palestine and State of Palestine are 
used interchangeably to describe the occupied State of Palestine. Palestinian statehood is discussed 
further in Appendix B.  
The primary research aim of this thesis is to evaluate the effectiveness of the PA’s state and 
institution building plan, Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State, during 2009-2011. 
Specifically, this thesis will: (i) provide an historical account of the establishment of a joint Israeli-
Palestinian governance framework and state and institution building efforts in Palestine: (ii) evaluate 
the effectiveness of the PA’s efforts to implement the Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State 
plan in regards to the security landscape, judicial system, and economic development in the West 
Bank, as well as the attempt to end the occupation and solidify recognition as a sovereign Palestinian 
state; and  (iii) formulate a strategic trajectory for the PA that will make the best use of time and 
resources to advance the PA’s national interests and state and institution building aims.   
Rationale for the Thesis  
 A wide variety of audiences may be interested in this research. Academic disciplines that 
could be enriched by this research include political science, international studies, peace and conflict 
studies, history, business, military, economics, sociology, security, non-violent resistance, and justice 
studies. This research may be of interest to the various contributors to the Palestinian state and 
institution building initiatives. Many actors, including states, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
                                                 
8
 United Nations General Assembly. “General Assembly overwhelmingly accords Palestine ‘non-member observer’ 
state status in United Nations.” United Nations GA/11317. United Nations General Assembly, 2012.   
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and multilateral institutions have invested diplomatic, military, technical, and economic resources to 
help the PA achieve its state and institution building aims.9 The World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), United States of America (U.S.), European countries, Arab countries, and the 
Government of Israel (GoI) are the largest contributors of financial and technical assistance to the PA 
and have a strong interest in its success.  
 The U.S., the GoI, and the PA have been the primary actors working towards a negotiated 
resolution to the conflict, and this research would be of particular interest, both to the governments 
and the individual citizens. Further, an analysis of the implementation of the plan and its results will 
allow one to determine if the PA’s plans are the appropriate trajectory and best use of time and 
resources to advance Palestinians’ national interests.   
 Stability in the Middle East was shaken during the “Arab Spring,” and the world's reaction to 
Palestinian statehood claims will have important implications for stability between Israelis and 
Palestinians, and more broadly, regional stability.10 
 As previous U.S. administrations have done, the Obama Administration has made the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process a priority and accepted an influential and controversial mediator role 
between the GoI and the PA.11 It is therefore crucial for the U.S. administration and special interest 
lobbyist groups that exert influence over the U.S. administration to be well informed on Palestinian 
state and institutional developments, in order to determine the PA’s readiness as a partner for peace 
with Israel.  
 Amidst competing claims to legitimacy between Palestinian political constituents, a critique 
of the PA's state and institution building efforts is particularly important. Such a critique should be of 
particular interest to Palestinian citizens, whose daily lives are impacted by the PA's plan and 
                                                 
9
 An NGO is a private organization that is independent from government control. 
10
 The Arab Spring is a revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests that began taking place in parts of the 
Arab world in December, 2010. 
11
 The PLO and others contend that America’s influence has been less than even handed, and particularly favorable 
to Israel, making its influential role as a mediator between the two controversial. 
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strategy, and who have a stake in the success of the state building program as a means to improve 
their livelihoods, expand their freedoms, advance recognition of a State of Palestine, and advance a 
resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
 This information is relevant to peoples seeking international state recognition in occupied 
territories such as the Golan Heights, Tibet, Cyprus, Jammu and Kashmir, Abkhazia, and South 
Ossetia. This research is informative to other groups of people who have declared independence but 
have not been able to attain UN membership or recognition by most major states, including the 
Kurdish, Tamil, Chechen, and the Oromo peoples.12   
 The thesis provides particularly timely information to all states and interstate bodies that have 
not yet accorded statehood recognition to Palestine. This thesis may provide states and interstate 
bodies with the information needed to determine if Palestine fulfills statehood criteria. It is therefore 
crucial for the U.S. administration and other states to be well informed on Palestinian readiness for 
statehood based in part, by a critical analysis of the implementation of its state and institution 
building plan.13 
Methodology 
The method used to conduct this research is a review and analysis of primary and secondary 
materials. Materials were identified by searching online databases and a variety of government 
websites. Primary sources include Palestinian and Israeli government data, along with data provided 
by the World Bank, the UN, and the IMF. The chief secondary source is books. This research also 
utilizes academic journal articles and a small amount of news reports, such as from The Jerusalem 
Post.  
Whenever possible, the West Bank will be studied and analyzed as a separate entity from the 
Gaza Strip because of the substantial differences between the trajectory of their economic, 
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 Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization. 2011-2012. http://www.unpo.org (accessed August 15, 2012). 
13
 Abukhater, Maher. West Bank: Palestinians determined to get more recognition. LA Times, August 13, 2011. 
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geopolitical, legal and social development, and because of the limited amount of data on the Gaza 
Strip. However, some data included in this thesis does not distinguish between the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip.  
Chapter two deals with the Oslo Accords, including the creation of the PA and the authorities 
transferred to it from the GoI, and the implementation of the Oslo Accords. This information 
provides the framework for present-day governance issues in Palestine. 
Chapter three reviews significant events and policies following the Oslo Accords and their 
effects on the PA’s state and institution building efforts. The Second Intifada, peace attempts, the rise 
of Hamas, the Palestinian Civil War, and the introduction of the PA’s 2009-2011 state and institution 
building plan, Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State are reviewed. 
Chapter four analyzes the PA’s stated judicial policy goals in Ending the Occupation, 
Establishing the State and their implementation. Chapter five analyzes the PA’s stated security policy 
goals in Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State and their implementation. Chapter six 
analyzes the PA’s stated economic policy goals in Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State and 
their implementation, and their effects on the economy and the people. This chapter also includes a 
detailed account of economic performance in the West Bank during 2009-2011. An overview of the 
international response and financial support for the plan is also included.  
The concluding chapter, chapter seven, summarizes the research and findings; outlines to 
what extent recent reforms and economic performance in the West Bank are sustainable, identifies 
opportunities and impediments the PA faces in advancing its state and institution building agenda, 
and presents a proposed Palestinian strategy to reform the Israeli-Palestinian economic framework. 
Appendix A includes an historic account of the peoples who have lived in Palestine and the 
claims they have to the land; an overview of key historic events in Palestine; identifies the key 
nationalist groups that have emerged; and documents the evolution of Palestinian nationalism. 
Appendix B explores what constitutes a state and how entities become recognized as states, identifies 
8 
 
Palestine as a state, and identifies obstacles and opportunities for the PA in achieving further 
recognition of a State of Palestine. Appendix C includes the text of the Balfour Declaration; 
Appendix D includes the text of UN Resolution 242; and Appendix E includes key initiatives in the 
Palestinian Reform and Development Plan, 2008-2010.  
Limitations and Future Research 
This thesis is limited in its scope. An analysis of state and institution building in the West 
Bank during 2009-2011 should be complimented by a similar analysis of state and institution 
building policies in the Gaza Strip. This future research would provide a comprehensive picture of 
state building challenges, achievements, and failures in Palestine. An analysis of state and institution 
building initiatives in the Gaza Strip would prove to be more difficult as there is less data available to 
the public. 
Some historical economic data was unavailable that would have provided a better means to 
evaluate long-term trends in the Palestinian economy.  
 This thesis included a limited discussion of borders, settlements, and refugees, all of which 
are large concerns for the PA and international community that should be addressed in tandem with 












Building the Structures of a Palestinian State  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 “Today the leadership of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization will sign a declaration of 
principles on interim Palestinian self-government. It charts a course toward reconciliation between 
two peoples who have both known the bitterness of exile. Now both pledge to put old sorrows and 
antagonisms behind them and to work for a shared future shaped by the values of the Torah, the 
Koran, and the Bible.”14 
---U.S. President Bill Clinton remarks at the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Agreement 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
In order to evaluate Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State and its implementation, it 
is necessary to review the creation of the Palestinian National Authority (PA) and the authorities 
transferred to it from the GoI, which have implications for present-day reform efforts. While the PA 
was intended to be a transitional governing body in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) when it 
was created in 1994, in the absence of a peace settlement between the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) and the GoI, the PA continues to share governing responsibilities with the GoI in 
the WBGS.15   
The Oslo Accords: Establishing a Governance Framework 
 In the midst of ongoing conflict during the First Intifada from 1987 to 1993, for the first time 
in the 1990s, Palestinian and Israeli representatives initiated diplomatic negotiations aimed at ending 
the conflict and establishing a recognized Palestinian state with agreed upon borders.16 The talks 
were encouraged by and in part facilitated by influential states, including the U.S., the Russian 
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 “Bill Clinton Remarks at the Signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Agreement.” Charlottesville: Miller Center at the 
University of Virginia, September 13, 1993.  
15
 The international community deems the PLO to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people. The 
establishment of the PLO and how it has evolved to serve Palestinian nationalist aspirations is discussed in detail in 
Appendix A. 
16
 See Appendix A for a brief history of the First Intifada. 
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Federation, and key Arab states. The readiness of the PLO and the GoI to engage in negotiations was 
supported by some Israelis and some Palestinians. This development gave promise to many 
Palestinians that they would at last have a fully internationally recognized Palestinian state; however, 
the negotiations were not supported by all segments within Israeli and Palestinian societies.17 Many 
Israelis were not supportive of engaging in peace talks with the PLO, which had openly supported 
violence against Israelis as a means to end the occupation and stake claims to the land of Israel. 
Further, many Palestinians and Israelis did not accept the UN partition plan resulting in a Palestinian 
state and Israeli state side by side as a statehood model for Palestinians and Israelis. For example, 
some Palestinians, such as members of Hamas, called for the destruction of Israel and for a State of 
Palestine in the entire area of the former Palestine Mandate.18 Some Haredi Jews claim the state of 
Israel is illegitimate and aim to establish communities in Israeli settlements in the WBGS.19 Other 
Israelis insisted that the West Bank and Gaza Strip were captured in a defensive war and therefore 
the GoI had legitimate claims to ownership and should not accommodate Palestinians claims to the 
land. Other Palestinians and Israelis advocated for a bi-national state that would encompass the 
current State of Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.  
Prior to the initiation of negotiations, many Palestinians wanted Israeli reassurances of 
compensation or repatriation for Palestinian refugees from the 1948 war, as required by UN 
Resolution 194, and as the GoI agreed to do when it was accepted to the UN in 1949. Palestinians 
also wanted a halt in Israeli settlement building in the WBGS before engaging in peace talks, which 
was not achieved.20  
                                                 
17
 See Appendix B for an explanation of how the Oslo Accords and resulting Palestinian government structures led 
to the creation of a State of Palestine, albeit with limited recognition by other states and entities. 
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 See Appendix A for a discussion on the UN partition plan and Palestine Mandate. 
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  Haredi Jews (also known as Ultra-Orthodox Jewry) constitute the most conservative form of Orthodox Judaism 
and have not adopted Zionist ideology. Haredi Jews claim that the State of Israel is illegitimate, believing that no 
formal government should exist in Israel before the Messiah comes and reestablishes a Jewish kingdom. 
20
 Freedom House. Palestinian Authority-Administered Territories [Israel] 2003. Freedom House, 2012.  
Quigley, John. The Statehood of Palestine: International Law in the Middle East Conflict. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, 172-173. 
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 The Madrid Peace Conference included the first major yet unofficial and unsuccessful peace 
talks, during which PLO representatives for the first time engaged in talks representing the 
Palestinian people.21 Then, despite public reservations, the PLO and GoI hastily agreed that a 
resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and permanent status issues, notably Palestinian 
sovereignty, would be accomplished through official diplomatic negotiations between the PLO and 
the GoI, facilitated by the U.S., which would be based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 
338 and would take place within a five-year timeframe to be completed by May 1999.22 The parties’ 
commitment put into effect the Declaration of Principles (DOP) on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements on September 13, 1993 (also known as the Oslo Accords), which ended the First 
Intifada.23   
 The Accords allocated some of the most difficult issues between the parties to permanent 
status negotiations.24 This historic effort was marked by deep concessions by both parties. The PLO, 
representing the majority of Palestinians, publicly acknowledged its willingness to accept limited 
autonomy in the WBGS, recognize Israel’s existence and its right to live in peace, accepted UN 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and rejected violence.25 The GoI recognized the PLO as 
                                                                                                                                                             
UN General Assembly Resolution 194 was passed in December 1948 and affirmed that Palestinian refugees should 
be permitted to return to their homes, known as the “right of return.” Article 11 of the resolution reads: (The General 
Assembly) Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should 
be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those 
choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, 
should be made good by the Governments or authorities made responsible.” 
21
 (Muslih 2005, 92)   
22
 (Guide to the Middle East Peace Process n.d.) 
“The Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations.” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Israel-
Palestinian%20Negotiations (accessed May 12, 2012).  
23
 (Freedom House 2012) 
(Quigley 2010, 172-173) 
24
 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements. The State of Israel. September 13, 1993. 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/oslo_eng.htm.  (accessed December 2, 2012). 
25
 See Appendix A for the history and significance of UN Security Council Resolution 242 and see Appendix D for 
the full text of the Resolution. 
UN Security Council Resolution 338 was created in Response to fighting between Israeli and a coalition of Arab 
states in the Yom Kippur War in 1973. The resolution also called for the “implementation of Security Council 
Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts; Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations 
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the sole representative of the Palestinian people and accepted the idea of a two-state model. The GoI 
also expressed a willingness to have U.S.-brokered direct face-to-face negotiations with the PLO and 
relinquish some control of the WBGS to Palestinians in exchange for peace.26 Following the signing 
of the DOP in Oslo, an Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) was established on October 1, 1993 by 
the Multilateral Steering Group of the multilateral talks on Middle East peace. The AHLC seeks to 
promote dialogue between donors, the PA and the GoI.27 
 The parties made subsequent arrangements for the interim Palestinian government. Table 1 













                                                                                                                                                             
start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the 
Middle East.” 
26
 (Quigley 2010, 175) 
27
 “Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC).” Local Development Forum, 2011. http://www.lacs.ps/article.aspx?id=6 
(accessed February 16, 2012). 
Established in 1993, the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) is a 15-member committee that serves as the principal 
policy-level coordination mechanism for development assistance to the Palestinian people. The AHLC is chaired by 
Norway and co-sponsored by the EU and US. In addition, the United Nations participates together with the World 
Bank (Secretariat) and the International Monetary Fund. The AHLC seeks to promote dialogue between donors, the 
PA and the GoI. 
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Table 1: Oslo Accords Arrangements 
 




As part of the Oslo Accords Agreements, on May 4, 1994, the GoI and the PLO signed the 
Gaza-Jericho Agreement, which stipulated the withdrawal of the Israelis in the Civil Administration 
(CA) and forces from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank city of Jericho.28 With the support of a Joint 
Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee, the PA assumed these powers and 
responsibilities. Included in the agreement were four annexes, outlining security arrangements, 
transfer of civil affairs, a legal framework, and an economic framework.   
By May 18, 1994, the CA in the Gaza Strip and Jericho was dissolved and its powers were 
transferred to the PA. The GoI maintained ultimate responsibility for security functions in Israeli 
settlements, for the roads leading to the settlements and in adjacent areas, and over external security 
and overall security.29 The PA created a Palestinian police force that assumed internal control in the 
Gaza Strip and Jericho area. In the realm of legal matters, the agreement provided the nascent PA 
legislative, executive and judicial powers and responsibilities within its territorial, functional and 
personal jurisdiction (the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area), with the exception of Israeli citizens in these 
areas.  
 The Gaza-Jericho Agreement contains important agreements relating to the powers of the 
judiciary and to the economy. Annex IV of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement is an agreement on 
economic relations between the GoI and the PA that the parties signed in Paris a few days before 
they signed the Gaza-Jericho Agreement and is known as the Paris Protocol on Economic Relations 
(PER).The PER provided a framework for interim economic relations between the GoI and the PA 
                                                 
28
 In 1981, the Civil Administration was established as the governing body in the West Bank and Gaza Strip under 
the authority of the Israeli Defense Forces to administer Palestinian civilian life in those areas. 
Karlsson, Ingela. “What is the Civil Administration?.” Diakonia. March 18, 2018 
http://www.diakonia.se/sa/node.asp?node=853 (accessed December 2, 2012). 
A discussion of the 1948 war and the resulting displaced persons is included in Appendix A. 
29
 (Muslih 2005, 302)  
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and is the single most important agreement for Palestinian economic potential, specifically with 
regards to trade and financing for the PA.30  
Transfer of Powers  
On August 29, 1994, the GoI and the PLO entered into an agreement, known as “The 
preparatory transfer of powers and responsibilities,” which entailed the GoI transferring more powers 
to the PA within the jurisdiction of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank city of Jericho. The primary 
spheres of authority of transfer included: education and culture, health, social welfare, and taxation. 
Whereas many tax matters had been dealt with in the PER, the parties made further agreements in 
this realm. Specifically, the Transfer of Powers allowed the PA to engage in indirect taxation in the 
form of a value added tax (VAT) on local production in the West Bank and excluding Israeli 
settlements and Israeli military locations.  
 The PA and Israeli government recognized there would be a shortfall in the collection of 
taxes during the period in which the PA established its own revenue collection system and jointly 
approached donor countries to seek funding for the shortfall.31  
Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities 
On August 27, 1995 the GoI and the PLO signed the Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers 
and Responsibilities, which resulted in the GoI transferring more powers to the PA within the 
jurisdiction area of the Gaza Strip and Jericho. The primary spheres of authority of transfer included: 
                                                 
30
 “Gaza-Jericho Agreement Annex IV: Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of the State of 
Israel and the P.L.O., representing the Palestinian people.” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. April 29, 1994. 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Gaza-Jericho+Agreement+Annex+IV+-
+Economic+Protoco.htm? (accessed March 4, 2012).  
31
 “Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities.” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. August 
29, 1994. 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Agreement%20on%20Pr
eparatory%20Transfer%20of%20Powers%20and%20Re (accessed April 3, 2012).  
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labor, commerce and industry, gas and petroleum, insurance, postal services, local government, and 
agriculture.32  
Interim Agreement 
The PLO and GoI signed the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip (also known as the Oslo II Agreement) in September, 1995. This agreement superseded 
the Gaza-Jericho Agreement; the Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers, and the Protocol on 
Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, though most of their provisions were incorporated 
into this agreement. The main points of the agreement were included in seven annexes dealing with: 
security arrangements, elections, civil affairs (transfer of powers), legal matters, economic relations, 
Israeli-Palestinian cooperation, removal of some Israeli checkpoints, and the release of some 
Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails. Article XXIV reaffirmed the parties’ commitment to 
economic relations based on the Protocol on Economic Relations (PER) and Annex V was a 
supplement to the PER. Through this agreement, the PLO agreed to revoke articles of the Palestinian 
Covenant calling for the destruction of Israel.33   
The Agreement extended the PA’s jurisdiction from the Gaza Strip and Jericho to additional 
areas in the West Bank. The agreement established different arrangements for three types of area: 
Area A, Area B, and Area C.34 The Agreement called for the PA to assume full responsibility for 
internal security and public order as well as full responsibility for civil affairs within Area A.35 
Within Area B, the Agreement called for the PA to assume full responsibility of civil affairs and 
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 “Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities.” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  August 27, 
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http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Further+Transfer+of+Powers+and+Resp
onsibilities.htm (accessed April 3, 2012).  
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 “The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
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 Pappé, Ilan. A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2004, 276. 
35
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public order, with the GoI maintaining responsibility for security. Within Area C, the Agreement 
called for the GoI to maintain full control over security and administration, but some powers and 
responsibilities of the Israeli military government and CA would be transferred gradually over 18 
months from the time of agreement to Palestinian jurisdiction. Area C was less densely populated 
than Areas A and B, containing agricultural land, nature reserves, Israeli settlements, designated 
military areas, Palestinian Bedouin communities, and the Jordan Valley.36 
The agreement increased the PA’s responsibilities and territorial control, and called for the 
election of a self-governing authority with legislative and executive powers, which took place in 
early 1996.37 This governing body would become known as the Palestinian Legislative Council 
(PLC) and it promulgated secondary legislation, including regulations and new legislation, though 
the GoI was given veto power over the legislation. The PLC assumed the responsibilities of the 
Israeli Civil Administration in all of the West Bank within the PA’s areas of jurisdiction, except for 
the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the PA, and the Israeli military government was 
withdrawn and replaced by Palestinian security forces. Additionally, the PA “established a military-
court system based on a penal code that the PLO had used in exile.”38 
The agreement called for the creation of a Liaison Committee to ensure the smooth 
implementation of the agreement. With representatives of the PA and GoI meeting regularly and 
steering the activities of sub-committees, the Liaison Committee could foster cooperation and 
peaceful relations. The subcommittees included: Joint Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation 
                                                 
36
 Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) and the World Bank. “Recent Political Developments.” In 
Development under Adversity – The Palestinian Economy in Transition, by Rex Brynen, edited by Radwan A. 
Shaban and Ishac Diwan. Washington, 1999, 39. 
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 Elections were agreed to be open to Palestinians living in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
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Committee, Joint Economic Committee, and Joint Regional Civil Affairs Subcommittees, one for the 
Gaza Strip and the other for the West Bank, and District Civil Liaison Offices in the West Bank.39  
The Interim Agreement established that permanent status negotiations would commence no 
later than May 4, 1996 between the parties and would cover remaining issues including the status of 
Jerusalem, refugees, right of return, water, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and 
cooperation with other neighbors, and other outstanding issues of mutual interest.40 
While Palestinian Security Forces were mandated to take over control within Palestinian 
jurisdiction, Article III: 4 of the agreement established that “Israel shall continue to carry the 
responsibility for external security, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the 
purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.”41 
Criticism of the Oslo Accords 
The Oslo Accords have been controversial since they were agreed to by the PLO and the GoI. 
Critics have targeted both the contents of the Accords and the degree to which the PLO and the GoI 
followed through on the commitments they made in the Accords. It is important to note the criticisms 
of the Accords since it is the present-day framework the PA is working within.  
The most prevalent criticism levied at the PLO by Palestinians was its failure to secure a 
freeze on the growth of Israeli settlements.42 While this was an objective of the PLO, it made this 
concession in part because of the difficulty in getting the GoI to agree to and implement it and 
because of the historic opportunity for the PLO to be recognized by the GoI as the sole legitimate 
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representative of the Palestinian people. Instead of building a restriction on building settlements into 
the Oslo Accords, the PLO agreed to leave the issue of settlements to final status negotiations.43  
Another criticism of the Accords by some Israeli critics and others relates to the continued, 
though changed nature of the Israeli occupation. Ben-Gurion University of the Negev’s Professor 
Neve Gordon argues that the creation of the PA was a way for the GoI to outsource the work of 
managing the Palestinian population, basically serving as a subcontractor, while the GoI continued 
the occupation and expansion of Israeli settlements on Palestinian land.44 Director of Research at the 
Foundation for Middle East Peace in Washington, D.C. Geoffrey Aronson, disagrees, arguing the 
agreement created a cooperative partnership between Palestinians and Israelis, saying, “Two striking 
aspects of Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation stand out in this interim agreement: it transforms Israel's 
"belligerent" rule over Palestinians into a partnership operating with Palestinian consent, and it 
repudiates what Prime Minister Rabin had called the "hallucination" of Greater Israel fostered by a 
generation of Labor and Likud politicians. In this agreement, diplomacy has created an extraordinary, 
cooperative order between Israelis and Palestinians.”45 
Stephanie Koury, a research fellow at the University of London, argues that the PLO 
sacrificed some Palestinian rights by law through agreeing to the Oslo Accords. She writes: “The 
PLO’s decision to enter the Oslo Agreements even without such legal references as the Fourth 
Geneva Convention or the right of return undermined consensus over a law-based approach to 
resolution of the conflict and the applicable legal framework.”46 
Political Scientist and researcher Inge Amundsen and researcher and Professor Basem Ezbidi 
pointed out that opposition groups also boycotted the Oslo peace process saying, “Major opposition 
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45
 Aronson, Geoffrey. “To Withdraw Without Withdrawing.” Settlement Report 5, no. 5 (September-October 1995). 
46
 Stephanie Koury, “Legal Strategies at the United Nations: A Comparative Look at Namibia, Western Sahara, and 
Palestine.” in International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, edited by Susan M. Akram et al. New York: 
Routledge, 2011, 165 
20 
 
groups, Hamas and Al-Jihad, were rooted ‘inside’ [the WBGS] and they disputed the PLO’s mandate 
to represent all Palestinians. While the PLO embarked on a process established by the Oslo 
arrangement, the Islamic opposition groups actively, sometimes even violently, boycotted that 
process.”47 
Implementation of the Accords 
Since the creation of the PA and state institutions, both the GoI and the PA have been 
responsible for operations within the  WBGS (though Hamas took control of Gaza in 2007), 
frequently with different goals and objectives and sometimes working against instead of with each 
other, while Palestine remains under occupation and the PA remains accountable to the GoI.48 
Institutional development necessitated the continued participation of the GoI, which could be 
perceived as complicating the process, helping the process, or both. The Oslo Accords equipped the 
PA with some of the tools it needed to maintain law and order and security through training and the 
gradual redeployment of Israeli forces but the monumental task of maintaining security for a people 
wanting to end an occupation proved exceedingly difficult for not only the GoI, but for the PA.  
While the PA was working to establish a legitimate government and authority for the 
Palestinian people, it faced significant public pressure to seek independence from the GoI. This 
pressure placed on the PA is unique from many other Arab states and post-conflict and transitioning 
governments, which didn’t operate under an active occupation by another country. However, 
transitional governments under a colonial power have faced similar state building experiences and 
pressures. 
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 The Accords called for elections for the position of president as well as the creation of the 
PLC. Despite Hamas’ status as a powerful political party with a promising outlook in the 1996 
elections and the only serious counterweight to Fatah, Hamas boycotted those elections, not wanting 
to give legitimacy to the PA, which Hamas felt was created through unacceptable negotiations and 
compromises with the GoI. The Palestinian Islamic militant organization, Islamic Jihad also 
boycotted elections. After leading the Palestinian nationalist movement and serving as the chairman 
of the PLO for decades, Yasser Arafat became the first president of the PA and Fatah members filled 
a majority of the PLC seats.49  
 Arafat was reviled by many Israelis for leading the revolt against the Israeli occupation, 
though he received the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in the Oslo Accords. His background did not 
prepare him well for the unique challenges of serving as the first president of the PA. 
The reality of implementing reforms in the WBGS was complicated, partly due to inept and 
corrupt Palestinian leadership; partly due to the constraints of the structures put in place by the Oslo 
Agreements; partly because of what was not included in the Oslo Agreements; and partly because 
there was not sufficient support for the Accords by Palestinians and Israelis, all of which will be 
further explored in this thesis. 
Specific details about how the PA should be structured and govern the WBGS were lacking, 
and these ambiguities set the foundation for abuse and failures within the PA.50 The first president of 
the PA, Yasser Arafat, took full advantage of the ambiguities in the interim agreement and assumed 
an overarching and powerful role that undermined balance of power typically found in democratic 
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systems. He faced heavy criticism by Palestinians and the international community for allegations of 
abuse of power and corruption.51 
Up until Palestinians had a Basic Law, which serves as a constitution, Arafat issued 
presidential decrees that were not subject to review or approval by either the PLC or an established 
judicial body.52 A couple of notable presidential decrees resulted in the establishment of the Palestine 
Monetary Authority in 1994 as stipulated in the Oslo Accords and the controversial State Security 
Court in 1995 to try cases involving security issues in the WBGS, which lacked almost all due 
process rights.53 In February, 1996, the PLC passed a Basic Law that would have served as a 
constitution and limited Arafat’s powers, stipulating that presidential decrees are subject to the 
approval of the PLC. However, Arafat did not ratify the Basic Law until 2002. 
Arafat postponed indefinitely certain laws that were passed by the PLC that needed 
ratification by the president. Michele Dune, a specialist at the U.S. Department of State and White 
House on Middle East affairs, reflects on the role Palestinian leadership played in unraveling the 
promise of the Accords: “Arafat undermined the PLC from the start, refusing to sign important 
legislation and insisting on holding broad leadership meetings that blurred the separation of 
powers.”54   
Further, Palestinians grew frustrated as Israeli settlement in the WBGS accelerated after the 
signing of the Oslo Accords, particularly in Area C in the West Bank, with higher growth in the 
settlements than in Israel, which continued into the Twenty First Century. The Jewish settlement of 
Ariel in the northern West Bank is home to a competitive university, the Ariel University Center of 
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Samaria that draws thousands of students each year, with 14,000 students enrolled in 2011.55 Figure 
1 charts the expansion of the Israeli settler population in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, 
including the five-year interim period of 1994-1999.  
Figure 1: Israeli Settler Population Growth in the West Bank, Including East Jerusalem, 1987-
2004 
 
Source:  UN OCHA. The Humanitarian Impact on Palestinians of Israeli Settlements and other 
Infrastructure in the West Bank. OCHA, 2007.  
 
Figure 2 charts the Palestinian population in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and shows the 
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Figure 2: Estimated Population in the WBGS Mid-Year 1997-2004 
(In millions) 
 
Source: Palestinian National Authority: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. “Estimated 
Population in the Palestinian Territory Mid-Year by Governorate, 1997-2016,” Palestinian 
Central Bureau of Statistics.  
http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/gover_e.htm (accessed January 2, 
2013).  
 
By mid-year 2012, just over 650,000 Israelis were settled in Palestinian lands, with over 
350,000 Israelis living in the West Bank and 300,000 Israelis living in East Jerusalem in 124 
settlement communities in the West Bank and 12 settlements in East Jerusalem.56 The PA reported a 
total population of 2, 649,020 in the West Bank and 1,644,292 individuals in the Gaza Strip in June 
2012.57 Map 2 depicts Palestinian West Bank settlements and the separation barrier in June 2012. 
Israeli settlements and the surrounding area included in the settlements are indicated in blue, and are 
dispersed throughout the West Bank.  
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Map 2: Palestinian West Bank Settlements and the Separation Barrier, June 2012 
 
Source: “West Bank: Settlements and the Separation Barrier.” B’Tselem. The Israeli 
Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, June 2012. 
http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files2/201206_btselem_map_of_wb_eng.pdf (accessed 
December 3, 2012).  
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The settlement areas, along with the roads leading to them, create a disjointed grouping of 
land over which the PA has jurisdiction. The geographic placement of the settlements in the West 
Bank has resulted in the separation of Palestinians from their land and families and the creation of 
security measures such as check points. 
Although there was no explicit ban on building Israeli settlements in the Oslo Accords, the 
PLO has long argued that Israelis settlement expansion violates Article XXXI (7) of the Interim 
Agreement by physically and demographically altering the West Bank. The article reads: “[n]either 
side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.”58 Further, by transferring parts of its own 
civilian population into the territory it occupies, the GoI is violating Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. A more detailed discussion of the responsibilities of a belligerent occupying state are 
listed in Appendix A of this thesis.59 
More than 15 years after the interim the Gaza-Jericho Agreement was established, the GoI 
and the PA continue to work within the framework it established because the two sides have not 
achieved a final negotiated peace agreement. 
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Significant Events that Impacted PA State Building Efforts  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 “The Palestinian government is…employing all of its energies and available resources, most 
especially the capacities of our people, to complete the process of building institutions of the 
independent State of Palestine in order to establish a de facto state apparatus within the next two 
years. It is time now for the illegal occupation to end and for the Palestinian people to enjoy security, 
safety, freedom and independence.”60 
---Introduction to Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Events Leading to the Second Intifada   
The state building process under occupation was designed to be temporary, lasting only five 
years at which time the Palestinians would potentially gain independence. The mandate for the PA 
technically expired at the end of the five-year interim period in 1999, but it continued to function in 
the absence of a peace agreement between the GoI and the PLO. While the transitional period 
potentially could have been helpful to the nascent PA, the transitional period proved to be highly 
disappointing to all parties as parts of the Accords were not implemented, there was poor Palestinian 
leadership, and there was dissatisfaction over the content agreed to in the Accords. Some Palestinians 
began questioning whether the Oslo Framework would indeed bring about a recognized and 
independent Palestinian state. Religious ideologies began to gain popularity amongst the Palestinian 
population and some religious groups offered an alternative vision for a Palestinian state and 
supported violence to achieve those aims.  
 In July 2000, U.S. President Bill Clinton encouraged Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and 
Palestinian President Yasser Arafat to come together in an effort to work through remaining final-
status negotiation issues. With Barak up for reelection and Clinton soon leaving office, this would be 
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a final effort to save the Israeli-Palestinian peace process by the leaders of the U.S, the GoI, and the 
PLO. The leaders came together in what became known as the Camp David Summit. Barak offered 
an arrangement that would give the Palestinians a state in approximately 77% of the WBGS over the 
next 21 years, and ultimately 86% of the lands Israel captured in the 1967 war. The deal would allow 
for the GoI to annex parts of the West Bank where Israeli settlers live as well as the access roads to 
those settlements. In exchange, Israel would allow for a small swap (approximately 1% of its own 
land). The proposal also called for the demilitarization of the WBGS, allowing for three Israeli early 
warning stations in the West Bank, as well as Israeli presence at all Palestinian borders, even those 
which the state of Israel did not share. In addition, the proposal would have divided sovereignty of 
East Jerusalem between Palestinians and Israelis.  
The offer was not in line with UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 or UN General 
Assembly Resolution 181. This is especially significant because the PLO and GoI agreed that a 
resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and permanent status issues, notably Palestinian 
sovereignty, would be accomplished through official diplomatic negotiations and would be based on 
UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.61 
While the PA was willing to accept a demilitarized WBGS and agree to some land 
concessions to account for major Israeli settlements, they were overall not willing to accept the 
proposal.  They felt that the proposal would have compromised their land rights as secured by UN 
resolutions and instead called for a Palestinian state that would include all of the West Bank, Gaza 
Strip and East Jerusalem, along with a right of return for Palestinian refugees or compensation in lieu 
of return.62 By the end of the summit on July 25 2000, the GoI and PLO did not reach a peace 
agreement and, consequently, Palestinians did not achieve recognition of an independent State of 
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Palestine. This outcome was perceived as a major defeat or victory for various actors in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. 
 Following the summit, frustrations soared: both sides accused the other of failure to follow 
through on the elements and timetable stipulated in the Accords. Violence replaced hope with the 
outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000. The Second Intifada was characterized by 
Palestinian protests and rioting and violence between the Israeli Defense Forces and Palestinians.63  
The Second Intifada, Peace Attempts, and the Evolution of the PA 
With progress towards a negotiated peace agreement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict stalled 
and increasing media coverage of the brutalities of war, in 2002 the world became more actively 
involved in an effort to bring both parties back to negotiations. Arab leaders presented a plan called 
the Saudi Peace Initiative, which was adopted by the Arab League on March 28, 2002. The plan 
recognized the legitimacy of Israel and its right to live in peace amidst its neighbors and promised 
peace and security to Israel in exchange for withdrawing from the WBGS, the creation of an 
independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and the return of Palestinian 
refugees. The plan was not adopted by Israel, but the plan was incorporated or acknowledged in 
subsequent peace plans such as the Quartet for the Middle East’s Roadmap for Peace and Barak 
Obama’s peace policy.64  
In the midst of the Second Intifada, the U.S. for the first time offered explicit support for the 
creation of a Palestinian state. Comprised of the U.S., EU, Russia and the UN, in 2002, the Quartet 
on the Middle East was formed, and in 2003 it revealed the “roadmap for peace,” a plan to resolve 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to bring about an internationally recognized and independent 
Palestinian state by 2005. The plan called for the PA to reject violence and to make democratic 
reforms, and for Israel to end the practice of establishing and growing settlements and accept a 
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reformed Palestinian government as a negotiating partner. Despite some significant reservations by 
the GoI and the PA, both parties endorsed the plan in 2003.65 In March 2003, in part to implement 
the “Roadmap to Peace” and in part ceding to American pressure, the PA implemented a series of 
reforms, which included creating the post of prime minister.66 Arafat appointed Mahmoud Abbas to 
serve as the first Palestinian prime minister. However, despite a stated commitment to the Road Map 
for Peace, the Second Intifada continued.  
There were some similarities between Arafat and the new Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas 
as both were founding members of Fatah and both had long been leaders within the PLO. Abbas, 
however, was different from Arafat in critical ways. Abbas earned a Ph.D in History from Oriental 
College in Moscow, whereas Arafat earned a civil engineering degree from Cairo University in 
Cairo, Egypt. Abbas was viewed as a pragmatist by the West and proved to be genuinely committed 
to reforming the PA, whereas many of Arafat’s actions were corrupt and he allowed and endorsed 
violence, despite a public commitment to nonviolence as president of the PA. Abbas’ appointment as 
prime minister was supported by the West, but he stepped down in less than a year due to power-
sharing struggles with Arafat. Upon Arafat’s death on November 11, 2004, Mahmoud Abbas took his 
place as chairman of the PLO’s Executive Committee.67  
In January 2005, Palestinians held elections, which Hamas and Islamic Jihad again 
boycotted, and Abbas was elected as the president of the PA. Abbas had run on a platform of 
nonviolence and promoted negotiations with Israel to end the occupation and to bring about an 
independent State of Palestine.68 Shortly after taking office, he helped bring an end to the Second 
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Intifada. Some Palestinians once again hoped that diplomatic negotiations with Israel would bring 
about a secular, democratic, independent and internationally recognized Palestinian state.69  
The rise of Mahmoud Abbas within the PLO and the PA ushered in a new type of Palestinian 
leadership. Abbas immediately set out to reform the PA, strengthen Palestinian institutions, and 
engage diplomatically with Israel to improve living conditions for Palestinians and to advance 
Palestinian goals. 
In August and September 2005, Israel enacted a unilateral disengagement plan that was 
outside of the parameters of the larger Road Map for Peace. In the Gaza Strip, Israeli Defense Forces 
left and Israeli citizens were evicted by the GoI. In the West Bank, four West Bank settlements were 
evicted by the GoI, while others remained or were soon added. While Israel ended its administration 
in Gaza in 2005 and declared it was no longer occupying the Gaza Strip, it maintained control over 
its borders, including the border with Egypt, along with its maritime and airspace, and import and 
export policy as granted by Oslo provisions. Therefore, the United Nations Security Council, along 
with some countries and humanitarian organizations continued to consider the Gaza Strip occupied 
by Israel.70 The PA initially welcomed the withdrawal, with hopes it would lead to Palestinian 
sovereignty.71 With Israeli promises of an easing of restrictions on Gazans, the PA cooperated 
throughout the disengagement and ensured it was peaceful. Two months after the withdrawal, Abbas’ 
attitude towards it shifted. He remarked: “We were told that our behavior would be a “test,” and that 
if we did our part, Israel would reciprocate by allowing Gazans to breathe the air of freedom and 
begin rebuilding their shattered lives. Yet, this has not happened: Gaza’s airport and crossing point to 
Egypt remain closed; its waters are off-limits to our fishermen; its borders are completely sealed and 
movement into or out of Gaza is virtually impossible; and no safe passage between Gaza and the 
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West Bank exists. Because investors rightly fear that without access to the outside world, Gazans will 
not be able to rebuild a functioning economy, they have been slow at investing.”72  
There was a marked decline in the number of mortars fired into Israel in 2005 though the 
number accelerated significantly in 2006, with estimates ranging from 968 to 1123 fired, and 
between four and nine individuals killed from the rockets and mortars that year.73 Table 2 provides 
estimates of the number of rockets and mortars fired from Gaza by year and the number of associated 
fatalities. 
Table 2: Number of rockets and mortar attacks from Gaza, by year, and associated fatalities 
Year 
IDF reported  
no. 
rockets/mortars  
fired from Gaza 
ITIC reported  
no. 
rockets/mortars 











2001 510 249 --   -- 
2002 661 292  --  -- 
2003 848 420  --  -- 
2004 1528 1157  -- -- 
2005 488 417  --  -- 
2006 1123 968 9 4 
2007 2427 1536 10 2 
2008 3278 2471 15 8 
2009 774 266 2 0 
2010 231 156 5 1 
2011 627  -- 3 2 
2012 1197+  -- --   -- 
          Source: (Nguyen 2012) 
 
A Palestinian Vision Splintered: Hamas and Fatah 
Islamist groups grew in popularity amongst Palestinians during the Intifadas. In 2006, after 
many years of boycotting Palestinian elections, the Islamic group Hamas decided to participate in 
PLC elections, posing a significant threat to the PLO and Fatah-dominated PA and their plans for a 
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two-state solution to the conflict. Despite less campaigning due to Israeli detentions of candidates, 
Hamas won a majority of the seats —76 out of 132—potentially ending decades of Fatah rule.74 
Officials and observers deemed the elections, peaceful, free, and fair.75 Foreign Policy took the 
praise a step further, stating the elections were “one of the freest and fairest elections ever conducted 
in the Middle East.”76  
Under Fatah leadership, by the Twenty-First Century, Palestinians had participated in two 
major conflicts (the Intifadas) and endured nearly 40 years of Israeli-occupation. It seemed as if 
Fatah had failed the Palestinian people. Hamas strongly opposed Fatah policies and offered what 
seemed a viable alternative leadership to the Palestinian people. Mandy Turner, Lecturer in Conflict 
Resolution at the University of Bradford, provided an analysis of the popularity of Hamas: “As 
Hamas stepped into the political arena, it was able to capitalize on the lack of peace process and 
growing disenchantment with Fatah, the ruling party, based on perceptions that Fatah was both 
corrupt and too willing to bend to the needs of Israel and the U.S. Hamas, as well as campaigning 
against the Oslo Accords and (for) a tougher stance towards Israel, also campaigned for transparency 
and ‘good governance’ on a ‘Change and Reform’ platform.”77  
The international community reacted swiftly to oppose the democratically elected Hamas 
members to the PLC. Mandy Turner states: “The Quartet demanded that the new Hamas-led 
government renounce violence, accept all previous agreements and recognize Israel,” which it 
refused to do. Turner outlines the rationale of Hamas: “Hamas believed the result gave it a mandate 
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to change the PA to reflect the needs of Palestinians in the post-Oslo era and to renegotiate previous 
agreements. Both the U.S. and the EU acknowledged that the elections had been free and fair, but 
decided that Hamas must renounce the platform upon which it had fought the election, or be isolated 
and eventually overthrown.”78   
When Hamas did not meet the Quartet’s demands, the donor community suspended foreign 
aid and loans to the PA (though some funds were shifted to Palestinian NGOs). Israel’s reactions to 
the election proved devastating to the PA. It withheld Palestinian VAT and border clearance revenues 
from the PA, in violation of the Paris Protocol on Economic Relations and it intensified attacks on 
members of Hamas.79 
Within the WBGS, election results initiated conflict between Fatah and Hamas, known as the 
Palestinian Civil War, and also between Hamas and Israel. The conflict included political and 
military actions over roles and powers within the PA and its institutions. In June 2006, the conflict 
between Israel and Hamas escalated, and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) arrested eight PA cabinet 
ministers and about 40 Hamas PLC legislators, along with some legislators from other factions, 
including PLC speaker Aziz Dweik. Michele Dunne, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, writes: “Without its majority in the body, and with speaker Aziz Dweik 
imprisoned, Hamas would not call the PLC into session. Fatah and its allies did not possess the 70-
seat quorum required to convene without Hamas.”80 The PLC, therefore, was unable to convene and 
was unable to pass laws and to approve political appointments, so Abbas disbanded the PLC and 
began ruling by presidential decree.81   
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In an effort to end the growing schism between Fatah and Hamas, in March 2007 both sides 
agreed to form a national unity government. Despite the creation of a Hamas-led unity government, 
donors continued to boycott the PA because of Hamas’ role in it.82   
Fighting between Fatah and Hamas members escalated in June 2007, and Hamas violently 
ousted Fatah forces in the Gaza Strip, seizing full control of the territory. President Abbas called the 
action a coup and reacted by dissolving the unity government and declaring a state of emergency. He 
dismissed Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh and replaced him with Salam Fayyad. Fayyad was a Third 
Way party member, which was not affiliated with Fatah or Hamas. Abbas tasked Fayyad with 
forming an interim PA caretaker government in Ramallah, including ministers that were not affiliated 
with Hamas or Fatah. Abbas promised to hold parliamentary elections as soon as circumstances 
permitted. As Fayyad began governing the Fatah-controlled areas of the West Bank, Haniya 
continued to govern in the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, creating a situation in which parallel 
governments both claimed constitutional legitimacy.83 The two different governance models resulted 
in different development paths for the WBGS and a severed vision for Palestinian statehood.84   
Some people have questioned the legitimacy of President Abbas’s actions. The Palestinian 
Basic Law provides guidance on these matters. While the Basic Law gives the president the right to 
declare a state of emergency and dismiss the prime minister, a state of emergency is only permitted 
to last for up to 30 days, and can only be extended for another 30 days if two-thirds of the PLC vote 
in favor of the extension. The PLC was not in operation, so the state of emergency and decrees issued 
were not approved.85  Since the PLC has not been in operation, it has not had the opportunity to 
                                                 
82
 (DeVoir and Tartir 2009, 9) 
83
 (Turner 2009, 562) 
Brown, Nathan. What Can Abu Mazin Do?. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007.  
84
 Zanotti, Jim. US Foreign Aid to the Palestinians. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, 2010. 
85
 Article 45 of the Basic Law states: The President of the National Authority shall have the right, in cases of 
necessity that cannot be delayed, and when the Legislative Council is not in session, to issue decrees that have the 
power of law. These decrees shall be presented to the Legislative Council in the first session convened after their 
36 
 
consider Salam Fayyad’s appointment as prime minister during the state of emergency and many 
PLC members continue to recognize Haniyeh as the legitimate prime minister.86  
Nathan Brown, Professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at Washington 
University, noted that the establishment of a caretaker government “would have to receive the 
support of an absolute majority of deputies (not just a majority of those voting) according to Article 
67[of the Basic Law].”87 Subsequently, ministerial offices were established in Ramallah, separate 
from those already established in Gaza.88   
The actions of Hamas were also contentious. Brown pointed out that the Hamas takeover of 
the Gaza Strip was illegal because it used its armed wing instead of the Palestinian Security Forces it 
controlled.89 
Despite the controversial method in which Fayyad came into power, the PA gained 
legitimacy and wide international support for its reform agenda. Israel, Fatah, Western governments, 
and international financial institutions supported Abbas’ actions. Foreign governments reacted by 
removing financial sanctions, lifting the boycott, and resuming aid to the caretaker government in the 
West Bank. Abbas refocused PA reform and development initiatives primarily in West Bank 
institutions within Area A and B, where the PA maintained partial or full jurisdiction.  
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Aside from allowing some humanitarian aid, the international community increased the 
intensity of the boycott and sanctions on the Hamas-led government in the Gaza Strip. Israel and 
Egypt imposed a land, air, and sea blockade of goods into and out of the Gaza Strip, with Israel 
closing five border crossings and Egypt closing its Rafah border crossing.90 Hamas secured 
alternative funding sources, primarily through Islamic charity organizations and Iran.91 Mandy 
Turner reflects on the international community’s reaction to the situation, saying: “Giving preference 
to President Abbas and the technocrats in Ramallah over the elected Hamas government was the only 
way in which the EU and the World Bank could disburse money without running afoul of U.S. anti-
terror legislation...Hamas was thus left with a dysfunctional PA apparatus in Gaza severed from a 
semi-functioning PA apparatus in the West Bank."92   
 The two different governments for the West Bank and Gaza Strip have resulted in different 
development paths. Within the West Bank, large sums of external assistance and technical assistance 
by international financial institutions, the caretaker government undertook a serious state building 
effort, exclusively in the West Bank. This effort has resulted in some notable institutional reforms 
and economic progress. Conditions have been very different in the Gaza Strip under the Israeli-
Egyptian blockade and Hamas rule, though Egypt partially opened its border with the Gaza Strip in 
May 2011. 93  There have long been hundreds of underground tunnels into the Gaza Strip from Egypt, 
many of which have been used for smuggling goods, people, and weapons and at times, Egypt and 
Israel have attempted to close them.94  
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Soon after Hamas began ruling in the Gaza Strip, Hamas’s military wing increased attacks on 
Israel and in December 2008, the Gaza War broke out. Also known as known as Operation Cast 
Lead, it consisted of a three-week air strike by Israel and hundreds of rocket attacks on Israel from 
Hamas’ military wing, causing immense destruction and loss of lives.95  
Hamas did not bring about the progress it promised during the 2006 elections. In December 
2011, Columbia University Professor Rashid Khalidi reflected on Hamas’ governance in the Gaza 
Strip: “If you look at the polls from Gaza you can see that governing doesn’t do good for a lot of 
these people. It’s perfectly fine to come in with a slogan that “Islam is the solution”, but try to solve a 
housing crisis, or infrastructure, or unemployment, with “Islam is the solution.” Well, Hamas didn’t 
do very well with some of these issues.”96 
Palestinians recognize the damage the divide between Hamas and Fatah has caused. 
Palestinians refer to the conflict, which was most intense during 2007, as “Wakseh,” meaning self-
inflicted humiliation and there is popular support for reconciliation.97 Many efforts have been made 
to bring together the two parties including Egyptian-brokered talks between the parties in 2007 and 
2009, but true reconciliation has not been achieved.98  
In January 2009, PA President Mahmoud Abbas’s term officially expired and elections were 
not held. Hamas argued that the expiration of Abbas’s gave him no constitutional authority to call for 
elections, which he did in 2010 and 2011, to which Hamas responded “that elections can only be held 
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under ‘national accord,’ under which the two sides agree to share control of Palestinian-ruled 
areas.”99  
Over the past few years, Hamas has at times shown signs of moderation. The most notable 
change was a cease fire agreement with the West Bank and Israel in January 2009, which resulted in 
varied success. Hamas subsequently took action to arrest its own militants and other militants 
engaged in firing rockets at Israel. Table 2 showed a sharp reduction in rockets and mortars fired into 
Israel from 2008 to 2009 and from 2009 to 2010. This decision was challenged domestically, 
particularly by Islamic Jihad militants. Further, Hamas leadership decided to focus on countering the 
occupation through popular resistance, a nonviolent struggle in place of a violent struggle. Following 
signs of moderation in 2009 and 2010, by late 2010 Hamas militants increased mortars and rockets 
into Israel, continuing into 2012, culminating an intense eight-day  breakout of violence, with intense 
Israeli airstrikes and a barrage or Hamas rockets fired at Israel.100 
 Amongst Palestinians, there is widespread support for Hamas and Fatah to reconcile. Like 
other governing bodies across the Middle East, the PA felt the pressure of the Arab Spring as 
Palestinians joined the movements across the Middle East, calling on their leaders to reconcile.101 In 
March 2011, The Economist reported: “Palestinians in both territories have been crying for 
‘revolution until we end the division’.”102 Mouin Rabbani, a Policy Advisor at the Palestinian think 
tank Al-Shabaka, suggested that a revival of the Palestinian national movement will require 
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reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah based on a common political program and democratic 
engagement of sectors of the Palestinian people that have been excluded.103 
In May 2011, Palestinians achieved a reconciliation deal in Cairo, in effect bringing an end to 
the internal conflict. Mediated by Egypt, Hamas and the smaller militant group Islamic Jihad began 
taking steps to join the PLO. In 2012, Hamas and Fatah agreed to form a joint caretaker government 
and to hold elections in 2012. A May 2011 Palestinian Center for Public Opinion poll revealed that 
“79.7%  [of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip] support the reconciliation agreement that 
was signed in Cairo.”104 The reconciliation deal did not in fact lead to a joint caretaker government or 
elections.  
Notably, acceptance into the PLO necessitates that Hamas renounce violent resistance and 
instead, adopt peaceful resistance and a truce with Israel. Acceptance to the PLO would mean that 
Hamas would have to adopt the two-state solution model, recognize Israel and agree to the political 
program of the PLO.  
Hamas’ indication that it wants to join the PLO has likely been influenced by a power shift in 
the Middle East due to the Arab Spring. Historically, Hamas leaders, the Syrian government and 
Iranian government have been strong allies. Iran has admitted to supplying money and weapons to 
Hamas. However, the Arab Spring lessened Iran’s influence and support for Hamas, and empowered 
Hamas’s parent group, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Hamas reacted strongly to the Syrian 
government’s role and brutality toward Sunni Muslims during the 2011 to 2013 civil war and it 
moved its Damascus headquarters to Qatar and Egypt.105 Further, Hamas indicated it would not join a 
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war on Israel should one start between Iran and Israel. Hamas’ lack of support of Syria has caused a 
rift between Hamas and Iran, and in August 2011, Iran reduced its funding to Hamas.106  
Members of Hamas have accused Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad of supporting 
Israel’s blockade of the Gaza Strip. His polarizing effect on members of Hamas, coupled with attacks 
by political rivals within the caretaker government could threaten the chances for Palestinian unity. 
Fayyad has recognized the situation and suggested that he would step down as prime minister to 
facilitate the reconciliation process. In November 2011, Fayyad remarked to the Al-Quds newspaper, 
“I call upon all factions and political parties to agree on a new prime minister. I was never an 
obstacle to the implementation of the reconciliation and I refuse to be used as a pretext for continuing 
the split.”107 
 In March 2012, the Hamas prime minister in Gaza, Ismail Haniya, initiated talks with the 
Central Elections Commission, indicating it intended to join the PLO. Palestinian President 
Mahmoud Abbas allowed the commission to operate in Gaza, as a stipulation in a power-sharing 
agreement between Hamas and Fatah. The commission began working to register up to 250,000 
eligible voters so that an election could take place and a power-sharing government between Fatah 
and Hamas could be formed.108 Abbas indicated that with a power-sharing government, the status 
quo would largely continue, with Hamas retaining control in the Gaza Strip as long as it adhered to a 
cease-fire with Israel.109 
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 These steps by Hamas and Fatah leaders were met by resistance by some of the members of 
their parties, particularly in their respective security forces, which have been integral to arresting 
members of the opposing party.110 Nonetheless, concrete steps have been taken towards moderating 
Hamas and reconciling Fatah and Hamas.  
The possibility of a true reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas and the acceptance of 
Hamas into the PLO is highly controversial in the international community. Some governments, such 
as the GoI, view the reconciliation and acceptance of Hamas as a threat to Israeli security.111 
Introducing a New State Building Initiative 
In 2007, faced with a dysfunctional institutional framework and years of economic 
retrogression, leaders in the PA set out to reform the social, political, and economic conditions in the 
West Bank. According to the PA: “In 2007, Palestine faced a major socio-economic crisis. The 
economy had virtually collapsed, with per capita GDP declining by more than one-third in real terms 
from 1999 to 2007. The government budget deficit was running at 24% of GDP while accumulated 
debts to public employees and private sector suppliers exceeded US$1.3 billion. Government sector 
strikes protesting the non-payment of salaries disrupted education and health services. Shattered 
business confidence suffocated private sector investment and capital formation, and human and 
capital flight was witnessed throughout occupied Palestine.”112  
Under the guidance of President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, the PA 
introduced reform plans intended to strengthen government institutions and to bring security and 
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prosperity to its citizens and to Israel. The PA, with support and assistance from international and 
bilateral institutions, especially the IMF and the United Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development, developed plans to restore good governance, the rule of law, and socio-economic 
stability and ultimately, establish a recognized independent democratic Palestinian state that would 
encompass the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. The plans the PA produced include the 
Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (2008), Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State 
(2009), Homestretch to Freedom (2010), and Establishing the State, Building our Future (2011).113 
In particular, when the PA presented its 2008 plan to the international development partners in Paris 
in 2007, it received widespread financial backing.114 Notably, Israel and the U.S. supported these 
initiatives through large contributions of financial aid and technical assistance.  
 American journalist, columnist and author Thomas Friedman is one of many individuals and 
institutions that gave credit to Fayyad for his strong role in the reform efforts, noting that the reforms 
outlined in the plan are remarkably transparent, a characteristic largely unique in the Arab world. 
Friedman coined the term “Fayyadism,” explaining: “Fayyadism is based on the simple but all-too-
rare notion that an Arab leader’s legitimacy should be based not on slogans or rejectionism or 
personality cults or security services, but on delivering transparent, accountable administration and 
services.”115  
The 2008 Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) outlined the PA’s policy goals 
of advancing safety and security, good governance, increasing national prosperity, and enhancing the 
quality of life. While the plan suggests that the full potential of the Palestinian private sector can only 
be realized by the lifting of Israeli-imposed restrictions on the movement of Palestinian goods and 
                                                 
113
 An outline of the reforms for Palestinian Reform and Development Plan 2008-2010 in the security, justice and 
economic sectors are included in Appendix E.  
114
 Palestinian National Authority. Palestinian Reform and Development Plan: 2008-2010. Palestinian National 
Authority, 2008.   
115
 Friedman, Thomas. "Green Shoots in Palestine," The New York Times. August 4, 2009. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/opinion/05friedman.html (accessed 
August 1, 2009). 
44 
 
people, the plan outlines policies that would promote a private-sector led approach to growth. The 
2009 Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State plan builds on the PRDP, further challenging the 
PA to establish a recognized and independent Palestinian state within two years. The ultimate goal of 
the implementation of the 2009 plan follows: “The supreme goal of the national liberation cause…is 
to end the occupation, establish a sovereign and independent state on the 1967 borders with 
Jerusalem as its capital, and reach a just and agreed solution for Palestinian refugees in accordance 
with relevant international resolutions, and UN General Assembly Resolution 194 in particular.”116  
The following chapters will include an analysis of the PA’s 2009-2011 Ending the 
Occupation, Establishing the State plan. The analysis will focus on goals relating to security, justice 
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Analyzing the Palestinian Judicial Sector  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
“The current development in the Judicial Authority would not have been achieved without the 
support the Palestinian National Authority received from donors who delivered assistance that is in 
line with the needs of the judiciary.”117 
--- Chief Justice, Judge Issa Abu-Sharar 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
This chapter includes an overview of the establishment of the Palestinian judicial system as 
stipulated in the Oslo Accords and subsequent developments. The PA’s judicial objectives as laid out 
in PA’s 2009-2011 Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State plan are presented and analyzed. 
Achievements and shortcomings of the judicial goals are assessed and suggestions for further judicial 
reforms are included. 
Building the Palestinian Judicial System 
President Yasser Arafat’s first presidential decree on May 20, 1994 was to recognize all 
legislation prior to June 5, 1967 as valid in Palestine, many of which were unique to the West Bank 
or Gaza Strip and subsequently, laws have been passed in an effort to unify the laws between the 
territories.118 The Palestinian judicial system was established in accordance with stipulations in the 
Oslo Accords and further legislation was introduced that would apply in both the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. Between 1996 and 2002, the PLC passed more than 80 new laws.119  The courts 
functioned simultaneously with longstanding Shari’a courts.120 
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Annex III of the May 4, 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement concerns legal matters and provides 
the basis of the Palestinian judiciary. The main purpose of Annex III was to transfer legal jurisdiction 
to the PA in areas of its control. Annex III provides specific arrangements for exercising jurisdiction 
in criminal and civil matters. The key points of Annex III are listed in Table 3. 
Table 3: Key Points of Annex III Concerning Legal Matters of Gaza-Jericho Agreement 
 
Key Points of Annex III 
The jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority covers all criminal offenses committed in the areas 
under its territorial jurisdiction. 
Israel has sole criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed in the settlements and the Military 
Installation Area, and over offenses committed throughout the Gaza-Jericho area by Israelis. 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority shall cooperate and provide each other with legal assistance in 
criminal matters including the exchange of information, records of criminal suspects, vehicle 
ownership registration, and the like. 
Both Israel and the Palestinian Authority may ask for a transfer of suspects or defendants that fall 
under their jurisdiction. 
The Palestinian courts and judicial authorities have jurisdiction in all civil matters. 
The Palestinians have no jurisdiction over civil actions in which an Israeli is a party unless that action 
relates to property in the autonomous area, or an ongoing Israeli business located in the autonomous 
area, or the Israeli in question has consented to such jurisdiction. 
Source: “Main Points of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement.” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. May 4, 1994. 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Main%20Points%20of%
20Gaza-Jericho%20Agremeent (accessed December 7, 2012).  
 
The nascent Palestinian judicial system largely performed poorly during the 1990s, marked 
by unfair trials and a lack of enforcement of court decisions. While the Minister of Justice and the 
attorney-general had the right to give orders to security forces, the security forces often did not carry 
out the orders. This lack of an effective formal justice system brought about an underground, 
informal judicial system.121  
Many Palestinians did not use the court system in the 1990s and dealt with matters 
themselves due to its severe inadequacies. However, as the PA slowly implemented reforms in the 
judicial sector, public perception toward the judiciary gradually improved.  In the early twenty-first 
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century, significant pieces of legislation were produced that inched the PA closer to creating the 
foundation for the rule of law.122  
One of the most important milestones in developing a stable government is establishing rules 
of law, primarily a constitution that establishes the rights of the people and of the powers of 
government. When the PLC was formed in 1996, it refused to adopt the Basic Law that the PLO had 
drafted, which clearly reflected the PLO’s desire to preserve its powers. According to article IX 
(1)(2) of the Declaration of Principles, the PLC was given the power “to legislate, in accordance with 
the Interim Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it.” Accordingly, the PLC produced its 
own Basic Law in 1997. While the PLC’s drafted basic laws were similarly shaped by various 
political interests, they established the institutions of a Palestinian state and placed limitations on the 
powers of the PA executive office. 
Arafat showed reluctance to cede powers to an independent elected assembly and refrained 
from ratifying the Basic Law until Palestinian and international pressure compelled him to do so in 
2002.123 In 2003 the political system was changed to introduce a prime minister. In 2005 the Basic 
Law was amended to conform to the new Election Law.124 The Palestinian Basic Law serves as the 
PA’s temporary constitution regulating functions in the WBGS and is the most important piece of 
Palestinian legislation that governs the Palestinian judiciary.125 The Basic Law established Jerusalem 
as the Palestinian capital, declared Islam as the official religion, and identified Arabic as the official 
language in Palestine. The Basic Law called for the protection of basic human rights and liberties for 
individuals, and called for the PA to become party to international declarations and covenants that 
protect human rights.  In order to further protect citizens’ rights, the Basic Law stipulated that it was 
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unlawful to arrest, search, imprison, restrict the freedom, or prevent the movement of any person, 
except by judicial order.126 
One of the salient features of the Palestinian Basic Law was that it established new roles 
within the judiciary, and called for a separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and 
judiciary branches of government. Figure 2 displays the hierarchical Palestinian governance structure 
as it exists today, which is largely shaped by the Palestinian Basic Law.  
Figure 2: Palestinian Governance Structure 
 
 
     Source: (Arab Political Systems: Palestine n.d.) 
Table 4 lists the components of the Palestinian executive branch, including the roles of 
president, prime minister and council of ministers, along with their key responsibilities as stipulated 
by the Basic Law. 
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Table 4: Palestinian Executive Branch 
 
President Prime Minister Council of Ministers 
Is an elected official who appoints 
and dismisses the prime minister. 
Is appointed by the president and the 
appointment does not require 
ratification by PLC. 
Is appointed by the prime minister in 
consultation with the president. 
Initiates and proposes laws to the 
PLC. 
Forms the cabinet in consultation 
with the president. 
Must receive a vote of confidence 
from the PLC. 
Can veto legislation within 30 days 
of its adoption by the PLC. 
 Proposes laws, issues regulations, 
and takes the necessary actions to 
execute laws. 
Appoints and dismisses the prime 
minister. 
 Controls the security services, while 
acknowledging the president’s role 
as “commander in chief.” 
Is the commander in chief of the 
armed forces. 
 Prepares the general budget to be 
presented to the PLC. 
May declare a state of emergency 
that cannot last longer than 30 days. 
The state of emergency may be 
extended another 30 days with 
approval of the PLC. During a state 
of emergency, basic rights may not 
be infringed and the legislature may 
not be suspended. 
  
Serves a four-year term and cannot 
be elected for more than two 
consecutive terms. The president 
could only be removed by death, 
resignation, or a determination of 
incompetence by a ruling of the 
High Constitutional Court along 
with a two-thirds majority of the 
PLC. 
  
Is replaced by the speaker of the 
PLC for a maximum of 60 days in 
case of death, resignation, or 
incompetence. 
  
May issue decrees with the force of 
law in exceptional circumstances 
while the PLC is not in session, 
which are subject to the approval of 
the PLC when it convenes. 
  
Initiates and proposes laws to the 
PLC. 
  
Can veto legislation within 30 days 
of its adoption by the PLC. 
  
Source: (Arab Political Systems: Palestine n.d.) 
 
Table 5 lists the key responsibilities of the Palestinian legislative branch, specifically the PLC 
as stipulated by the Palestinian Basic Law. When in session, the PLC complained of being 
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marginalized by the executive authority. However, following Arafat's death, the PLC reinvigorated 
its activity, and commonly summoned senior executive officials to testify before it.127  
Table 5: Palestinian Legislative Branch Key Responsibilities 
 
Palestinian Legislative Council 
Is made up of 132 members elected to five-year terms, and the president serves as a member of the Council. 
Initiates and passes legislation. 
Can overturn a presidential veto of its proposed legislation by a two-thirds vote. 
Can amend the Basic Law with a two-thirds vote. 
Confirms or rejects the prime minister upon nomination by the president and approves the PA’s budget. 
Confirms or rejects all government cabinet positions proposed by the prime minister. A no-confidence motion can 
be proposed by the prime minister or by at least ten members of the council. 
Can question ministers but not the president of the PA. 
Cannot be dissolved during a state of emergency. 
Has two ordinary sessions every year, that lasts no longer than three months. 
Takes decisions by a simple majority of the members present, except as otherwise noted. 
Sources: (Arab Political Systems: Palestine n.d.) 
 
Table 6 lists the key responsibilities of the Palestinian judiciary as stipulated by the 
Palestinian Basic Law.  
Table 6: Palestinian Judiciary Key Responsibilities 
Judiciary Council Courts 
The High Judicial Council exercises significant authority 
over the judiciary. It reviews policies regarding the 
structure and function of the judiciary, and appoints, 
promotes, and transfers judges. 
Courts of Appeal review cases that have been decided by 
a lower court of law. Petitions may be made to a higher 
court for the purpose of overturning the lower court's 
decision.  
 District Courts are multi-judge courts that hear more 
serious civil and criminal matters, as well as appeals to 
judgments of the Magistrate Courts. 
 Magistrate Courts are single-judge courts that hear 
minor civil and criminal matters. 
 The Supreme Court is composed of two departments: a 
Court of Cassation that serves as the final court of 
appeals for civil, criminal, and commercial matters and a 
High Court of Justice for administrative disputes. 
 Military courts have jurisdiction over police and security 
force personnel and crimes by civilians against PSF. 
128
 
 Shari'a courts operate for Muslims and other Palestinian 
religious communities have their own courts.
129
 
Sources: (Arab Political Systems: Palestine n.d.) 
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The Palestinian Basic Law established that Palestine is a parliamentary democracy built on 
the separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. The Basic Law 
provided the framework for the judiciary, calling for the creation of a High Judicial Council (HJC) 
and a High Constitutional Court. The High Constitutional Court is more commonly referred to as the 
High Court and has the authority to review laws and to determine their constitutionality. In 2000 the 
HJC took over judicial matters formerly administered by the PA Ministry of Justice (MoJ).130 Table 6 
shows that the HJC exercises significant authority over the judiciary. It reviews policies regarding the 
structure and function of the judiciary, and appoints, promotes, trains, and transfers judges. 
In addition to allowing for administrative courts, the Basic Law also enabled Shari’a Courts 
for Muslims and religious courts to continue to operate, particularly to handle family matters by 
Palestinians who prefer Shari’a courts.131 While secular groups had originally lobbied for no mention 
of Shari’a Law, the Basic Law established that the principles of Islamic Shari’a Law would be a 
source of legislation. It also established military courts to handle military affairs involving police and 
security force personnel. The Basic Law established that all governmental bodies and individuals 
would be subject to the rule of law and every Palestinian should have the right to access the judicial 
system.132  
Nathan Brown praises the Basic Law as one of the most liberal constitutional documents in 
Arab history.133 While the Basic Law inched Palestine closer to the rule of law and separation of 
powers, there have been a plethora of setbacks along the way. For instance, while the Basic Law 
called for the implementation of judiciary rulings, the judiciary has experienced regular interference 
by the executive branch, which has been slow to accept the powers given to the judiciary and often 
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has not respected High Court rulings. Furthermore, Palestinian security agencies have often been 
reluctant to enforce High Court rulings.134  
Additional important legislation relating to the judiciary the PA passed includes the Law of 
the Formation of Civil Courts of 2001 and the 2005 Law on Illicit Gains.135 The Judicial Authority 
Law (JAL) of 2002 was also an important piece of legislation as it “regulated the Palestinian judicial 
system, including magistrate, first instance, appeal, and high courts as well as the office of the 
attorney general.” Further, it gave the High Justice Court the power to nominate judges for 
appointment to the judiciary.136 Controversy erupted in 2005 when the President amended the JAL by 
presidential decree. The changes in the JAL would have changed the composition of the HJC and the 
appointment procedure for the attorney general, and ultimately, would reduce the power of the 
judicial council and transfer powers to the MoJ, which would have administrative authority over the 
judiciary.  The changes, however, did not go into place as the Palestinian High Court responded by 
overturning the presidential decree in question in its capacity as Constitutional Court.137   
Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State Judiciary Objectives 
The PA recognized the weaknesses of the judiciary and in July 2009 hosted a United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID)-funded training conference held in Bethlehem on 
the theme “Towards an Independent Judicial Authority.” More than 130 judges from the various 
courts in the West Bank and three High Court judges from the Gaza Strip took part in this 
educational conference. Against the backdrop of a struggling judiciary, the PA released Ending the 
                                                 
134
 (Transparency International 2009) 
135
 Milhem, Feras, and Jamil Salem. “Building the Rule of Law in Palestine: Rule of law without freedom.” In 
International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A rights-based approach to Middle East peace, edited by 
Susan M. Akram, Michael Dumper, Michael Lyk and Iain Scobbie, 253-275. New York, New York: Routledge, 
2011, 257, 265. 
136
 (Jamal 2001) 
137
 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Confusion in Fatah after Primaries, Final Round of Palestinian 
Municiple Elections, Judicial Law Overturned.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. December 20, 2005. 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2008/08/20/confusion-in-fatah-after-primaries-final-round-of-palestinian-
municipal-elections-judicial-law-overturned/6dp2 (accessed November 4, 2012).  
(Milhem and Salem 2011, 257-258) 
53 
 
Occupation, Establishing the State in August 2009, with plans to make the judiciary more 
independent and impartial. Further, the PA sought to protect citizens’ fundamental rights and 
freedoms, as well as enhance justice sector performance through the implementation of the plan. 
The plan includes reforms in the civil and criminal justice areas, as a part of an overall effort 
to reform Palestinian governance. The PA outlined its aims relating to civil and criminal justice in the 
plan, stating: “the Government will develop and consolidate (the) civil and criminal justice system 
(by) bolstering the principle of the separation of powers, building capacities of human resources 
within the judiciary, police, and civil defence [sic], enacting modern legislation, and providing 
appropriate infrastructure to ensure enhanced performance.” 138 In the plan, the PA outlined specific 
objectives for the MoJ that would protect citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms and enhance 
justice sector performance. Table 7 outlines these objectives. 
Table 7: PA Ministry of Justice Reform Goals for 2009-2011 
 
Protect citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms Enhance justice sector performance 
Developing, in cooperation with all relevant public 
institutions, an integrated civil and criminal legal 
framework which safeguards separation of powers and 
ensures the integrated operation of all sector institutions. 
Supporting the development of specialization in the 
justice sector, developing specialist courts and 
specialized staff in fields of commercial disputes, labour, 
etc. 
Developing the forensic medicine capacity. Supporting continuing education through the Palestinian 
Judicial Institute. 
Contributing to developing and rejuvenating the Bureau 




Constructing justice facilities, including courthouses and 
public prosecution offices, throughout governorates. 
Monitoring administrative performance in prisons to 
safeguard human rights. 
Supporting computerization in the justice sector, 
including the police, public prosecution and courts. 
Developing and implementing legal aid programs for 
citizens who are incapable of defending themselves for 
financial reasons. 
Supporting the development of professional capacities, 
including members of the public prosecution service and 
judges. 
Following up on the execution of court judgments.  
Source: (Palestinian National Authority 2009) 
 
Judiciary Plan Results 
The World Bank provided a positive assessment of the PA’s effort to modernize its legal 
framework, stating that this “is being done in a consultative manner, involving civil society, the 
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private sector, and academic experts.”140 In 2011, the United Nations Special Coordinator Office for 
the Middle East (UNSCO) provided a similar positive assessment, crediting the PA with 
demonstrating its ability to carry out core governance functions and reported that “there have [also] 
been significant advances in the rule of law and justice sector, including the drafting of legislation, 
and regulations to ensure compliance with international human rights norms as well as improved 
access to legal services and enhanced institutional capacity.”141 Some of the key legislation the PA 
ministries have drafted includes a Palestinian Penal Code and a Palestinian Juvenile Justice Law. It is 
critical for the PLC to reconvene in order to pass newly drafted legislation into law. In the interim, 
the only laws that are passed are through presidential emergency decrees. 
 Further, the PA made progress toward establishing a Palestinian Chamber for Arbitration and 
Mediation. New judges and prosecutors were recruited, and a legal skills diploma was designed for 
continuing professional training.142 In February 2011, the MoJ organized a workshop for experts in 
criminal law. Through brainstorming sessions, workshops participants worked towards drafting a 
modern criminal code and other legislation.143  
 In 2010, the World Bank reported on specific recent accomplishments in the judicial sector, 
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Table 8: Key Palestinian Judiciary Reforms 
 
Establishment of an Anti-Corruption Court 
Establishment of a Customs Court 
Litigants are now witnessing much more speedy trials 
Court decisions are being more regularly enforced and 
honored.  
The number of cases filed before courts is increasing, 
indicating the public's confidence in the justice sector is 
increasing. 
Appointment and promotion of judges and public 
prosecutors is done through a more transparent and 
objective process, including written and oral 
exams/competitions. 
The Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) rotates judges to 
different governorates to reduce conflicts of interest. 
     Source: (The World Bank 2011)    
 
 Notably, the PA established the Anti-Corruption Court in 2010 and the Customs Court in 
2011. Foreign Policy reported that in November 2011, “the Palestinian prosecuting-general charged 
Economy Minister Hassan Abu Libdeh with corruption.” Further, the Palestinian Anti-Corruption 
Commission charged the Agriculture Minister, Ismail Daiq with corruption.144 These new initiatives, 
legislation, and their implementation at the highest levels of the PA are significant achievements and 
show the PA’s ability to set goals, commit to, and achieve them, and have given the PA increased 
legitimacy. 
Judiciary Challenges and Summation 
 Despite the progress that the PA has made in regards to the rule of law and justice, the 
judiciary continues to be plagued with problems including persistent political interference, 
insufficient legislation clarifying roles, and an inability to guarantee Palestinians their rights as 
outlined in the Palestinian Basic Law. UNSCO reports that the PA needs to work to clarify the roles 
and responsibilities of the MoJ, the HJC and the Attorney General’s office.145 Milhem and Salem 
explain, “The HJC lacks sufficient capacity and institutional design to efficiently administer the 
courts. As it stands, the HJC is simply not equipped to perform this additional task…There are no by-
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laws for the different departments of the HJC, so they lack clear institutional guidance or clarity 
concerning their respective responsibilities.”146 The World Bank adds, “The jurisdictions and powers 
among the main justice sector institutions -- the MoJ and the SJC -- have not yet been clearly 
delineated in law.”147 Clearly, additional legislation is needed to outline HJC responsibilities for the 
court system and the PA should improve coordination among justice sector institutions.  
 In 2010, Nathan Brown outlined serious flaws in regard to the rule of law and the judiciary, 
indicating that PA security services routinely act outside the law while politics often prevailed over 
justice in the courts. He argued that rivalries are rampant in the legal system and there are systemic 
human rights abuses. He noted that in 2009, Prime Minister Salam Fayyad made an effort to stem 
human rights abuses, specifically torture, though these abuses continued by the security forces, albeit 
slightly less frequently than in the past. Under the guise of improving security, Hamas supporters 
were targeted, denied, or fired from jobs, detained unfairly and tortured. Brown reports: "In the West 
Bank… [t]eachers sympathetic to Hamas have simply been fired in almost certain violation of the 
law, and the courts have closed their eyes."148 Al-Haq, an independent Palestinian non-governmental 
human rights organization, revealed cases of arbitrary detention and illegal abuse and torture of 
Palestinian civilians by the PA and Hamas authorities throughout the reform years.149 Comprehensive 
data is not available to determine the prevalence of the abuses and corruption in the courts, though it 
is clear the problem remains.   
To maintain the support of the Palestinian people, the PA must further efforts to make the 
court system independent of political pressures and do everything within its powers to reform the 
justice sector and deliver on the promises of an independent and impartial judiciary as established in 
the Palestinian Basic Law and reaffirmed in the plan Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State.  
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Analyzing the Palestinian Security Sector 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
“There is a consensus [within the diplomatic community] that the 
Fayyad government has delivered, and the cornerstone of his success is security reform. 
Improvements in all other sectors, including the gradual economic growth, are utterly dependent on 
the performance of the security forces.” 
---Western Diplomat in an International Crisis Group interview, January 2010150 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 Safety and security are basic human needs and individuals will go to great lengths to ensure a 
sense of security. Achieving security has been a difficult challenge for Palestinians and Israelis 
because their interests, particularly land, dictate a threat to the other’s sense of security. Both the 
Israeli and Palestinian governments, however, have demonstrated an understanding of the critical 
link between delivering a secure environment for their citizens and advancing peace. Security is 
perceived by Palestinians and Israelis and their governments in different ways, and the different 
perspectives influence government policies.  
Since the establishment of the Palestinian Security Forces (PSF) in 1994, its forces have 
gradually taken on more responsibilities in areas of the WBGS.151 In recent years, the PA has placed 
a policy emphasis on the further development of the Palestinian security sector and this chapter will 
evaluate the implementation of the PA’s security objectives that it laid out in its Ending the 
Occupation, Establishing the State reform plan. The complex security situation in the West Bank will 
be explored in this section, including the ongoing tensions between Israelis and Palestinians; the 
nonviolent resistance movement; the GoI and its citizens’ role in security in the West Bank; and the 
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PA and GoI’s inclination to value state security over human security for Palestinians. The 
information in this section almost exclusively relates to security in the West Bank, and does not 
discuss the vastly different security situation in the Gaza Strip under Hamas rule.  
Security Defined 
Shaped by historical experiences including the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the 
Israeli occupation of the WBGS, Israelis and Palestinians have fundamentally different concepts of 
security, which are at odds with each other. Both the PA and the GoI have acknowledged and agreed 
that a secure environment in Israel and Palestine will not only increase the safety and security of their 
citizens, but also increase investor and public confidence in their governments, and lead to social, 
political, and economic progress. 
For Israelis, the First (1987-1993) and Second (2000-2005) Intifadas along with the Hamas 
takeover of the Gaza Strip left enduring painful memories of Palestinian suicide attacks,  barrages of 
rocket of attacks, and stone-throwing by Palestinians in the WBGS. While the Intifadas have 
subsided and the security situation for Israelis has vastly improved in recent years, there continue to 
be ongoing missile attacks from the Gaza Strip, stone throwing at Israeli soldiers and civilians by 
Palestinians, and violent clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinians in the West Bank.152 Israeli 
Defense Forces (IDF) and PSF regularly uncover Palestinian plots to attack Israelis and the 
Palestinian suspects and perpetrators are jailed.153  
The ongoing violence not only results in physical injuries and the deaths of Israelis, but it 
also creates an environment of emotional stress and fear that results in negative political and 
economic implications. Following bouts of violence, tourism suffers and businesses that employ 
Palestinians traveling from the West Bank into Israel are affected when their employees cannot make 
                                                 
152
 The public had a lower, yet still high level of fear of a terrorist attack on themselves or family members at 70% in 
2009, which was well down from 92% in 2007.  
Meir, Yahuda Ben, and Olena Bagno-Moldavsky. Trends in Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2004-2009. 
Memorandum No. 106, The Institute for National Security Studies, 2010. 
153
 The Palestinian Security Forces are also known as the Presidential Guards. 
59 
 
it to work on time or at all due to increased security screening measures. When Israelis are injured by 
Palestinians, they grow frustrated with Palestinian leadership and the inability of Israeli security 
forces and the government to protect them, and demand political action or changes in leadership and 
are less likely to support a peace process with Palestinians.154  
Memories of a volatile past and the experiences of a violent present have made national 
security the primary concern of the Israeli public. The prevalent perception as touted by the GoI, is 
perceived pervasive existential threats to the State of Israel and a distrust of regional actors, even 
avowed peace partners in the region such as Egypt and Jordan. The Israeli government places the 
security of its citizens as its highest priority, and demands this of Palestinian leaders as well. Hence, 
Israel maintains a powerful army that actively intervenes to mitigate actual and perceived security 
threats within Israel and the region and especially in the WBGS and coordinates activities with the 
PSF.155 For its citizens—whether in Israel, in the WBGS or abroad—the GoI has shown an 
exceptional resolve to go to great lengths to ensure their safety, even at the expense of the rights of 
Palestinians.156  
The GoI frames the discussion of security around Israeli security needs and acquires 
substantial international support to advance its objectives to achieve that aim. While the GoI’s   
primary security focus is on mitigating threats by Palestinians and Arab states, it also mitigates 
internal security threats by Jewish extremists, which have increased in recent years.  
The demands made by the Gol through two decades of bilateral peace negotiations with 
Palestinians aimed at resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have helped to clarify their perception 
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of security. Israel has sought Palestinian acquiescence in subduing threats of Palestinian violence 
within the PA’s jurisdiction, a mere 17.2 percent of the West Bank known as Area A.157 While 
seeking Palestinian participation in security matters, Israel has been reluctant to view Palestinians as 
fully capable partners in providing security for Israeli citizens and has retained overarching control 
over security within the WBGS as granted by provisions in the Oslo Accords. Israel has shown 
skepticism that a peace agreement with Palestinians will result in enhanced security for its citizens. It 
has insisted upon an improved security environment and security guarantees from Palestinians as a 
prerequisite to a peace agreement, also known as the Israeli “Security First” objective.158  
‘Security first’ encapsulates a set of conditions that Israel has set for Palestinians to meet in 
order for Israel to engage in peace talks and perhaps a “partial, phased and conditional” 
withdrawal.159 Even with a peace deal, Israel has indicated that it intends to maintain a military 
presence in a Palestinian state.160 At the commencement of Middle East peace talks in September 
2010, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s remarks reflect the preeminence Israeli security 
plays in all Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic considerations. He said: “We left Lebanon, we got terror. 
We left Gaza, we got terror. We want to ensure that territory we concede will not be turned into a 
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third Iranian-sponsored terror enclave aimed at the heart of Israel.”161 It should be noted there is 
internal dissent within Israel regarding the GoI’s “Security First” model and there are individuals and 
groups who advocate for a policy based on human security for Israelis and Palestinians.162 
On the Palestinian security side, Palestinians and the PA perceive the removal of an Israeli 
military presence and sovereign control over Palestinian territory as essential for securing Palestinian 
individual and collective rights, along with security for Israelis. While Palestinian security is a high 
concern amongst Palestinians, it is not their top concern; rather, issues relating to the economy, 
specifically “job/money” have consistently been at the top, as reported in public opinion surveys 
from 2009-2011.163 The stated PA security objectives are to provide security for its citizen and to 
hold the PSF accountable to the rule of law and to uphold human rights and freedoms. Upon a close 
evaluation, however, it is evident that providing security to the GoI and its citizens is often times a 
PA goal that is elevated higher than goals relating to providing individual Palestinian security needs 
and demands.164 
Particularly following the Second Intifada, the PSF in the West Bank has worked in tandem 
with Israeli police forces to achieve the PA and Israel’s security objectives. While together they have 
made positive strides toward creating a safer environment for Israelis and Palestinians, particularly in 
the West Bank, the IDF and PSF have at times forfeited their duty to protect Palestinians’ most basic 
rights, drawing criticism and resentment amongst Palestinians. While working towards achieving 
security for Palestinians and Israelis, the underlying motivation of the PA is to achieve its main 
objective, which as stated above, is to end the occupation of Palestinian lands.  
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The PA has shown an inability to protect Palestinian citizens from unlawful acts by Israeli 
citizens and the GoI. On a daily basis, Palestinians, especially those who live in Area C under Israeli 
jurisdiction, face physical threats and threats to their land and property.  
Suspected Israeli perpetrators of violence are subject to Israeli civil and criminal law, though 
more than 90 percent of all reports of Israeli settler violence are met with impunity by the GoI.165 By 
contrast, Palestinian suspects are subject to military tribunals, which have a conviction rate of 99.74 
percent.166 Thousands of Palestinians who have been convicted of offenses or are being held in 
administrative detention without charge or trial reside in Israeli jails. Investigations by Israeli-based 
B’Tselem and bodies indicate cases of inhumane treatment.167 Palestinian civil society has 
consistently advocated for the preeminence of Palestinian rights.168 Conversely, the PA does not have 
the authority to detain or try Israelis for crimes committed against Palestinians. Israelis who have 
committed crimes in the West Bank and are held accountable by the GoI—with varying degrees of 
success.  
The vast majority of Palestinians do not share Israel’s belief that Israel’s existence is under 
constant regional threat; rather, they view Israel as a powerful military force that has secured safety 
for its citizens by signing binding peace agreements with Jordan and Egypt. Palestinians similarly 
believe that a just peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians that results in an independent 
and viable Palestinian state will provide security for the two peoples.   
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Palestinians who engage in violence against Israelis maintain that they are fighting to secure 
their rights and that peace can only be achieved once Palestinians have attained sovereignty over a 
recognized Palestinian state.169 Those who engage in violence against Israel, like the militants within 
Islamic Jihad and Hamas, maintain that forceful resistance is a legitimate means to protest and end 
the occupation and achieve a recognized Palestinian state on either the 1967 borders or a state in all 
of historic Palestine, including present day Israel. Such groups are identified as terrorist groups by a 
handful of powerful countries, including the U.S. and Israel.170  
The PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian people and does not endorse violence. 
The PLO and the PA have made strong efforts to reel in groups with violent tactics toward Israel or 
the PA. In an effort to enhance security and its monopoly over violence, the PA, in tandem with IDF 
forces, target militant groups in the West Bank. When dealing with individuals suspected of being 
affiliated with Islamic Jihad and Hamas the PSF at times forfeits its mandate to protect all citizens, 
targeting, injuring, jailing, or killing those individuals without due process of law.171 Further, the 
International Crisis Group reports: “The crackdown against the Islamists’ military branch seamlessly 
broadened into a far more controversial crackdown against its social and political manifestations and 
other forms of dissent.”172 
Palestinians have been reluctant to accept a continued Israeli presence in the WBGS as part 
of a peace solution. Dennis Ross, an American diplomat, author, and Special Middle 
East Coordinator under President Bill Clinton, was a leading negotiator in the Middle East Peace 
Summit at Camp David of July 2000. In his book, The Missing Peace, he commented on Israeli and 
Palestinian perceptions of security with regards to a future peace agreement saying, “Israelis must 
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face the fact that Palestinians will require an independent state in both appearance and reality. 
Carving up the West Bank, preserving buffer zones, and maintaining an Israeli presence all around 
the perimeter of the Palestinian state will not produce a solution.”173  
Both the GoI and PA have a strong motivation for creating a safe environment. Not only is it 
their responsibility to keep their citizens’ safe and secure, but strong security in the region also 
directly contributes to a viable economic environment.  
While Palestinians and Israelis both can relate to the strong desire for security, it is important 
for the sides to recognize how their citizens and governments perceive security and understand each 
other’s security expectations. Former Israeli President Shimon Peres showed an understanding of the 
Palestinian security perspective by conveying: “Ultimately, you cannot fool history. If a nation wants 
one hundred percent security, it has to give its neighbor one hundred percent freedom, because a past 
enemy can be a future partner.”174 It appears that the current leaders in the GoI underestimate the 
value Palestinians place on ending the occupation, having an independent state, and the potential 
security that could be attained with a permanent peace agreement with Palestinians. Palestinians may 
not understand the deep scars Palestinian attacks have left on the Israeli public and the repercussions, 
including increased domestic and international support for Israel’s “Security First” model following 
attacks. Palestinians and Israelis who engage in violence in an attempt to obtain security for 
themselves must be held accountable by their governments. The governments should hold 
accountable the perpetrators of violence while respecting human and legal rights. 
The GoI feelings of insecurity manifest themselves in various degrees. Below are some of the 
more notable of these that are not related to security arrangements with the PA. Israel has not carried 
out certain obligations by international law such as the compensation of or repatriation of Palestinian 
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refugees. Israelis fear the repatriation of Palestinians because a large scale repatriation of millions of 
refugees would make Israelis a minority in Israel. Israel has invested billions of U.S. dollars in 
creating and in purchasing advanced weapons technology and uses the security systems and weapons 
against Palestinians during times of conflict. Further, the GoI mandates required military service for 
its citizens and it invests in training and collaboration with the PSF.  These are all examples of Israeli 
actions that are motivated by deep rooted security concerns and indicate Israel’s extensive security 
reach within the WBGS. 
Establishing the Palestinian Security Sector 
Security considerations played a central role during the Israeli and Palestinian permanent 
status negotiations in 1999. Omar Dadani highlights its central role, stating, “Security issues were 
raised by one or both of the parties as a key component of virtually all of the other issues on the table 
– with respect to the location of borders, the disposition of Israeli settlements, the division of 
sovereignty and control over Jerusalem, the fate of Palestinian refugees, the allocation of water 
resources, and the framework for economic relations between Israel and Palestine.”175 Security 
remains highly important to Israelis and Palestinians and is a key component in advancing a viable 
and independent Palestinian state.  
Prior to the security agreements in the Oslo Accords, Israel held full responsibility for 
maintaining the security of Palestinians and Israelis within Israel and the WBGS. With the 
Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation beginning in 1987, Israel was unable to maintain 
security throughout the WBGS, and its citizens’ safety suffered as a result. Through the Oslo II 
Agreement, also known as the Interim Agreement that was signed on September 28, 1995, Israel 
transferred the monumental responsibility of restoring rule and order and security within areas of the 
WBGS to the newly formed PA. The agreement called for the creation of six security branches: Civil 
Police, Public Security, Preventive Security, Presidential Security, Intelligence, and Civil Defense.  
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The International Crisis group points out that the PA established additional security services as well, 
up to seventeen security branches in total at one point.176   
The security sector in Palestine was designed to include executive management and oversight 
bodies; justice and law enforcement institutions; security forces; legislative management and 
oversight bodies; and informal oversight institutions, all of which are outlined in detail in Table 9. 
Informal Insurgency groups, while not part of the formal security sector, are one component of the 
PSF.   
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The Interim Agreement stipulated that the PA would gradually take over the security 
administration in parts of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The PLO has criticized Israel for failing 
to fulfill the third redeployment from Area C.178  The Interim Agreement established that Israel 
would retain the responsibility for external security, as well as the responsibility for overall security 
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of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.179  Jerusalem 
would remain under Israeli control until a decision was made during the final-status negotiations. The 
territorial designations of the West Bank shifted throughout the 1990s. The PA gradually assumed 
more control in Areas A and B and all of the Gaza Strip, except for in the Israeli settlements, which 
were eventually dismantled. Table 10 shows the evolving territorial designations in the West Bank. 
Table 10: Territorial Designation of the West Bank 
 
 
         Source: (Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) and the World Bank 1999, 39) 
 
 
By 1999, Area A constituted 17.2 percent, Area B constituted 23.8 percent, and Area C 
constituted 59 percent of the West Bank, though estimates of  Area C during the reform years were at 
62 percent of the West Bank.180 Through the 1995 Interim Agreement, both sides agreed to carry out 
their security responsibilities “with due regard to internationally-accepted norms of human rights and 
the rule of law” and would “be guided by the need to protect the public, respect human dignity and 
avoid harassment.” Further, security obligations were not to interfere with the “normal and smooth 
movement of people, vehicles, and goods within the West Bank, and between the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip.” Both sides agreed to take “all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, 
crime and hostilities directed against each other, against individuals falling under the other's authority 
and against their property and shall take legal measures against offenders.”181 
In the case of security-related disputes between Israel and the PA, the Accords stipulated that 
Israel and the PA should address security issues together, through bilateral dispute resolution, 
without involving international institutions or processes. Annex I of the Interim Agreement, The 
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Protocol Concerning Redeployment and Security Arrangements, called for the creation of a Joint 
Security Coordination and Cooperation Committee (JSC) made up of five to seven members of each 
side to “deal with all security matters of mutual concern regarding this Agreement in the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip” that would “deal with alleged violations, as well as differences relating to the 
application or implementation of the security arrangements set out in this Agreement.”182 Indeed, a 
JSC was created along with a bilateral dispute resolution system but proved to be largely ineffective. 
University of the Pacific professor Omar Dajani argues, “The Palestinians’ capacity to advance 
effective challenges to Israeli violations of individual or collective rights through the bilateral dispute 
resolution structures defined in the Accords was limited [however], by their narrow latitude for self-
help or retaliatory action.” If Palestinians felt Israelis violated the Agreement or made unrealistic 
security demands, Palestinians could cease cooperating with Israeli security demands, but Israel held 
significant leverage in this regard. If Israel felt the PA violated the Agreement, it could withhold the 
transfer of clearance revenues and taxes to the PA, which it has, or refrain from the next stage of 
military redeployment.183 
 Initially, it seemed that the stipulations in the Accords had the potential to create an 
environment conducive to safety for Palestinians within the WBGS, protect their ability to move 
freely within the WBGS, and provide recourse for disputes. However, the security agreements 
relating to Palestinian welfare and movement were overridden by critical caveats in the Accords 
giving priority to Israeli security interests, and effectively overriding security guarantees to 
Palestinians. One such provision gave Israel “overriding responsibility for security for the purpose of 
protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism.” Another caveat indicated "Nothing in this 
Article shall derogate from Israel's security powers and responsibilities in accordance with this 
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Agreement.”184 These critical caveats in the Agreements provided a scenario in which Palestinian 
security and movement within the WBGS were constantly subject to change, based on Israel’s 
perceived security needs. The Accords established that Israeli security was tantamount, thereby 
making agreements safeguarding Palestinian security uncertain.  
The PA aimed to achieve security for Israel and the rule of law within its own jurisdiction—
in part by denying Palestinians a sense of security. Those suspected of being affiliated with violence 
against Israelis and paradoxically those suspected of cooperating with Israel secretly faced illegal 
detention and treatment, and in the best case scenario, a trial.   
The PA elevated Israeli security needs above the rights of Palestinians through the 
establishment of the Palestinian State Security Court. By a presidential decree, President Yasser 
Arafat established the State Security Court in 1995 to try cases involving security issues in the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip. The court lacked almost all due process rights and many of those detained 
and tried in the courts were deprived of fundamental human rights. Inmates were often held without 
charges, tortured, denied the right to defend themselves in court, denied the opportunity of appeal if 
convicted of a crime, and some faced death by a firing squad.185 The Israeli newspaper Haaretz 
published an article in 2003 discussing the creation of the court. The article stated, “When the State 
Security Court was established, Palestinian jurists immediately recognized that one of Arafat’s main 
tools was to bypass the rule of law and deliberately weaken judicial authority. Individuals tried in the 
court had no right to appeal their sentence.186 
The Accords provided motivation and impetus for the PA to take measures to provide 
security, namely to Israelis, while the PA considered that security for Palestinians could only be 
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secured through final-status negotiations. The Interim Agreements regulate Palestinian and Israeli 
security relations to this day, and continue to reflect the preeminence of Israeli security concerns. It is 
within this framework that the PSF operate. 
Building on the Palestinian Security Sector 
The long-delayed ratification of the Palestinian Basic Law in 2002 provided legal 
clarification regarding the roles of the PSF and police, potentially bringing enhanced security to 
Palestinians and Israelis. The Basic Law stipulated that the security forces and police would be 
responsible for defending the WBGS within its jurisdiction, serving the people, protecting society, 
and maintaining public order, security, and public morals. The security forces and police would be 
obliged to adhere to the limits prescribed by law, and would respect the rights and freedoms 
established by it. The PSF were mandated to operate in parts of the WBGS.187 The Basic Law placed 
the security services under the control of the cabinet (council of ministers), while acknowledging the 
president’s role as “commander in chief.” The Palestinian Basic Law led to improved security for 
Palestinians, in part due to its role in leading the PA to abolish the unconstitutional Palestinian 
Security Court, along with abolishing the practice of trying Palestinian civilians in military 
tribunals.188 
While the Interim Agreement and the Palestinian Basic Law provide some basic legal 
framework for the PSF, further legislation needs to be created to regulate their work, which cannot 
happen until the PLC reconvenes. In 2005, two laws were developed that provided some clarification 
of duties within the PSF. The International Crisis Group explains: "The Law of Services in the 
Palestinian Security Forces (No. 8 of 2005) stipulated the merger of the forces into three branches 
and, for the first time, regulated the rights and obligations of security personnel and enshrined a 
promotion system based on professional performance. The PA also enacted the General Intelligence 
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Law No. 17 to better regulate a particularly anarchic agency [the Palestinian Intelligence agency].”189 
The latter law defined the branch’s overall responsibilities, but lacked clarity on how its work was 
different from that of Preventive Security and Military Intelligence.190   
Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State Security Objectives 
The security reforms in the PA’s Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State plan were a 
continuation of the extensive security objectives laid out in the PA’s 2008-2010 Palestinian Reform 
and Development Plan (PRDP). Annex E includes a list of reform goals laid out in the PRDP, a few 
of which include increasing the execution of court decisions, improving the quality and quantity of 
intelligence information, and improving the civil defense response rate to incidents.   
From 2008 to 2010, the PA allocated US$257 million to Security Sector Reform and 
Transformation, much of which was funded by U.S. external assistance.191 Table 11 displays the 
allocation of the PA development budget resources during 2008-2010, and the high priority given to 
Security Sector Reform and Transformation, within spending on government reforms. 
Table 11: Allocation of PA Development Budget Resources  
(US$ millions) 
  
Source: (Palestinian National Authority 2008) 
The PA’s Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State plan laid out goals aiming to 
improve safety and security for persons and their property and to reform internal organization and 
security management. The PA set the expectation that the state security apparatus should adhere to 
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the rule of law, be accountable to an independent judiciary and be looked after by oversight bodies. 
Specifically, the PA assured, “It [the government] will also provide suitable training, equipment, and 
infrastructure to help the security sector improve its performance.”192 Table 12 lists the PA’s 
Ministry of Interior Objectives for 2009-2011 under the following categories: establishing rule of law 
and public safety, delivering services effectively, ensuring transparency, and developing relations. 
Table 12: Palestinian Ministry of Interior Objectives 2009-2011 
 
Establishing rule of law 
& public safety 
Delivering services 
efficiently 
Ensuring transparency Developing relations 
Developing the capacity 
of restructuring and 
reorganizing the security 
establishment, and 
regulating each security 
agency in accordance 




systems and process of 
the MoI.  
Implementing 
administrative and 
financial reforms in all 
branches of the security 
sector, including 
centralization of financial 
management and 
clarifying the jurisdiction 
of each branch to ensure 
effective integrated 
operations.  
Guiding activities to 
represent Palestine as a 




Continuing to train 
security staff, building 
security offices and 
headquarters, and 
providing modern 
equipment to help the 
security agencies perform 
their assigned tasks.  
Building directorate 
offices and public service 
centers that offer high 
quality services.  
Ensuring integrated and 
cooperative systems and 
working methods 
throughout the MoI in a 
manner that unifies and 
centralizes its 
administrative and 
financial management.  
Developing MoI’s 
operations on committees 
established by the Arab 
Council of the Ministers 
of Interior as well as 
rejuvenating MoI’s role 
in the Mediterranean 
Civil Protection Program.  
Completing development 
of laws regulating the 
functions of security 
agencies and preparing a 
code of conduct to protect 
citizens and safeguard 
public freedoms.  
Automating service 
delivery and establishing 
connectivity with other 
institutions (e.g., the 
Civil Registry).  
Developing a policy 
framework and strategic 
plan for implementing 
security sector 
development programs 
and projects.  
Develop a code of 
conduct for Palestinian 
civil society activity.  
Developing the capacity 
of, restructuring and 
reorganizing the security 
establishment, and 
regulating each security 
agency in accordance 




systems and processes of 
the MoI. 
 Building media capacities 
of MoI so that it can 
effectively communicate 
with the Palestinian civil 
society.  
 Developing the Law on 
Nationality & Passports. 
.   
     Source: (Palestinian National Authority 2009) 
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In order to achieve its security objectives during the reform period, the PA consistently 
allocated high levels of funding to the Ministry of Interior and National Security, which along with 
the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, implemented the majority of the security reforms and 
upgraded security infrastructure. Significantly, in 2009, the PA allocated more to the MOI than to 
any other ministry—a total of US$929.9 million, which accounted for 32 percent of all PA 
expenditures.193 The funds were used to hire, train and equip security personnel and to demobilize 
militias (mainly Hamas forces) across the West Bank.194 From 2007 to August 2010, the U.S. 
appropriated nearly US$400 million and provided training to support PA efforts to strengthen and 
reform the PSF and criminal justice systems in the West Bank.195 Funds were used to increase the 
number of employees and enhance training within the security sector. The World Bank reports 
64,000 individuals in the Palestinian security sector as of mid-2011, with 30,000 in the West Bank 
and 34,000 in the Gaza Strip.196  In 2011, the PA added 1,325 new employees to the security 
sector.197 
The Quartet on the Middle East, consisting of the UN, the U.S., the EU and Russia, have 
supported and encouraged PA efforts at enhancing security. In March 2010, the Quartet released a 
statement endorsing Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s leadership in improving security, law and order 
in the West Bank and urged the international community to continue funding the PA’s effort.198 
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Security Plan Results 
Improving the capabilities and performance of the PSF was a priority of the PA and Israel 
long before the Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State plan was launched in 2009. In 
September 2010, the International Crisis group reported: “The Palestinian Authority (PA) largely 
has restored order and a sense of personal safety in the West Bank…pursuing militant groups’ armed 
wings.”199 
 Historically, Palestinians dealt with security issues in local communities and did not report to 
a central authority. Despite the creation of the central Palestinian security sector, the historic pattern 
of security decentralization has been slow to change.  
A September 2010 International Crisis Group Report outlined PA security achievements and 
challenges the PA faced with its security branches. The report quoted a Palestinian ministry official 
who said, “We need to rein in the virtual autonomy of some security branches. For too long, some 
chiefs acted as if they, not the PA, owned their forces.”200 During the reform years, security 
coordination was poor even between President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. 
Security chiefs have been known to make decisions based on consultation with Fayyad and other 
political actors, but Abbas has been attempting to get the security chiefs to coordinate their activities 
with the Ministry of Interior. To advance this aim, beginning in April 2010, the prime minister, 
interior minister, and heads of security branches began meeting on a weekly basis to make strategic 
security decisions.201   
The U.S., EU, and Israel have exercised influential roles in strengthening Palestinian 
institutions that deliver security, training the PSF, and funding these operations. Further, cooperation 
between Israeli and Palestinian security forces rose to unprecedented levels during the reform years. 
In a report prepared by the GoI to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) in April 2010, the 
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government reported that in 2009, Israeli and Palestinian military forces coordinated 1,297 
operations, amounting to a 72% increase compared to 2008.202 A year later, the GoI reported that in 
2010, Israeli and Palestinian military forces coordinated 2,968 operations, amounting to a 118% 
increase compared to 2009. Further, in 2010, 686 joint bilateral meetings were held, amounting to a 
26% increase compared to 2009 and in 2011, 764 joint security meetings were held.203 Notably, in 
2010, the UN Secretary-General acknowledged that the PSF had emerged as a reliable security 
partner with Israel.204 
A few examples highlight the collaborative reform efforts the PA engaged in to improve its 
security institutions and to provide security and safety for Palestinians and Israelis. In 2005, the PA 
began working with the U.S. government to implement a variety of U.S.-funded programs designed 
to train and equip PSF.205 One such program was a 19-week, U.S.-funded military course for 
Palestinians at the Jordan International Police Training Center. Training began in 2008, and as of 
October 2010, 3,000 out of a goal of 5,000 Palestinians had completed the training program.206 
Senior and intermediate level Palestinian security officers attended leadership courses led by the U.S. 
Security Coordinator in Ramallah.207 The program provided jobs to local Palestinians and resulted in 
an increase in tips being reported and a reduction in crime.208 In addition to the training program, and 
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in conjunction with the PA’s plan, the U.S. financed the construction of nine operational camps for 
the PSF in the West Bank and new interior ministry facilities in Ramallah.209  
The EU also has been instrumental in assisting the PA achieve its security objectives. During 
recent years, the EU provided financing for infrastructure projects and training programs. The EU 
funded the reconstruction of two security headquarters in the West Bank that had been destroyed by 
Israel during the Second Intifada before cooperation between the IDF and PSF began. Further, the 
EU implemented a program called EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) 
beginning in 2006. In the first four years of the EUPOL COPPS program, approximately 3,000 civil 
police officers received advice and training in areas of investigation, crime scene management, 
public order, public policing, administration, and internal oversight.210   
In addition to collaborative efforts aimed at strengthening the PSF, other promising security 
related developments transpired during the reform period. Trying civilians under military courts was 
illegal under Palestinian Basic Law, but had long been practiced. In January 2011, following 
significant campaigning by Palestinian human rights organizations and foreign diplomatic 
representatives, Palestinian General Intelligence officials announced that PA military courts would 
no longer be allowed to prosecute civilians in the West Bank. Further, civilians detained as a result of 
military arrest warrants were released and their cases were transferred to civilian courts.211  
The previous examples show a few ways the PA is addressing security sector reform, which 
have not gone unnoticed. The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research data shows that “In 
the last quarter of 2009, 63 percent of Palestinians felt secure compared with 32 percent in March 
2008. Two thirds of Palestinians rated the provision of security services as good.”212 The World Bank 
acknowledged the improved security situation for Israel. An August 2011 World Bank note states: 
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“virtually all Palestinian organizations operating in the West Bank have renounced violence and the 
security forces of the PA maintain close security ties with their Israeli counterparts.”213  
UNSCO released a report on Palestinian state building on April 13, 2011, acknowledging 
improvements in security administration in the West Bank, particularly with regards to daily 
policing. UNSCO attributed the improvements to cooperation between the GoI and the PA along 
with the American-led PA security force training program in Jordan. The IDF has also acknowledged 
improvements in Palestinian security capabilities. IDF Major General Mizrachi reported that security 
force performance in the West Bank was “excellent” one month after he assumed OC Central 
Command in 2010.214   
Different opinions prevail as to why there have been improvements in security in the West 
Bank. While the GoI credits positive security results to Israeli and Palestinian security force 
cooperation and increased training to Palestinian forces, a PA security official attributed the 
improvements to the increased operational area the PSF was able to work. As quoted in a report by 
the International Crisis Group, a PA official said, “The single most important factor in improving 
their [Palestinian security officials] performance is allowing them to perform. Israel has facilitated 
our work by increasing the PSF’s operational area…That is the basic condition for establishing 
control and attaining some kind of operational coherence.”215 
Within the PA, there is disagreement about external influence in Palestinian security reform 
efforts. A Hamas member of the PLC said in 2010, “The security agenda of the PA is not only 
foreign, but undermines the security interests of the Palestinian people. Ultimately, it represents 
Israeli and American interests.”216 
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Security Plan Shortfalls  
Despite significant improvements in the competency of PSF and cooperation between Israeli 
and Palestinian security forces, ensuring security for Palestinians and Israelis has been exceptionally 
challenging, particularly in Area C where Palestinians live but the PA does not have jurisdiction over 
security. There, Palestinian and Israeli citizens clash amongst themselves over resources and 
ideological differences. Some Palestinian communities and international activists regularly protest 
the Israeli occupation, such as in the West Bank city of Nabi Saleh, often resulting in altercations. 
Further, while there have been fewer incidents than during the Intifadas, clashes between West Bank 
Palestinians and Israelis living in West Bank settlements in Area C continue to be commonplace and 
as a result, each year, hundreds of Palestinians and Israelis are injured and dozens are killed.  
The ever growing number of Israeli homes and structures on land which Palestinians own in 
Area C of the West Bank complicate the PSF’s ability to provide a secure environment for its 
citizens. Sometimes the settlers have Israeli permits, while others do not have permission by the 
Israeli government, but rather, claim justification on ideological grounds, such as that the land is 
given to Jews by God. These actions infringe on Palestinian rights, and sometimes the Palestinians 
pursue legal recourse, with limited success.217  
Sources provide varying estimates of the number of Palestinians and Israelis injured and 
killed due to clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinian communities. The UN reports that 
between September 21, 2010 and February 20, 2011 in the West Bank, 545 Palestinians, a fifth of 
whom were children, were injured and 12 Palestinians were killed due to the actions of Israeli settlers 
or Israeli Security Forces. During the same period, 29 Israelis were injured by Palestinians and there 
were no deaths.218 Shortly after the reporting period, in March 2011, Palestinians were responsible 
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for killing an Israeli family of five in an Israeli settlement in the West Bank and for a bombing in 
Jerusalem that resulted in one casualty and 28 injuries.219  
Human Rights Watch reports that from January 2011 to October 2011, Israeli settlers were 
responsible for injuring 167 Palestinians and killing two, while Israeli military forces were 
responsible for killing five Palestinian civilians in the West Bank, mostly demonstrators. During that 
timeframe, Israeli settlers were responsible for 377 attacks, damaging Palestinian property, including 
nearly 10,000 olive trees. Approximately nine percent of the Israeli perpetrators of the attacks were 
indicted by the IDF.220 
Despite implementing significant steps toward reforming the Palestinian security sector, the 
PA has been criticized for not providing sufficient safety to both Palestinians and Israelis. In 
September 2010, the International Crisis Group reported: “The PA, Israeli and international security 
officials largely agree that Palestinian capabilities have improved, though the extent of the 
improvement, and the reasons for it remain somewhat in dispute, as does the question whether, 
without an IDF presence, Palestinian forces could ensure Israel’s security.”221  
With regards to the PA’s shortcomings in providing security to Israelis, in a report to the Ad 
Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC), the GoI reported that the PA still had much work to do to reduce 
terrorist activities emanating from the West Bank.222 Israel cited ongoing security concerns as the 
rationale for maintaining checkpoints and roadblocks.223 The GoI reported sustained high levels of 
Palestinian terrorist activity against Israeli targets in the West Bank and the Jerusalem Area in 2009 
and 2010, particularly by members of Hamas. Israel's report to the AHLC indicated there were 646 
Palestinian terrorist attacks in 2009 and 89 attacks in the first two months of 2010 that emanated 
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from or were carried out in the West Bank. Stone throwing by Palestinian youth and adults is 
classified as a terrorist activity and makes up a majority of the reported terrorist attacks. While Israel 
credited the PSF with making significant efforts to combat terrorism, it called the PA’s efforts 
insufficient and suggested that the PA create legislation prohibiting Hamas. Additionally, Israel 
called on the PSF to do much more to uproot terrorist activities by prosecuting more suspected 
terrorists, incarcerating convicted terrorists, and confiscating weapons. Israel also called on the PA to 
improve the independent functioning of the justice system and increase prison space.224  
Nonviolent Resistance Movement 
Alongside violent opposition to the occupation, there has been a stronger nonviolent 
resistance initiative in the WBGS. In May 2011, a poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Public 
Opinion showed that “69.9% oppose to varying degrees the launching of Al-Qassam rockets from 
Gaza into Israel.”225 During the reform years, there was a growing worldwide movement to divest 
from companies profiting from activities in Israeli settlements in the West Bank and a boycott of 
goods produced in the settlements. This is part of a larger growing peaceful resistance movement led 
by Palestinians, Americans, Israelis, and other activists that aims to make the building of Israeli 
settlements economically unviable and bring to light other issues associated with the occupation.  
In 2005, the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign was launched by 171 
Palestinian non-governmental organizations. South African leaders including Desmond Tutu, the 
Anglican archbishop emeritus of Cape Town and winner of a Nobel Peace Prize, supports divestment 
as a tool to end the occupation, as it was an effective tool to break down apartheid in South Africa.226 
The campaign, now prevalent amongst civil society groups and college campuses worldwide, has 
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indicated it will continue promoting these actions until the GoI complies with international law and 
human rights, namely: 1)Ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands occupied in June 
1967 and dismantling the Wall; 2) Recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian 
citizens of Israel to full equality; and 3) Respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of 
Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN Resolution 194.227  
The PA has channeled the frustrations of the masses with the ongoing occupation by 
encouraging and supporting a non-violent resistance movement, advocating divestment, boycott, 
marches, and other peaceful means of resistance over stones and guns. The peaceful resistance 
movement has negative economic repercussions in the Palestinian and Israeli economy. For example, 
Palestinian contractors refuse to use materials produced in Israeli settlements, even if the materials 
from the settlements are the lowest cost. It could be argued that while divestment and boycott 
certainly harm the Palestinian economy, the peaceful acts of resistance cause far less harm to the 
economy than a resistance movement based on acts of violence.  
Beginning September 27, 2011 Palestinian prisoners revived the practice of hunger strikes to 
protest administrative detention without charges by Israel.228 Many high profile cases were covered 
in the media of prisoners refusing to eat until near death, increasing worldwide awareness and 
concern regarding the use of administrative detention without charges. While the GoI changed its 
policies, in practice, it continued to use administrative detention without charges. Supporters of the 
hunger strikes were arrested by Israel and held in administrative detention, but the hunger strikes 
have continued at a higher rate than in the past.229 Also, part of the nonviolent resistance movement 
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has been support for positive investment in Palestine by international churches and other influential 
bodies to promote peace and economic growth in Palestine.230 
PA Failures in Ensuring Palestinian Human Security 
In February 2011, Yezid Sayigh, Professor at King’s College London, produced a paper 
titled, “Policing the People, Building the State: Authoritarian Transformation in the West Bank and 
Gaza.” In the paper, he identified deficiencies in the PA’s security sector, indicating that the security 
sector lacked democratic governance and constitutional order. He cited deficiencies in the rule of law 
and observance of human rights, a lack of constitutional checks and balances, and weak legislative 
and judicial oversight. He indicated that individuals who belonged to or were suspected of belonging 
to Hamas were particularly at risk of abuse by the PA. Further, he described security reforms as 
being authoritarian in nature that will threaten both long-term Palestinian security and the ability to 
achieve a recognized Palestinian state. Sayigh argued that Palestinians need to achieve ownership in 
developing its security sector and unlike Israeli suggestions of separating from Hamas, he suggested 
integrating forces in the West Bank with the security forces in the Gaza Strip, and engaging all 
relevant stakeholders in the process.231  
 The Palestinian Basic Law guarantees the protection of basic human rights and liberties.232 
Nonetheless, allegations of human rights abuses, specifically torture, committed by the PA security 
services, continued in the West Bank during the reform period and were reported on by the 
Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR).  From January through September 2011, the 
ICHR reported 91 complaints of torture and 479 complaints of arbitrary arrests; however, PA courts 
have not indicted any security officers on human rights abuse charges.233 Further, in 2011 and 2012, 
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PA security forces arbitrarily prevented or violently dispersed nonviolent Palestinian protests and 
detained and at times physically injured journalists covering the events, particularly at events critical 
of the PA or supportive of Hamas.234 Human Rights Watch reports that despite court orders to release 
detained journalists, security officials ignored the orders in several cases in 2011.235  
A 2009/2010 UN Human Development report stressed the need for the PA to reframe “the 
concept of ‘security’” and advocated participatory state building to promote political and social 
cohesion and overall human security in the WBGS. The report stated: “The reframing of what 
‘security’ can mean is particularly important in Israel and the oPt [Occupied Palestinian Territories] 
because the Israeli focus on State security over and above the requirements of human security has 
been a dominant theme since the inception of the State….It is imperative, if development and lasting 
peace are to be secured, that security be re-envisioned as something that guarantees the collective 
safety of Palestinians and Israelis rather than just the military security of the State of Israel.”236   
Israeli Role in Palestinian Security  
It is important to note that Palestinians’ sense of security is not only impacted by the actions 
of the PA security forces and Israeli settlers living in the West Bank and Jerusalem, but also by those 
of the GoI and its security forces. As mentioned previously, Israel has retained overarching control 
over security within the WBGS as granted through Oslo Accord provisions.  
While the PA was given the right to administer security in Area A, in practice, the PA does 
not maintain full control of security in Area A as Israel occasionally makes incursions into the area, 
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citing security concerns and arguably undermining the effectiveness of the PA.237 One such incursion 
took place on February 29, 2012, when about 30 Israeli troops raided two Palestinian television 
stations in Ramallah. The soldiers confiscated computers, broadcasting equipment and administrative 
files, and the stations were subsequently unable to broadcast.238  Further, the Israeli Human Rights 
organization B’Tselem reported continued physical and verbal attacks towards Palestinians by Israeli 
soldiers at check points and during interrogations of minors and adults who are suspected of a crime 
that go beyond limits set by the law. From September 2000 through the end of 2011, B’Tselem 
reported 473 suspected cases of abuse of Palestinians by security personnel, and reported all of them 
to either the Military Advocate General’s Corps or the Department for the Investigation of Police. 
The vast majority of the cases were closed without measures being taken. B’Tselem indicates that 
abuse of Palestinians is widely underreported, “because of lack of trust in the system - a system 
which tends not to believe them, and which tends to protect rather than prosecute those who injured 
them.”239 In addition to organizations such as B’Tselem, the PA should also advocate for the well and 
legal treatment of Palestinians. Thus far, however, the behavior is tolerated and offenders are largely 
not brought to justice.  
Following the Second Intifada and especially during the reform years, the GoI observed 
security improvements in the West Bank and loosened some of its security barriers. In light of 
improved security and in an effort to support Palestinian economic growth, following the Second 
Intifada, Israel took “calculated risks” by removing hundreds of roadblocks and dozens of 
checkpoints to support Palestinian business activity and economic growth.240 In particular, the GoI 
eliminated some of its main checkpoints and blockades to access roads in the West Bank, while 
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leaving the checkpoint infrastructure in place. The GoI further reduced restrictions on Palestinian 
movement in 2011. 
Despite the reduction in barriers to movement, the GoI maintained an expansive system of 
restrictions on Palestinian movement in the West Bank during the reform years. Palestinians were 
unable to use some of the main roads and highways and encountered many checkpoints in the West 
Bank. In December 2012, there were 97 fixed checkpoints in the West Bank. 241 Throughout the 
reform years, the Israeli military erected hundreds of surprise flying checkpoints along Palestinian 
roads, averaging 350 to 500 of these fluctuating checkpoints per month. Further, the GoI maintained 
an average of 400 to 500 physical obstructions to block access roads for Palestinians, which included 
dirt piles, concrete, blocks, iron gates, and trenches. B’Tselem reflects on the security concerns 
driving Israeli policy on Palestinian movement in the West Bank: “Israel's policy is based on the 
assumption that every Palestinian is a security threat, thus justifying restrictions on the person's 
freedom of movement. This racist assumption brings with it the sweeping violation of human rights 
of an entire population based on national origin. As such, the policy flagrantly breaches international 
law.”242 
While Israel has acknowledged significant improvements in the PA’s ability to police the 
West Bank and lauds the increasing cooperation between Israeli and PSF, it ultimately is not satisfied 
with the security situation. The April 2010 and April 2011 GoI reports to the AHLC illustrate 
continued security concerns. The 2010 report stated: “Unfortunately, security threats still require 
preventative measures. The ease with which terrorist activity can torpedo progress on the ground 
makes it necessary for Israel to take steps to deter and prevent terrorism.”243 The GoI stated that the 
Palestinian attacks in response to the September 2010 peace talks and the aforementioned March 
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2011 killings and Jerusalem bombing “all serve as painful reminders of just how distant real security 
remains.”244 In July 2011, the GoI maintained approximately 520 closure obstacles in the West Bank, 
a separation barrier was in the process of being built, and the GoI restricted items the WBGS could 
import, particularly items that could be considered “dual use”—all justified on grounds of ensuring 
security for Israelis, through prevention and intercepting attacks aimed at Israel.245 
Within the West Bank, Palestinians are subject to Palestinian laws, and also to Israeli 
Military Law as Israel is the occupying power. 246 The GoI tries Palestinians in Israeli courts and 
sentences Palestinians to terms that must be served in Israeli jails. This practice is contentious 
amongst Palestinians as the PA does not have the authority to try, convict, and detain Israelis in 
Palestinian jails.247  
The number of Palestinians in Israeli jails has widely fluctuated. The human rights 
organization, B’Tselem began reporting the number of Palestinians in Israeli jails in 2001 and the 
lowest number of Palestinians in Israeli jails since reporting began was 719 Palestinians in January 
2001, with 16 Palestinians under administrative detention. The highest number of Palestinians in 
Israeli jails was in October 2006, following the PLC election victory by Hamas members, with 9,494 
Palestinians in Israeli jails and 696 Palestinians under administrative detention. B’Tselem reports that 
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the number of Palestinians held in Israeli jails at the beginning of the PA’s Ending the Occupation, 
Establishing the State plan in August 2009 was 7,285, with 363 Palestinians under administrative 
detention. At the end of the reform period in September 2011, the number of Palestinians in Israeli 
jails was 5,269, with 286 Palestinians under administrative detention.248  
In 2009, the GoI created the first military juvenile court to try Palestinian children 12 years 
and older. Historically, the GoI treated Palestinians ages 16 and older as adults, though in September, 
2011 the majority age was raised to 18 years old. Human Rights Watch praised these policy changes 
though it criticized the GoI for continuing to sentence Palestinians based on their age at the time of 
sentencing instead of their age at which the crime took place. In 2008, 423 children were in Israeli 
detention. The number of children fell to 135 in December 2011, but it has been increasing and in 
May 2012, 234 Palestinian children were in Israeli Military custody.249 Children are often detained on 
suspicion of rock throwing or because they are suspected to have valuable security knowledge. Israeli 
soldiers have shared their experiences inflicting or witnessing the mistreatment of children including 
beatings, intimidation, humiliation, and verbal abuse. The arrests of children often occur at night and 
the children sometimes are questioned without a lawyer or parent present.250  
James Kitfield, the national security and foreign affairs correspondent for National Journal 
magazine, suggests that the GoI unintentionally undermines the efforts the PA is making to enhance 
security.251 Kitfield argues that the GoI deals with and treats the symptoms of security breaches but 
some of its actions and those of its citizens contribute to Palestinian violence.  In areas in the West 
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Bank under Israeli control, building permits are nearly impossible to obtain and Palestinians 
sometimes proceed with building homes and other buildings without Israeli permits or have pre-
existing structures with no permits, which are often demolished.252 Kitfield challenges the practice of 
demolishing these structures. Kitfield also criticizes GoI-supported West Bank settlements. The GoI 
enables and at times encourages settlement growth by providing incentives such as lower taxes that 
attract individuals and businesses to move to the settlements. Further, the GoI provides and maintains 
infrastructure such as roads to the settlements, along with the provision of security forces to protect 
the settlements.  Kitfield suggests that the ongoing building of Israeli settlements in the West Bank 
(now home to more than 350,000 Israelis) not only often results in violence between settlers and 
Palestinians but also reduces the credibility of the PSF in the eyes of the very people they are charged 
with serving.253 Palestinians are frustrated by the settlements, and some view the PSF as pawns of 
Israel because of their cooperation with IDF actions towards Palestinians.  
The cessation of settlement building has been a top priority for the PA and its citizens and the 
PA has refused to participate in further diplomatic negotiations towards a peace agreement without 
Israeli assurances of a freeze in settlement building.254 
Security Summation 
Emerging from the First and Second Intifada and with many of the underlying causes of 
Palestinians violent actions during the Intifadas remaining, particularly the continued occupation, it 
should be considered a momentous achievement that order and relative calm, as compared to the 
Intifadas, prevailed during 2009-2011. Within the West Bank, daily policing improved, crime was 
reduced, a sense of personal safety improved, security branches began to be reigned in, and while 
discontent with the occupation continued, it was increasingly channeled through the nonviolent 
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resistance movement. The GoI recognized improvements in the security environment and removed 
many obstacles to movement in the West Bank.255   
 Credit for creating a more secure environment in the West Bank cannot all be attributed to 
the PA’s efforts since much of the planning, financing, training, and implementation of security 
reforms in the West Bank were headed or backed by Israel, the United States and the European 
Union. At the same time, the economy was growing and unemployment was falling, both of which, 
had an impact on individual Palestinians’ sense of security, reducing the likelihood for renewed 
conflict.  
The heavy external influence on the Palestinian security reform agenda is reflected by the 
resources and efforts placed on the crackdown on Hamas and other opposition groups, and the PA 
risked resentment or worse by Palestinians disenchanted with PSF cooperation with IDF forces.  
Overall, the PSF and IDF efforts have benefitted both Palestinians and Israelis though 
security gains are fragile and concerns remain. In addition to the lack of respect for Palestinian 
human rights, key concerns include continued Israeli involvement and presence within the PA’s 
jurisdiction, and settlement growth, which aggravates the parties’ affected and Israel-Palestinian 
relations.   
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Analyzing the Palestinian Economy 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
“Investments to rebuild and consolidate the institutional capacity of the justice and security sectors 
have significantly improved public perceptions of safety and the rule of law, contributing to rising 
business confidence and economic growth.”256 
---Excerpt from Establishing the State, Building Our Future 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
In today’s world where the lives of the people are conditioned by socioeconomic issues, the 
ability to instill peace and prosperity among a people is directly tied to the economic environment a 
government is able to create for them. As a result, economic progress is an essential element of 
Palestine’s hopes to build itself up and gain lasting peace and independence. In the Israeli-Palestinian 
case, the state of the economy affects leaders’ internal credibility and support, and externally 
validates governmental policies and creates a sense of legitimacy.  
At the heart of this is the economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS), and Israeli-
Palestinian economic relations following the Israeli occupation of the WBGS in 1967 and similarly, 
following the start of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in the early 1990s. The economic trends in 
the WBGS set the framework for a discussion of Palestinian economic performance during the 
reform years, 2009-2011. Specifically, the discussion will include monetary and banking 
arrangements, sources of revenue, fiscal policies and performance, foreign aid and the Non-
Governmental Organization sector, the public sector and private sector, doing business in the West 
Bank, and trade policies.  
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The Palestinian Economy Prior to the Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State Plan 
Economy at the Onset of the Oslo Accords 
Some of the earliest reliable economic data for the WBGS is provided by the World Bank 
beginning in 1991, in the midst of the First Intifada. In 1991, the Civil Administration (CA) was 
made up of 22,000 employees, 95 percent of which were Palestinians. The remaining five percent 
were Israelis, who notably, filled most policy-making and senior administrative positions. At the 
local level, there were 29 municipalities and 96 village councils, which shared the responsibility of 
delivering services with the CA. Additionally, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
provided infrastructure and services for 27 refugee camps in the WBGS, which were made up of 
refugees and their descendants from the 1948 war.257    
In 1991, the population in the WBGS was about 1.7 million, the Gross National Income was 
about US$2.9 billion and the Gross National Product (GNP) per capita was US$1,715.258 The WBGS 
economy was mostly service-oriented and the private sector dominated the economy, accounting for 
approximately 85 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Services accounted for about 50 
percent of GDP, agriculture accounted for 30 percent, construction accounted for 12 percent, and 
industry accounted for 8 percent of GDP. At the time, about one third of the Palestinian labor force 
commuted to Israel for work, with their earnings accounting for more than a quarter of the 
Palestinian GNP.259  
While the private sector dominated the Palestinian economy in 1991, the WBGS had 
exceptionally low levels of industrialization. Further, 90 percent of trade was conducted with Israel 
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and the CA had accumulated a large trade deficit with the GoI.260 Public infrastructure and social 
services were severely inadequate and overstretched, and there was a high degree of environmental 
degradation of natural resources, especially water.261 Palestinian income levels had stagnated for 
more than a decade, with unemployment and underemployment high and rising. In light of the 
ongoing conflict, the CA faced the challenge of rebuilding neglected infrastructure that was in ruins 
due to the First Intifada.262 
Establishing an Economic Framework through the Oslo Accords  
The Oslo Peace process initiated fundamental changes to the Palestinian economic 
framework with mixed results. While Israel had leading roles in administering services in the WBGS 
and provided financing for its operations since the occupation in 1967, many of these responsibilities 
and financial obligations began shifting to Palestinians, who lacked expertise and local revenue 
sources. In 1993, the Declaration of Principles (DOP) resulted in the formation of the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) that took over some of the governing roles of the CA. In addition to inheriting an 
economy with low industrialization and poorly developed and diversified trade, the World Bank 
reported that the PA was “inheriting very weak and fragmented institutions with little capacity for 
preparing and implementing development programs” and warned that the process of transitioning to 
an exclusively Palestinian administration would be “slow and complicated.” The World Bank 
indicated that domestic employment creation and poverty alleviation should be high priorities for the 
incoming Palestinian government.263 Further, the World Bank warned that the Palestinian economy 
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was dangerously dependent on the Israeli economy, highly vulnerable to external shocks and faced 
threats due to an uncertain and fragile political situation.264 
From the beginning of the peace process that began in the early 1990s, the international 
economic community understood that the development of a sustainable Palestinian economy and a 
rebounding of standard of living for the Palestinian people following the First Intifada was a crucial 
element for the success of the peace process. Many Palestinians were optimistic that the economic 
conditions would improve quickly as a result of the Oslo Accords.265 The international community 
intervened at this critical juncture, providing technical and monetary assistance to help the PA carry 
out its state and institution building initiatives as it developed mechanisms to generate internal 
revenue sources, aiming to create conditions conducive to economic growth in the WBGS. When the 
PA worked to establish institutions and faced challenges such as rising unemployment, foreign aid 
helped the PA survive, working to offset other declines in the economy. Between 1993 and mid-
1999, aid to the PA exceeded US$4.6 billion.266 
The PA, supported by the international community, including institutions such as the World 
Bank, devised a strategy for the development of the private sector economy. This strategy consisted 
of a variety of efforts to strengthen legal framework for entrepreneurial activities, to stimulate private 
business activities, and to reconstruct the physical environment that had suffered damage throughout 
years of neglect and destruction. Specific projects were created to expand and improve public 
services for water, sanitation and electricity, and to increase private sector participation in the efforts. 
For instance, the Gaza water and sanitation project and the Electricity Distribution and Management 
project involved the PA in a regulatory role while the private sector engaged in providing services. 
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Further, the strategy involved encouraging the strengthening of the financial sector including small 
business and private lending, and spurring the development of industrial parks with the aim of 
fostering business and employment to modernize the private sector.267  
In 1993 the PLO established the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and 
Reconstruction (PECDAR). PECDAR was responsible for the development of economic policy, 
project management, coordination of aid distribution, and facilitating cooperation between 
Palestinian nongovernmental organizations (PNGOs) and other international organizations. In this 
function PECDAR tendered public projects primarily focused on infrastructure rehabilitation. 
PEDCAR facilitated an open bidding process on projects and local contractors typically implemented 
projects while international firms and consultants provided technical assistance.268 The development 
of PEDCAR was especially critical, given the limited scope and capacity of public institutions at the 
time. PEDCAR would work in tandem with municipal institutions, capable of implementing 
investment programs. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near East (UNRWA), United Nations Development Programme, and PNGOs also played key roles 
in providing jobs and services within the WBGS.269 
The 1994 Paris Protocol on Economic Relations (PER) established the framework for Israeli-
Palestinian interim economic relations. The PA inherited some powers over the economy including: 
the authority to determine and set taxes, set industrial development policies, set industrial policy, 
employ individuals in the public sector, and administer a monetary authority to act as the PA’s 
economic and financial advisor and to regulate and supervise banks in designated areas.270   
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The agreement introduced economic relations largely between Israel, the Gaza Strip, and the 
West Bank city of Jericho, and the area expanded in the West Bank in subsequent Oslo Agreements. 
The PER gave the PA control over imports and customs policy and procedures for goods on lists A1 
and A2, which included a limited number of mostly Arab countries. The quantities of goods imported 
was to be determined between PA and Israel and a sub-committee of experts. With regards to goods 
not on list A1 or A2, Article III: 10 of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Annex IV of the Economic 
Protocol stipulated, “both sides will maintain the same import policy…and regulations including 
classification, valuation and other customs procedures…and the same policies of import licensing 
and of standards for imported goods, all as applied by Israel with respect to its importation. Israel 
may from time to time introduce changes in any of the above, provided that changes in standard 
requirements will not constitute a non-tariff-barrier.”271  
During the Oslo Accords negotiations, Palestinian negotiators wanted a free trade agreement 
with Israel, which would have required the sides to agree to customs borders. Israeli negotiators 
wanted to extend the de facto customs union and ultimately, both sides agreed to a customs union, 
allowing the Palestinian economy to remain integrated in and dependent on the Israeli economy.272 
While the PER did not endorse free trade, it called for the elimination of Israeli and Palestinian trade 
barriers on agricultural products and industrial goods.273 Other features of the PER included the free 
movement of goods manufactured in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank City of Jericho, and the 
ability of tourists to move freely between Israel and the WBGS. Further, the PER called for mutual 
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mobility of labor and for the PA to establish a social security system. Israel retained some powers 
over the Palestinian economy. Chiefly among them was control over external borders.274  
A model of free trade would have reduced Palestinian dependence on the Israeli economy 
and enabled their producers and consumers to tap the worldwide market without facing any tax or 
non-trade barriers.275 B’Tselem, The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied 
Territories, indicates Palestinians were compelled to accept the customs union model with Israel 
stating: “Israel made acceptance [of the model set forth in the Protocol] a condition at a time that the 
Palestinian Authority was unable to provide employment within the autonomous areas to the tens of 
thousands of Palestinians working in Israel.”276 
Later on September 28, 1995, the PA and GoI agreed to the Interim Agreement, which 
reaffirmed their commitment to the PER by incorporating it into the Interim Agreement and 
expanding up on it. This supplement to the PER included: an expansion of the area in the West Bank 
that was regulated by the PER, revisions to items and their quantities on the acceptable Palestinian 
import list, a commitment by Israel to transfer funds to the PA in order to cover recurrent costs 
associated with the additional responsibility the PA was assuming, and changes to the clearance 
revenue transfer system, including a new three percent deduction by Israel from each transfer to the 
Palestinian side of import taxes and other indirect taxes, to cover Israel’s administrative costs in 
handling the taxes.277 
Soon after the DOP, Israel showed reluctance to implement aspects of the Oslo agreement. 
For example, Israel delayed the removal of Israeli forces from parts of Area C and delayed the 
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transfer of clearance revenues to the PA.278 Further, there was strong interference by Israel in the 
movement of people, vehicles, and within the West Bank, and between the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip and between Israel and the WBGS, despite stipulations in the Oslo Accords that security 
obligations were not to interfere with the “normal and smooth movement of people, vehicles, and 
goods within the West Bank, and between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.”279 These restrictions to 
movement significantly reduced economic performance and discouraged investment in Palestine.280 
In addition to barriers to movement negatively impacting the Palestinian economy, the PA failed at 
varying degrees in its new role, particularly with regards to implementing the rule of law, and 
providing security for Palestinians and Israelis. Further, many of the highest PA officials engaged in 
corrupt activities, and the economy suffered as a result. A lack of effective policies for the protection 
of creditors, the regulation of the capital market, the enforceability of land titles, and the capabilities 
for urban planning and development were very apparent. The World Bank attested that the PA was 
lacking skills and training for the adequate management, planning and auditing of public finances.281  
Within the West Bank, Palestinians have had increasingly less access to land since the Oslo 
Accords, namely because the Oslo Accords established that the majority of the West Bank (59 
percent) was designated as Area C. Palestinians living in Area C prior to the Oslo Accords were able 
to freely live, travel within and engage in commerce in Area C and much of the land was used for 
agricultural purposes. Upon the inception of the Oslo Accords, Israel created obstacles for 
Palestinians to live and work in Area C, such as the requirement to obtain permits to live and work 
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and to travel into this area. Difficult to obtain permits have resulted in fewer Palestinians living and 
working in Area C, resulting in lower economic activity in the area.282 
The Israeli population in the West Bank and Jerusalem was 169,200 in 1987, and rapidly 
grew to 332,200 by 2004. From 1987 to 2005, the amount of land the settlements covered increased 
by 400 percent.283 The increase in Israeli citizens living in the West Bank has resulted in the building 
of additional roads by Israel within the West Bank to link the settlements to Israel. The roads further 
reduced and divided Palestinian land. The Israeli settlements have contributed to dwindling natural 
resources for Palestinians, namely water, which also has a negative impact on Palestinian economic 
potential. Some of the lost Palestinian jobs in the West Bank were replaced by jobs in Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank, though the nature of the work changed mostly from agriculture to 
construction. 
Since the GoI assumed responsibility for security and administration in Area C in the mid-
1990s, its policies have made it a difficult place for Palestinians to live. Much of the land was 
historically used for agriculture or herding animals by tens of thousands of Bedouins.284 In 2012, 
approximately150,000, or six percent of West Bank Palestinians lived in Area C.285 Israel has made 
approximately 38 percent of Area C off limits to Palestinians, designating 21 percent of the West 
Bank for military bases and closed military areas and 8.7 percent as Israeli-declared nature reserves. 
Further, Palestinian land west of the separation barrier along with Israeli settlements, outposts, and 
related infrastructure such as Israeli roads are off limits to Palestinians without a permit by the IDF. 
Further, some of the land Palestinians can access in Area C is dissected by Israeli roads or is impeded 
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by road blocks and check points.286 The land available to Palestinians is increasingly shrinking as 
Israeli settlements are quickly expanding. Between 1999 and 2009, the population in Israel grew by 
19 percent whereas the settler population, excluding East Jerusalem, grew by 56 percent.287 
Palestinians who live and work in Area C face insecurity and instability. Land registered to 
Palestinians in Area C has been confiscated by the GoI for settlement building or “public needs,” 
though the Supreme Court of Israel deemed the practice illegal in 1979.288 Construction for 
Palestinians is prohibited in 70 percent of Area C and in the 30 percent where it is possible, proving 
ownership of land or getting permits to build infrastructure is nearly impossible. Many Palestinians 
build without permits, though the GoI demolishes hundreds of these structures annually. Further, 
restrictive zoning policies limit the use of land and construction. These policies and the resulting 
reduced access to land and resources, coupled with insecurity such as limited protection from settlers 
from the Israeli justice system, have caused Palestinians, namely farmers and herders to move from 
one part of Area C to another part of Area C or from Area C to Areas A or B.289 
When the PLO and the GoI failed to follow through with some of their commitments made 
during the Oslo Accords and to negotiate a peace settlement, their failures did not go unnoticed. The 
PLO and the PA lost legitimacy amongst Palestinians and Palestinians grew frustrated with Israeli 
policies, such as its growing settlements and restrictions on movement, and the Palestinian economy 
suffered. The average Palestinian had many grievances. These frustrations, along with an interim 
period much longer than expected without reaching objectives, culminated in the Second Intifada in 
2000, which had a strong negative impact on the Palestinian economy. The UN OCHA reported that 
“In practice, Palestinian construction is normally permitted only within the boundaries of a plan 
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approved by the Israeli Civil Administration (ICA), which covers less than one percent of Area C, 
much of which is already built-up.”290  
Economic Performance  
Trade suffered during the Oslo years: during 1992-1995, imports to the WBGS fell from 61 
to 48 percent of GDP and exports from the WBGS fell by 14 percent of GDP.291 Once coupled with a 
delay in transferring revenue clearances to the PA, a lack of implementation of the Oslo Accords, 
poor governance by the PA, and excessive Israeli interference, these factors had a significantly 
negative impact on the Palestinian economy. Subsequently, the WBGS experienced a significant 
decline in real GDP per capita and real GNP per capita of 10-15% and 20-25% respectively between 
1994 and 1996. 292 Particularly hard hit was the Palestinian agricultural industry as the closures 
disabled access to the much needed Israeli market for these perishable goods.293 As a result, some 
Palestinian industries were forced to shut down and farmers switched from the production of high 
value, but perishable, products to the production of low-value crops.294 In 1997, the private business 
sector of the WBGS remained the main economic driver, with the private business sector accounting 
for approximately 80% of the GDP.295 During 1994-2010, economic output was erratic and output 
per capita contracted at an average annual rate -0.6 percent.296 The Second Intifada and other bouts of 
violence played a role in the erratic output per capita. Despite the immediate attempt of the 
international community as well as the PA to reform and revitalize the economy, at the dawn of the 
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Second Intifada in 2000 – almost seven years after the Oslo Accords – there were signs that 
Palestinian society was still lacking crucial policies and institutions for the promotion of a 
sustainable economy.297 
When the Second Intifada erupted, the Palestinian economy was again negatively affected. 
The adverse effect of the Second Intifada then was compounded by increases of Israeli restrictions on 
Palestinian movement for security purposes. Table 13 includes economic indicators for the 
Palestinian economy at the onset and during the Second Intifada. 
Table 13: The Palestinian Economy During the Second Intifada  
 
Year GDI in  
WB 
US$ a/ 

































1999 2,113.2 1555.1 1896.1 13 32 20 5.9 16.9 11.8 
2000 2035.2 1532.1 1839.1 18 42 27 12.1 18.7 14.1 
2001 1662.1 1282.1 1513.1 27 54 37 22 34.2 25.5 
2002 1452.1 1130.1 1326.1 41 68 51 28.2 38 31.2 
2003 1621.1 1227.1 1467.1 37 64 47 23.8 29.2 25.6 
Source: B’Tselem. “Restrictions on movement: Statistics on unemployment and poverty.” B’Tselem. January 1, 
2011. http://www.btselem.org/freedom_of_movement/unemployment_statistics (accessed January 4, 2012). 
 
a/ Gross Domestic Income (GDI) measures the overall market value of all t goods and services produced within a 
given economic area during a particular period of time. This figure, which is not substantially different from the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), is the indicator used in World Bank reports on which this table is based.  
b/ The poverty rate is calculated based on daily per capita income below $2.1.  
c/ Adjusted employment also includes "discouraged workers," who are not employed and have stopped seeking jobs 
due to pessimism regarding the prospect of actually finding work and/or are receiving subsidies or remittance 
income that approximate or exceed the wages they could earn in the labor market. 
Statistics for the West Bank include East Jerusalem. 
 
Table 13 shows that the Palestinian Gross Domestic Income (GDI) per capita dropped from 
US$1,896 in 1999 to US$1,326 in 2002 while the poverty rate and unemployment rates increased. 
These changes took place in light of the violence during the Intifada, Israeli security measures, 
including restrictions on movement that prevented Palestinians from working in Israel or in parts of 
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the WBGS, and the failure of the PA and its international financiers to create the institutional and 
policy environment needed to stimulate adequate job creation.298  
Employment 
Employment of Palestinians in the 1990s was extremely vulnerable. While the First Intifada 
was officially over with the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, lower levels of violence continued 
periodically. Higher wages served as a strong motivation for Palestinians to travel to Israel or to the 
Israeli settlements in the West Bank for employment opportunities, even when it conflicted with their 
personal views on the Israeli occupation.299 Israel implemented new security measures through 
internal and external border closures in the WBGS, at times completely eliminating the employment 
of Palestinians in Israel.300 With many Palestinians reliant on agricultural and construction jobs in 
Israel, any changes in freedom of movement had an immediate impact on the Palestinian economy. 
Identification cards were necessary for all Palestinians but even with security cards Palestinians were 
often denied access to cities.  
The employment of Palestinian workers in Israel declined to about 28,000 in 1996, down 
from 116,000 in 1992.301 By 1999 the employment of Palestinians in Israel had recovered slightly, to 
33,000 – despite Israel’s commitment as part of the Paris Protocol to keep its labor market open for 
up to 100,000 Palestinians. Most of the jobs previously held by Palestinians were lost as the Israeli 
labor market started to substitute Palestinian workers with immigrants from Eastern Europe and 
Southern Asia.302 In 2012, 41,000 Palestinian workers were employed with permits in Israel and in 
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the settlements, while another 22,000 Palestinians worked without permits, with more than half of the 
jobs in the construction sector.303 
Table 14 shows the percentage of West Bank Palestinians working in Israel and the 
settlements, in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank from 1995 to 2010. With 22 percent of employed 
Palestinians from the WBGS working in Israel and the settlements in 1999, nearly a quarter of the 
workforce was earning substantial wages. Following the onset of the Second Intifada in 2000, the 
percentage of Palestinians working in Israel and the settlements plummeted to 8 percent by 2004, 
recovering slightly to 10 percent in 2011. 
Table 14: Geographical Percentage Distribution of Employed Persons from the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, 1995-2010 
 
Year Israel and 
Settlements 
Gaza Strip West Bank Total 
1995 16.2 23.2 60.6 100 
1996 14.1 26.6 59.3 100 
1997 17.1 26.1 56.8 100 
1998 21.7 24.5 53.8 100 
1999 22.9 24.2 52.9 100 
2000 18.8 24.8 56.4 100 
2001 12.5 25.4 62.1 100 
2002 9.3 27.5 63.2 100 
2003 8.7 30.0 61.3 100 
2004 8.0 27.8 64.2 100 
2005 9.3 28.9 61.8 100 
2006 8.6 26.5 64.9 100 
2007 8.9 29.1 62.0 100 
2008 10.1 26.7 63.2 100 
2009 10.2 26.4 63.4 100 
2010 10.5 26.0 63.5 100 
2011 10.0 29.1 60.9 100 
Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Survey. Annual Report: 2010, 
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011.
304
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While Palestinian employment in Israel was fluctuating during the Oslo years, the Palestinian 
unemployment rate improved overall, with the adjusted unemployment rate reaching a 5.9 percent 
low in the West Bank in 1999. At the onset of the Second Intifada, Israel restricted Palestinians’ 
travel to Israel, and Palestinian unemployment was directly affected. With the onset of the Second 
Intifada, the West Bank Palestinian unemployment rate steadily increased during 1999 to 2002, 
peaking at over 25 percent in 2002, as shown in Figure 3.  
Figure 3:  Unemployment Rate Trends/ Predictions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 1994-2014 
 
 
Sources:  Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics; and IMF staff estimates and projections. 
(IMF 2011) 
 
Restricted employment of West Bank Palestinians in Israel and rising unemployment 
beginning in 1999 reflect the negative repercussions of conflict on the Palestinian economy. 
Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State Economic Objectives 
Since assuming the office of Prime Minister in 2007, Salam Fayyad immediately began 
working with international financial institutions to identify priority reforms that would stimulate the 
Palestinian economy and pinpoint ways to improve fiscal management. In December 2007, the PA 
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presented the one of many reform plans, the 2008-2010 Palestinian Reform and Development Plan, 
at a donor’s conference in Paris. The plan was well-received and donors financed the PA’s initiatives, 
in 2008 and subsequent years. 
In 2009, the PA presented a new state and institution building plan, which overlapped with 
and built upon its Reform and Development Plan initiatives. The title, Ending the Occupation, 
Establishing the State, aptly described the PA’s ultimate goal through implementation of the plan. 
The PA identified a strong, sustainable, active and efficient economy as the foundation of a self-
sufficient Palestinian state, and the PA presented goals within its capacity to create the conditions to 
build a stronger economy.  
The PA claimed that it had increased public sector employment to provide employment 
opportunities and reduce poverty in the past in an effort to “deal with economic stagnation and 
contraction.”305 The plan aimed to restrict the growth of the public sector wage bill, make the PA 
more accountable for the resources it spent, and create job opportunities in the private sector. 
Developing domestic capacities and resources and creating an attractive investment environment 
would reduce the PA’s dependency on foreign aid too, and lay the foundation for sustainable growth. 
The PA expressed its commitment to a free market economy, and promised to actively 
prevent monopolies and other forms of economic opportunism and exploitation within the Palestinian 
economy. The plan called for continued work on industrial infrastructure projects, particularly for 
information technology, precious metals, and renewable energy industries.306  
Economic Performance during the Reform Years  
Monetary and Banking Arrangements in the West Bank 
The primary currency in Palestine is the Israeli New Sheqel (NIS). Article 4 of the 1994 PER 
stipulated that the PA could adopt additional currencies and in practice, Palestinians also regularly 
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use US dollars, as this is how most external support is received. Palestinians also use the Jordanian 
Dinar, especially in the West Bank, and the Egyptian pound is frequently used in the Gaza Strip.  
Throughout the reform years, the PA enacted changes across various ministries to improve its 
fiscal management system and reporting to the public. Some of the initial reforms in 2009 included 
the establishment of a new commercial accounting section in the Palestinian Ministry of Finance and 
regularizing the bank reconciliation process in the course of preparing financial statements.307  
The Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the Palestine 
Monetary Authority (PMA) provided quality data in a timelier manner during the reform years. 
Specifically, the MoF published data on expenditures, revenue, external aid, and public debt, on its 
website on a monthly basis, providing the utmost transparency and making the evaluation of 
governmental actions in these areas easily accessible to the public.308  
With IMF technical assistance, the PA introduced wide-ranging reforms to its public 
financial management within the PMA and MOF system during 2009-2011, listed in Table 15.  
Table 15: PA Internal Reforms Within the PMA and MoF, 2009-2011 
 
Palestine Monetary Authority Ministry of Finance 
Adopted regulations governing mergers and 
acquisitions 
Introduced a Financial Management Information 
System to link the Ministry of Finance to line 
ministries 
Established a unit to implement Fair Lending 
Regulations 
Established procedures to enable regular external audits 
of its annual financial statements and initiated audits 
Established a bounced-checks tracking system Established a macro-fiscal unit 
Created a bank deposit insurance scheme with World 
Bank assistance  
Expanded property tax collection to nearly half of 107 
municipalities in the West Bank 
Installed an electronic payment system in 2010, 
including a Real Time Gross Settlement system 
(RTGS) and a Clearance House that raised bank 
payments’ efficiency and reduced liquidity risk 
Integrated the Commitment Control System into the 
Financial Management Information System, preventing 
excessive expenditure commitments and arrears 
Created a new central bank law to guarantee the 
independence of the PMA 
Modified the Commitment Control System to ensure 
that purchase orders are determined by monthly cash 
plans that take into account delays in donor aid 
Established a credit scoring system, contributing to the 
rise in bank credit to the private sector  
  
Integrated a credit scoring system into credit registry  
Source: (IMF 2011) 
                                                 
307
 (The World Bank 2011) 
308
 (IMF 2011) 
107 
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided an assessment of PMA changes during the 
reform years. A September 2011 IMF report indicated all the banks in the WBGS were rigorously 
regulated and supervised by the PMA. Further, the IMF assessed that the PMA used a variety of 
sound instruments to do so such as, “reserves ratios, capital requirements, liquidity ratios, limits on 
credit concentration, outside placements, and currency exposure.”309 
Sources of Revenue  
The PA’s revenue base includes tax and nontax revenues; border clearance revenues and tax 
refunds. The PLO and GoI agreed to a situation in which the GoI would collect clearance revenues 
and income taxes by Palestinians employed in Israel and transfer the funds to the PA monthly. 
Specifically, the Gaza-Jericho Agreement stipulated that Israel would transfer to the PA 75 percent of 
the revenues from income tax collected from Palestinians employed in Israel and 100 percent of 
income taxes collected from Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, Jericho Area, and West Bank 
settlements.310 
The Gaza-Jericho Agreement provided guidelines on PA taxation policies, stipulating that the 
Palestinian Tax Administration would conduct its own taxation policies and the PA would implement 
a Value Added Tax (VAT) at around 15 to 16 percent.311  
Table 16 details Palestinian fiscal indicators from 2004-2011, and includes a breakdown in 
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Table 16: Palestinian Fiscal Indicators, 2004-2011  
(In millions of US dollars, unless otherwise indicated) 
 





Total net revenues 
     Gross domestic revenues 
         Tax revenues 
         Nontax revenues 
     Gross clearance revenues  a/ 
     Tax refunds 
 
     Total recurrent expenditures  b/ 
     Wage expenditures 
     Non-wage expenditures 
     Net lending 
 
    Total recurrent expenditures  c/ 
    Wage expenditures 
    Non-wage expenditures 
    Net lending 
 
    Recurrent balance  b/ 
    Recurrent balance  c/ 
 
    Development projects  c/ 
    Development projects  b/ 
 
    Overall balance  c/ 
(Including development expenditures) 
 
Financing 
     External support for recurrent & 
     development expenditures 
         External support for recurrent  
         expenditures disbursed or indicated 
         External support for development  
         expenditures 
     Domestic financing 




























































































































































































































































































































Source: IMF. “Resident Representative Office -- News Archive: West Bank and Gaza (Various reports from 2008-2010. ).” IMF. 
http://www.imf.org/external/country/rrpagesexternalmore.aspx?isoCode=wbg&pageLang=ENG&isRegion=0 (accessed 4 
January, 2013). 
IMF. Macroeconomic and Fiscal Developments in the West Bank and Gaza. Ad Hoc Liaison Committee Meeting. New York: 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2007. 
(IMF 2012) 
 
a/ Gross clearance revenues are taxes collected by Israel at the border and sent to the PA monthly. 
b/ Commitment basis   
c/ Cash basis 
d/ Percent of GDP US $billion 
 
Based on data in Table 16, taxes the PA collected constituted 19 percent of PA revenues in 
2009, 25 percent in 2010 and 21 percent in 2011. The PA had budgeted for 24 percent of its revenues 
to come from local taxes in 2011, but lower than projected economic growth and tax compliance 
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contributed to lower than expected tax revenues in 2011.312 Income taxes, consumption taxes, and 
corporate taxes are the primary taxes the PA administers. Income tax revenues made up about 1.5 
percent as a share of Palestinian GDP in 2011, which is the lowest rate in the region. The IMF 
indicated that tax revenues constitute three to four percent of revenues as a share of GDP in Algeria, 
Jordan, and Lebanon in 2011.313 The corporate tax rate in the WBGS was 16.8 in 2011. By 
comparison, the Israeli corporate tax rate was 30.5 and the U.S. corporate tax rate was 46.7 percent in 
2011, the U.S. having the highest rate in the industrialized world.314 The corporate tax base is small 
in Palestine as large private enterprises (defined as having 20 or more employees) make up only one 
percent of the private sector, the rest of which, are small and medium sized enterprises (SMSE), 
which constitute a small tax base.315 In 2008, the Palestinian VAT decreased from 16% to 14.5%.316 
In 2012, the World Bank and IMF assessed that a portion of PA public finance reform should 
be aimed at broadening the tax base.317 Faced with less than a 40 percent compliance rate for paying 
income taxes in the WBGS, the IMF suggested the PA enhance tax payment compliance by 
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implementing a self-assessment system and integrating the administration of VAT and income tax.318 
While the 2011 portion of PA revenues that came from taxes (21 percent) was sizeable, revenues 
were far below expenditures, so the PA’s revenue base must grow to meet its expenditure needs, or 
its expenditures must be reduced so that its revenues are sufficient to meet expenditures and 
sustainable external assistance. 
 While clearance revenues/taxes constituted the largest portion of revenues and domestic taxes 
constitute the next largest portion of PA revenues, nontax revenues constituted the smallest portion of 
PA revenues. Nontax revenue is any government revenue apart from taxes. Examples of nontax 
revenues include fines and fees. The PA received US$256 million in nontax revenues in 2011, below 
a budgeted US$300 million. Further, nontax revenues in 2011 were lower than nontax revenues in 
2010 and 2009, at US$270 million and US$284 million, respectively. The IMF identifies the primary 
reasons for lower nontax revenue in 2011 reporting, “a wide substitution of petroleum products 
imported into Gaza from Israel with cheaper products from Egypt…, the unbudgeted partial 
repayment of license fees to the Palestinian Telecommunications Group,” and lower than budgeted 
transfers of dividend payments from the Palestine Investment Fund (PIF).319 
The most significant source of PA revenues is Israeli border clearance revenues. The Interim 
Agreement expanded the jurisdiction of the PA, and the PA began collecting income taxes in its 
jurisdiction and continued to receive 75 percent of revenues from income taxes collected from 
Palestinians employed in Israel from the GoI.320  
Businesses operating in Israeli settlements pay taxes to the GoI. While these businesses 
provide much needed and higher paying jobs to Palestinians, it could be more beneficial to the PA if 
it had jurisdiction over this area as Palestinian businesses could be established, and the PA would 
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receive 100 percent of taxes from the businesses and individuals, assuming that there would be the 
same or higher level of output in the areas as there is now.321 
Despite a clear mandate of clearance revenues based on final destination as stipulated in the 
Oslo Accords, this is not always followed in practice.322 More than half of the PA’s imports from 
Israel are produced in a third country. Israeli importers purchase items in bulk and resell them to 
Palestinian consumers. These “indirect imports” accounted for at least 58 percent of trade that was 
reported as PA imports from Israel in 2008, and Israel retained all customs revenues collected on 
these imports, which would have amounted to approximately US$0.5 billion. These funds would 
have reduced the 2008 budget deficit and external financing requirements by 26 percent. This 
arrangement prevents the PA from collecting these revenues. Therefore, a trade arrangement that 
allows third countries to export directly to the West Bank or Gaza Strip would be preferable to the 
PA.323 
Border clearance revenues constituted 70 percent of the PA revenues and 46 percent of the 
PA’s budget overall in 2011. The actual amount in 2011, US$1.424 billion, fell below the budgeted 
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Figure 4: Total Clearance Revenues for the PA, 2004-2010  
(value in US$ Millions) 
 
Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Performance of Palestinian Economy, 2010. 
Palestinian National Authority, 2011.  
 
 
While the PER arrangement clearly stipulates that Israel will transfer the taxes and clearance 
revenues in a timely manner, there have been delays in their transfer. The present system of clearance 
revenues transfers is a source of Palestinian fiscal instability. The GoI has withheld funds collected 
from Palestinian workers, mainly the equalization levies, national insurance contributions and 
pension funds.325 The GoI has delayed the transfer of funds to the PA many times since the 
arrangement was established during the Oslo Accords due to political reasons, periods of intensified 
hostilities, the Second Intifada and Hamas’ electoral victory.326 As a result of the latter situation, the 
PA nearly collapsed in 2006, exposing the fragility of PA stability and its vulnerable fiscal 
situation.327  
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In 2011, the unstable nature of the system of transfer of clearance revenues caused great 
strain on the PA.  Israel temporarily suspended the transfer of clearance revenues in May, and again 
in November 2011 in retaliation for Palestinian’s UN statehood bid, though it released the funds in 
late November.328 While donors have covered the PA’s revenue shortfall in the past when Israel 
withheld or delayed clearance funds transfers, donor fatigue and the worldwide economic downturn 
in 2011 made it more difficult for the PA to secure aid to replace the funds.  
The IMF and World Bank have recognized that clearance revenue transfers are a critical PA 
revenue source and indicate there have been substantial tax leakages at the borders, greatly reducing 
the clearance revenues the PA receives. Due to a lack of data provided on the matter by the GoI, the 
extent of the tax leakages has been impossible to determine, though it is clear small changes to the 
collection system could result in big increases in revenues for the PA. The IMF indicated that a five 
percent increase in clearance revenues would increase the PA’s 2012 budget by US$75 million.329  
During the reform years, Palestinian and Israeli Ministries of Finance discussed the problem 
and made progress on developing plans to reduce leakages, but the implementation of their plans was 
stalled once Palestinians reached a controversial reconciliation agreement in April 2011. The plans 
had many features, including: 1) an increase in the amount of real time data on trade between Israel 
and the WBGS shared by Israel through electronic interfaces, including data on imports whose final 
destination is the WBGS; 2) allowing the PA to pay electricity bills directly to the Israeli provider in 
place of automatic deductions from clearance revenues transferred; 3) allowing PA officials to be 
present at  border crossings; 4) reviewing processes at the borders regarding revenue sharing to 
ensure they are consistent with the Paris Protocol on Economic Relations (PER) provisions; and 5) 
addressing the problem of Palestinian traders underreporting declarations and working towards 
collecting the full amount of VAT and excise taxes dues from these traders. Historically, Palestinians 
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have under-invoiced their declarations and there has been low follow-through by Israeli Customs 
authorities to remedy this issue, which ultimately resulted in lower VAT collections. Further, in order 
for the PA to get VAT funds from the GoI, it had to present copies of receipts for imports. 330 With no 
presence at the borders, the World Bank reports that “it is difficult to collect the receipts from 
Palestinian merchants seeking to avoid paying VAT” and the GoI has a poor track record of 
questioning dubious declared values on WBGS-bound goods.331 A remedy to this problem will 
require the Israeli MoF sharing information on VAT receipts collected at the borders with the PA. 
The IMF encourages the full implementation of the Paris Protocol, specifically with regards to 
practices surrounding exit fees distribution, suggesting that exit fees levied by Israel on Palestinian 
passengers crossing the Allenby Bridge between the West Bank and Jordan be shared equally 
between the GoI and the PA.332 
Fiscal Policies and Performance   
Table 17 outlines selected economic indicators for the WBGS in 2009, 2010, and 2011, with 
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Table 17: Selected Economic Indicators in the WBGS, 2009-2015  
 
Source: (IMF 2012) 
Economic performance in the WBGS was strong during 2008 to 2011, in part due to an 
improved security situation and business environment, large inflows of external financing, and a 
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loosening of Israeli restrictions on movement within the West Bank and between the West Bank and 
Israel. The Gaza Strip experienced a strong recovery as it began rebounding from a low and 
depressed base following conflict and a loosening of Israeli closures. Table 18 includes economic 
indicators in the WBGS during 2007 to 2011. 
Table 18: Economic Indicators for the WBGS, 2006-2011 
 




Nominal exchange rate (average; NIS per US $1) 
Nominal GDP (in millions of dollars) 
 
Real GDP (2004) Market Prices 
GDP in the West Bank 
GDP in the Gaza Strip 
CPI inflation rate (end-of-period) 
CPI Inflation rate (period average) 
 
     3.6         3.9          3.7       3.73        3.70             3.58 
  5,204     6,108      6,720      8,331      9,163          9,809 
                          (Annual Percentage Change) 
    --             7.1          7.4         9.3         7.0               9.5 
    --           12.0          9.5         7.6         4.0               5.8 
    --             --            8.4        19.5       20.2            20.0 
    --             7.0          4.3         2.8          3.8              2.7 
    --             9.9          2.8         3.7          4.0              2.9 
Source: (IMF n.d.) 
(IMF 2007) 
(IMF 2011) 
 (IMF 2012) 
Palestinian National Ministry of Finance. Table 7: Total External Financing, Budget Support and 
Development, Palestinian National Authority, 2012.   
 
a/ Based on data for the first three quarters of 2011. 
 
 
The West Bank experienced strong growth during the reform years at 12 percent, 9.5 percent, 
7.6 percent, and 5.8 percent in 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 respectively.333 While GDP growth has 
fallen since 2008, it has remained impressively high and is now settling into more sustainable levels 
of growth.  
The exchange rate in the WBGS (reflecting the exchange rate of the Israeli New Sheqel with 
respect to the U.S. dollar) remained relatively stable during the reform period. In 2011, the exchange 
rate was lower than the PA had projected at NIS 3.58 to US$1. The PA had budgeted for an exchange 
rate of NIS 3.70 to US$1. The lower than projected exchange rate contributed to a small portion of 
the budget deficit, and was due to the depreciation of the US Dollar. Table 19 shows select fiscal 
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indicators expressed in terms of GDP. This data provides critical insights into the PA’s fiscal 
management and economic performance in the WBGS.  
Table 19: Palestinian Fiscal Indicators, 2004-2011 
(As a Percentage of GDP unless otherwise stated)  
 






  Revenues 
  Recurrent expenditures & net lending 
         Wage expenditures 
         Non-wage expenditures 
         Net lending 
  Recur. balance before ext. support  a/ 
  Recurrent balance before external support  b/ 
  External support (recurrent)  
  Ext.support (including development expend.) c/ 
  Development expenditures b/ 

















































































































a/ Commitment basis   
b/ Cash basis 
c/ In billions of dollars 
 
 During 2004 to 2011 nominal PA expenditures doubled, thanks in large part to greater 
external assistance (see Table 19 above) and slightly increased revenues. While revenues rose from 
US$1,568 million in 2008 to US$2,046 in 2011, thanks in large part to large sums of external 
assistance, revenues as a percentage of GDP fell from 25.7 percent in 2008 to 20.9 percent in 2011. 
At US$2.046 billion in 2011, revenues were US$103 million less than the budged US$2.149 billion. 
During the reform years, taxes and clearance revenues accounted for the most significant increase in 
revenues while nontax revenues declined slightly. In 2011, clearance revenues accounted for two-
thirds of the PA’s revenues, financed around 43 percent of PA spending, and were equivalent to 15 
percent of GDP.334  
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Notably, total recurrent expenditures as a percentage of GDP fell appreciably during the 
reform years, from 47.5 percent of GDP in 2009 to 33.9 percent of GDP in 2011 and are down from a 
peak of 50.2 percent of GDP in 2006. Within expenditures, the nominal wage bill approximately 
doubled since 2004, but has fallen as a percentage of GDP from 21.8 percent in 2009 to 18.2 percent 
in 2011, and is down from a peak of 26.3 percent of GDP in 2006. External assistance to the PA was 
lower than pledged and the PA spent 1.678 billion out of a budgeted $1.709 billion wage bill.  
While public employment experienced net growth during the reform years, some sectors 
grew, while others contracted. The largest area of PA employment growth was the security sector in 
the West Bank, with 1,122 new employees and the second largest area of growth was the addition of 
546 new workers in the education sector in the WBGS in 2011.335  
These statistics demonstrate that the PA has made progress on its expenditure management 
goals as part of its overall public finance reform. However, while expenditures as a percentage of 
GDP have dropped consistently over the past six years, the PA’s expenditures remain a high and 
unsustainable proportion of GDP. The PA should continue to reduce expenditures as a percentage of 
GDP, while it should continue to grow and diversify the revenue base.336  
PA lending and development spending have constituted a small percentage of GDP. PA 
lending began on a downward trend beginning in 2006 and fell from from 5.6 percent of GDP in 
2009 to 1.4 percent in 2011. This reduction was achieved due to the PA ending subsidies to 
municipalities, mostly for electricity bills that were not paid to the Israel Electric Corporation.337  
As a percentage of GDP, development spending constituted 3.5 percent in 2008, 6.0 percent 
in 2009, 3.3 percent in 2010, and 3.0 percent in 2011. Notably, the PA had budgeted for development 
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expenditures that would constitute 5.5 percent of GDP in 2011, but spent less in part due to fiscal 
retrenchment measures necessitated by lower than expected aid levels.  
The PA’s negative cash fiscal balance remained high at the end of the reform years, but was 
far lower than in years past. In 2004, the overall cash balance was -US$124 million; it peaked at US$ 
-1,905 billion in 2008, constituting -31.2 percent of GDP, shown in Tables 16 and 19, respectively. 
During the reform years, the PA’s overall cash fiscal balance fell from US$-1,905 billion in 2008 to 
US$-1,087 billion in 2011, constituting -8.0 percent of GDP in 2011. The lower recurrent cash fiscal 
balance reflects lower levels of PA wage and operating expenditures as a percentage of GDP and 
lower levels of external assistance in the later years, though it remains an exceptionally large 
negative cash balance. 
At first glance, it could appear that the PA was positioned to incur a massive budget deficit 
each year with significantly more expenditures than revenues in its budget, especially during the 
early reform years. However, the exceptionally high budget deficit levels were part of a deliberate 
plan based on enormous pledges of external assistance by the international community that wanted to 
provide financing the PA requested to improve and expand services, particularly in the judicial and 
security sectors. The PA was the recipient of large amounts of planned external assistance relative to 
GDP that has largely offset the correspondingly large negative fiscal balance.  
PA finances followed a different trend in 2011 from previous years. In addition to over 
optimistic projections mentioned earlier, the PA received lower than expected external financing and 
there were delays in clearance revenues, all of which contributed to an accumulation of domestic 
shortfalls, including arrears to the pension fund, private sector suppliers, development projects, and 
in PA wage payments.338 The shortfalls resulted in a fiscal crisis for the PA and in turn the 
government greatly reduced budgeted expenditures and borrowed up to commercial bank limits 
including US$137 million to meet this financing gap, reducing the availability of financing for the 
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private sector. By the end of 2011, debt to commercial banks rose to dangerously high levels at 
US$1.1 billion, which is equivalent to approximately 93 percent of the Palestinian banks’ equity.339 
The PA was still unable to pay bills to its suppliers in a timely manner, hurting business confidence 
and reducing output relative to what it could have been. Due to the lower than expected external 
financing, the PA incurred additional costs in 2011 such as interest payments and other charges 
required by private suppliers of goods and services that were affected by the PA’s funding 
shortfalls.340  
Factors Contributing to Economic Growth 
It is critical to identify factors contributing to Palestinian economic growth. During the 
reform years, the WBGS, especially the West Bank, was experiencing a period of relative peace and 
the economy was recovering from the severe downturn and damage it suffered during the Second 
Intifada. The IMF identified sound economic management; policy reforms such as strengthening 
regulation and supervision of banks in the WBGS; large quantities of donor aid relative to the size of 
the economy, and the easing of Israeli restrictions on internal movement and external trade as factors 
contributing to economic growth.341  Other factors that should be noted include actions by the GoI in 
2011, including, “upgrading commercial crossings, approving projects in Area C, increasing the 
number of permits for Palestinian employment in Israel, and pushing forward an agreement to build 
four electricity substations in the West Bank to increase the amount of electricity available for further 
economic development.”342 Mohammad Mustafa, Head of the Palestine Investment Fund, also credits 
political stability, improved security in the West Bank, and institutional, legal, and economic reforms 
as contributing factors to economic growth in the West Bank.343 The IMF identified key areas that 
could further increase GDP growth including the fulfillment of pledges of assistance by the 
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international community, on time clearance revenue transfers from Israel to the PA, and further 
removal of Israeli barriers to movement in the West Bank. The World Bank offered similar 
sentiments, remarking that sustainable economic growth “necessitates a lifting of Israeli restrictions 
on access to land, water, a range of raw materials, and export markets.”344 
 Foreign Aid and the Non-Governmental Organization Sector 
Following the Second Intifada, PA leaders indicated that very large levels of external 
financing were needed to finance its physical reconstruction, and governance development initiatives 
that would create conditions conducive to economic growth. The international community responded 
by providing generous financing and technical assistance to support the PA reform agenda. The 
results included an expansion of PA services, especially in the security and education sectors. Figure 
5 depicts levels of external support to the PA during 2004 to 2010.  
Figure 5: External Support to the PA, 2004-2010  
(Value in US $ Million) 
 
 
Source: (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2011) 
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Following the end of the Second Intifada in 2005, external aid to the PA grew significantly 
and peaked in 2008. While aid has remained high, the amount of aid has declined each year since. 
The spike in funding not only stemmed from the international community’s willingness to help 
rebuild following the Second Intifada, but also reflects their political support of the incoming leaders 
in the West Bank.  
As shown in Table 16, in 2008, the PA received US$1.979 billion in external assistance, 
equivalent to 31.7 percent of GDP (as shown in Table 19) and budgeted for and received 
progressively less financing in subsequent years. While the rise and fall in external financing to the 
PA largely reflected the PA’s requests for funds, the PA faced a challenge in 2011 when external 
financing was far lower than the aid levels pledged. In 2011 the PA collected a mere US$169 million 
of a projected US$500 million for development expenditures, while external support for recurrent 
expenditures totaled US$771 million of a projected US $967 million showing a higher willingness by 
the international community to fund the PA’s recurrent expenditures than its development initiatives. 
The year 2011 was marked by social unrest in many Middle Eastern and North African countries and 
many of those countries that had made financial pledges to the PA but were unable to or unwilling to 
fulfill their promises.345 
Table 20 identifies major donors to the PA during 2010 and 2011, including individual 
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Table 20: External Financing to the PA, 2010-2011 by donor  
(In million NIS) 
 






Total External Financing 
 
1 Budget Support 
a. Arab Donors 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (a) 
United Arab Emirates 
Qatar 
Oman 
b. International Donors 
USA 
PEGASE 
   Civil servants and pensioners (b) 
   Vulnerable Palestinian Families 
   Support to Essential Public Services 





   Trust Fund 
   Development Grant 
   ESSP 
   FPCR 
   SSNRP 
2 Development Financing (c) 
         CBPERIP 
         Co-Financing for Projects of MOEd 
         Old Grants for Line Ministries 
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52.4 


































































   Source:  (Palestinian National Ministry of Finance 2012) 
   This figure is not representative of the amount of external financing provided by the US to the PA in 2011. See 
   explanation on page 171. 
   a/ Saudi Arabia: In 2011, US$200 million grant, of which US$150 million is budget support and US$50 million is  
   development support (September).  
   b/Civil servants and pensioners: Civil servants and pensioners and civil police and civil defense. 
   c/ Development Financing include all of the CBPERIP, Co. Financing for Projects (MOEd), Old Grants for line 
   ministries, others. 
 
Table 20 shows that overall, external financing to the PA fell considerably from 2010 to 
2011. Saudi Arabia, Algeria, the U.S., the United Arab Emirates and European countries (through 
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PEGASE) contributed large amounts of external financing to the PA.347 Contributions from Egypt 
and the World Bank decreased.  Russia, India, and Qatar did not provide financing to the PA in 2011, 
though these countries had contributed in 2010. 
While Table 20 indicates a sharp drop in U.S. contributions from 2010 to 2011, U.S. budget 
support to the PA actually increased from US$150 million in 2010 to US$200 million in 2011.348 
Further, U.S. budgetary security assistance to the PA is reported separately and totaled US$150 
million in 2011. The total of all U.S. funding to the WBGS is much higher. Zanotti reports: "U.S. 
bilateral assistance to the West Bank and Gaza Strip has averaged nearly US$600 million." 
Typically, the U.S. allocates US$200 million in budgetary assistance, US$100 million in security 
assistance for the PA in the West Bank, and US$300 million for project assistance through grants to 
PNGOs.349 As a comparison, the U.S. gave US$3 billion in military aid to Israel in 2011 and from 
2009 to 2018, the U.S. will give US$30 billion in military aid to Israel. Israel has been the largest 
recipient of U.S. aid since WWII, totaling US$115 billion, with two-thirds of it being military aid.350 
Separate from providing funding to the PA, the international community supports Palestinian 
social and economic development through financing the work of Palestinian and international NGOs 
that provide development assistance.  
The 2009 Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) publication, “Tracking 
External Donor Funding to Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations in the West Bank and Gaza 
1999-2008” indicates that “between 1999 and 2008, external aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
                                                 
347
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increased by over 600% to 3.25 billion US Dollars per year.”351 Lecturer, editor and author on peace-
building and conflict resolution, Mandy Turner, points out that the donor community to Palestine is 
made up of a complex web of 42 donor countries and 30 UN and other multilateral agencies that 
provide assistance.352 
The same MAS publication tracked external donor funding to Palestinian non-governmental 
organizations (PNGOs) and among the findings were that PNGOs in the WBGS have a larger role 
than country NGOs in countries with similar levels of per capita income. PNGOs were established to 
serve Palestinian needs related to the Israeli occupation such as advocating for land, water, and 
human rights, and the needs the nascent PA was unable to fulfill in the 1990s, but their pervasiveness 
and expansion indicates that foreign aid agencies and individual countries are supporting Palestinian 
development through PNGOs. Further, the MAS publication reported that in the WBGS, “between 
1999 and 2008, external aid to PNGPs increased by over 500% from 48 million US Dollars in 1999 
to 257 million in 2008.”353    
PNGOs grew from 930 in 2000 to about 1,500 in 2007, and about 10 percent of international 
aid to the WBGS is channeled through PNGOs. Europe was the largest donor to PNGOs, providing 
nearly 70 percent of their financing. External aid was channeled through PNGOs to address a wide 
range of issues, in which 30 percent went to PNGOs engaged in rights-based activities; 26 percent 
went to PNGOs engaged in social services; 22 percent went to PNGOs engaged in stimulating the 
economy; 14 percent went to PNGOs engaged in education; and nine percent went to PNGOs 
engaged in relief work. Arab countries were less likely to provide financing to PNGOs than they 
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were to provide direct budget support to the PA. Moreover, compared to Western donors, funding 
from Arab countries steadily decreased.354 
Table 21 includes a breakdown in the sources of revenues for PNGOs in the years 1999, 2006 
and 2008. 
Table 21: PNGO Sources of Revenue in 1999, 2006, and 2008 by percentage 
 
 
            Source: (DeVoir and Tartir 2009) 
 
In 1999, external aid accounted for 46.8 percent of PNGO revenues and that figure increased 
substantially to 78.3 percent in 2008. Local donations represented a smaller percentage of PNGO 
revenues, and fell from 10.8 percent in 1999 to 5.3 percent in 2008. Contributions from Palestinian 
Diaspora to PNGOs have been nominal and falling, contributing 2.3 percent of all revenues to 
PNGOs in 2008.355 In 2010, remittances to Palestine were US$2,476.5 million and dropped to 
US$1,552.5 in 2011.356 While there were an estimated 5.6 million Palestinians living in the Diaspora 
in 2009, 4.8 million were refugees and received services from the UNRWA and the Red Crescent.357  
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A key source of PNGO revenues are from the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), which is separate from U.S. funds sent to the PA for budgetary assistance. 
Since 1994, USAID has provided US$3.5 billion in economic assistance to Palestinians.358 With 
PNGOs entrenched throughout the WBGS, to help bring about successful development, they must 
partner and coordinate activities between each other and partner with Palestinian governmental 
institutions and the private sector. 
Another venue through which the U.S. provides external finance is through the UNRWA.359 
In its capacity as the largest state donor to the UNRWA, the U.S. has provided approximately US$4 
billion since its inception on May 1, 1950.360   
The PA and PNGOs in the WBGS are vulnerable because of their high aid dependency. This 
unsustainable situation could quickly deteriorate without continued financing, resulting in the 
collapse of the Palestinian economy, which happened in the past, namely in 2006, due to conflict and 
funds being withheld for political reasons. Mandy Turner points out that past efforts by the 
international community to influence political outcomes in the WBGS have had mixed success and 
argues that the role of external actors in Palestinian state building has not been neutral or always 
positive. When Hamas members won the majority of the seats in the PLC in 2006, anti-terror laws 
prompted the international donor community to abruptly cut off aid to the PA Ministry of Finance’s 
single treasury account. With the PA facing a complete collapse, Arab countries, the Arab League 
and some European countries provided financing indirectly to the PA, through the office of the 
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president. Eventually, the Quartet and the European commission approved the Temporary 
International Mechanism, allowing funds to continue finance the PA.361  
While some actors in the international community are driven to donate in the WBGS by a 
belief that they are supporting the peace process, critics of aid argue that the funds may have a 
limited impact on the peace process, and actually contribute to subsidizing and enabling an illegal 
Israeli occupation. UN officer Anne Le More and Byrnen Rex, Professor at the University of 
Calgary, assert that donor assumptions about contributing to the peace process and peace building 
policies actually entrench the Israeli occupation. For example, by financing projects in Area A and 
Area B and avoiding Area C as it is controlled by the GoI, donors could be contributing to Palestine’s 
fragmentation.362 Another argument that is critical of aid posits that aid (i) fosters rent-
seeking/corruption; (ii) supports malgovernance, and (iii) subsidizes bad economic policies. Rent-
seeking in Palestine will be explored in the section Public Sector Challenges. 
 The U.S. Congress has used its position of influence to withhold promised funding from the 
PA, exposing the fragile nature of aid programs. In the fall of 2011, when the PA submitted an 
application to be considered a member state of the UN, the U.S. congress reacted by withholding 
US$187 million in USAID funds as it felt the Palestinian action was inconsistent with promises to 
resolve issues surrounding Palestinian statehood through bilateral negotiations with Israel. Congress 
approved the release of US$40 million in December 2011, but continued to withhold US$147 
million. The reduction in funds negatively affected USAID agencies’ ability to function, the agency’s 
partners, contractors who do business with the PNGOs, and the PA, causing frustration and 
resentment amongst Palestinians. Notably, the Israeli government did not support the funding freeze 
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because they feared it could weaken the PA and inadvertently empower Hamas and therefore 
encouraged the U.S. Congress to reconsider its decision. U.S. State Department spokesman Victoria 
Nuland reminded congress that the USAID funds are in the interest of the Palestinians, the U.S., and 
Israel saying, “This money goes to establishing and strengthening the institutions of a future 
Palestinian state, building a more democratic and stable and secure region.”363   
One such program that was cancelled due to the cut in funding was Palestinian Sesame 
Street, known as "Sharaa Simsim" in Arabic, which is a program that taught children about peace, 
tolerance, and fairness.364 Ultimately, U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton overrode the U.S. 
congress recommendation and released the funds in April 2012.365  
It seems that external assistance to the PA and PNGOs is critical for Palestine’s social and 
economic development. However, external assistance is given with certain expectations in return and 
if Palestinians are unable or unwilling to meet those expectations, they should not take the aid 
because if they do not meet those expectations and external assistance is cut off suddenly, Palestine 
could quickly transform into an unstable or even unsafe environment for investors. 
The Public Sector and Private Sector 
This section of the thesis will identify the composition of the private sector, explore 
initiatives to grow micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSME), identify challenges to the 
private sector, explore the role of the public sector, and provide an overview of employment and 
unemployment trends in the WBGS.  
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Services, construction, manufacturing and agriculture make up the private sector, while the 
public sector provides services. Figure 6 reflects the growth and contraction of these sectors as a 
percentage of GDP from 1994 through 2010 in the WBGS.  
Figure 6: Palestinian Shares of GDP by Sector Relative to 1994  
(Index; 1994=100) 
 
Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics; and IMF staff estimates. 
(IMF 2011) 
 
Note: In 1994, the shares as percent of GDP were as follows: 9 for public sector services, 46 for private sector 
services, 9 for construction, 20 for manufacturing, and 13 for agriculture. 
 
Figure 6 shows that public sector services have constituted the largest share of the Palestinian 
GDP since the onset of the Second Intifada, and remained relatively stable during the reform years. 
Private sector services declined slightly as a percentage of GDP, construction grew sharply, and 
manufacturing and agriculture remained relatively stable during the reform years, though the latter 
two sectors have steadily fallen as a percentage of GDP since 1994. 
In 1994, private sector services output made up 46 percent of the GDP. Private sector output 
has remained relatively constant since 1994, but has fallen as a percentage of GDP and is a 
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fundamental problem in the Palestinian economy.366  There are many reasons for private sector 
decline as a percentage of GDP, namely the development and expansion of the public sector; wages 
being driven up by aid agencies; measures put in place by Israel; and PA policies, including those in 
the judicial and security sectors. 
Many small and medium-sized businesses are informal and family run and are less likely than 
large businesses to engage in export activities.367 Small and medium-size businesses make up 99 
percent of the private sector, whereas large private enterprises only make up one percent.368 
Businesses operating in the WBGS largely do not have direct access to a seaport or airport, making 
export and import activities more difficult and making it difficult for Palestinians to travel abroad.369 
The private sector will be explored further with regards to investment in Palestine in the subsequent 
section of this thesis. 
Palestinian information and communications technology (ICT) businesses are a small but 
important part of the private sector with enormous potential. The ICT sector emerged in the 1980s, 
servicing the private sector. With the signing of the Oslo Accords in the 1990s, ICT demand 
increased significantly in the public and private sectors. Specifically, the creation of the PA and its 
demand for IT services drove the growth of the ICT sector. In 1995, Palestine Telecommunication 
Company (PalTel) was created as a public shareholding company and was the sole license holder in 
Palestine. In 2011, it served as the largest private sector employer in Palestine with 3,000 employees 
and $US 800 million in assets.370 Further, two mobile operators were created in the WBGS, in 1999 
and 2006.371 By the end of 2011, mobile operator Jawwal had 2.42 million customers.372 
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In addition, the PA Ministry of Economy supported Palestinian entrepreneurs in their 
establishment of the Palestine Information Technology Association of Companies (PITA) in 1999, a 
non-government body that defends the interests of the ICT sector, which cooperates with PalTel.373  
As a result of aforementioned initiatives, there are 391,000 thousand fixed and 169,000 
thousand ADSL subscribers with affordable access to ICT and broad band technology and internet 
through PalTel.374 The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics reported that in 2011, 96.7 percent of 
households had TV sets, 50.9 percent of households own a computer, 30.4 percent of households had 
internet access, and 95 percent of households had a mobile line.375 The sector grew from 3 percent of 
GDP in 1999 to 4.9 percent in 2006, and ICT revenues grew from US$440 million in 2004 to 
US$882 million in 2007. Additionally, ICT exports grew from US$79 million in 2004 to US$196 
million in 2007.376 Palestinian information technology and software exports have grown, in part 
because Cisco, HP, and Intel, among other firms, outsource development work to Palestinian 
software companies.377  
Recognizing the growth potential in the information and communication technology sector, 
the Middle East Venture Capital Fund (MEVCF) created the first Palestinian venture capital fund in 
2011. Cisco, Google, the Skoll Foundation and the European Investment Bank are among the 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Palestine Trade Center’s (PalTrade) purpose is to lead the development of Palestinian trade as a driving force 
for sustainable national economic growth. As the National Trade Development Organization (NTDO) and a 
membership of more than 327 Palestinian leading businesses, PalTrade advocates a competitive, enabling business 
environment and is dedicated to improving trade competitiveness through trade promotion and capacity building. 
(Kawasmi and White 2010) 
372
 Paltel Group. “2012 at a glance.” PalTel Group. 2012. 
http://paltelgroup.ps/index.php?TemplateId=1&PageId=7&ParentId=14&MenuId=19&Lang=en (accessed January 
3, 2012).  
373
 PITA. “Overview.” Palestine Information Technology Association of Companies. 2012. 
http://www.pita.ps/content/overview (accessed January 3, 2013).  
374
 (Kawasmi and White 2010) 
375
 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Palestine - Household Survey on Information and Communications 
Technology. Palestinian National Authority, 2011.  
376
 (PalTrade 2010) 
377
 The Aspen Institute. “Palestinian technology venture fund MEVCF launches operations securing $28.7M.” The 
Aspen Institute. March 9, 2011. http://www.aspeninstitute.org/news/2011/03/09/palestinian-technology-venture-
fund-mevcf-launches-operations (accessed March 11, 2012).  
133 
 
investors providing US$28.7 million for the venture fund.378 The MEVCF targets internet, mobile 
and software startup companies in the West Bank to finance. The fund provides Palestinian software 
entrepreneurs access to risk capital and international markets, which they need in order to be 
competitive on the world stage. This type of investment is critical to providing high quality jobs to 
Palestinian engineers and programmers, many of which might otherwise leave Palestine in search of 
job opportunities.379 
There is potential for significant growth of the Palestinian ICT sector. ICT is significant part 
of the Israeli and Jordanian economies. In Jordan, the ICT sector contribution to the GDP was 14 
percent in 2009. There are many reasons more extensive ICT growth has not been realized in the 
WBGS. Significant challenges in the development of the ICT sector remain, and many are related to 
the Oslo Interim Agreement. In August 2010, PalTrade released a report outlining these challenges, 
including: “Telecommunication operators, Internet Service Providers, and ICT companies continue 
to have difficulty acquiring needed frequencies for existing and potential wireless networks, building 
telecom networks in Area C and importing needed equipment. New restrictions have been imposed 
by the Israelis, due to unclear restrictions and policies, including the refusal to release frequencies 
needed for the development of existing mobile networks and the development of new advanced 
wireless and mobile networks.”380 The report further explains that the Joint Technical Committee, 
which includes GoI and PA representatives and which is supposed to address technical issues 
between both sides has only met twice since 2000, in 2005 and 2007.  
While the ICT subsector of the private sector has grown in recent years and promises 
tremendous growth potential, there has been a strong shift away from the agricultural sector. In 1994, 
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agricultural output made up 13 percent as a share of the GDP, and fell to 6 percent in 2010.381 The 
trend continued into 2011, with agricultural sector output in the West Bank falling by nearly 4.5 
percent in the first three quarters.382 The fragmentation of the West Bank has been caused by 
increasing Israeli settlement (from 1967 to present) and subsequent infrastructure within Area C 
where agricultural activities were once common that accelerated with the signing of the Oslo 
Accords in 1993. Coupled with restrictions on movement and restricted access to water, these 
measures have significantly limited agricultural potential in the West Bank.383 The fragmentation of 
the West Bank is demonstrated in Map 2. 
At the same time, the PA and GoI provided inadequate measures for land registration to 
Palestinians, especially in Area C, which oftentimes resulted in a loss of land when Israeli settlers 
made claims for the land. The agriculture sector has also been hurt by limitations on exports as 
stipulated in the PER.384 Measures by the GoI also have had a negative effect on agriculture in the 
West Bank. The GoI prohibits many Palestinian farmers from living on their land in Area C and 
limits their access to the land during important times of the year. As a prerequisite to working the 
land, Palestinians must obtain permits, which have been increasingly difficult to obtain, with 94 
percent of permit requests being rejected in recent years.385 The Israeli government typically requires 
that farmers enter their land on foot. By restricting farm machinery and extra laborers, Palestinian 
agricultural potential and profitability is greatly reduced. These measures have had an impact on the 
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types of crops grown and Palestinian farmers are increasingly giving up more time and labor 
intensive fruit and vegetable harvests for less profitable olive harvests.386 
On the eastern strip of the West Bank in the South, known as the Jordan Valley, the land is 
particularly fertile and ideal for agriculture. It is home to tens of thousands of temporary and 
permanently-based Palestinians. The land in the Jordan Valley available to Palestinian development 
is just six percent, while 37 Israeli settlements control 86 percent of the land. Settlers receive 
subsidies from the GoI and many of the individuals in the settlements are engaged in modern 
agribusinesses and export to Europe. Palestinians could also develop a cosmetics industry from 
mineral extraction from the Dead Sea, which has proved profitable for Israeli settlement 
communities. In 2012, Oxfam reflected on Palestinian economic potential and restrictions in the 
Jordan Valley including in a briefing paper: “It is estimated that if Israeli restrictions on Palestinian 
development were removed, an additional 50 sq/km of the Jordan Valley could be cultivated, 
potentially adding $1bn a year to the Palestinian economy, or 9 percent of gross domestic product.” 
Presently, Palestinians are discouraged from engaging in agriculture in the Jordan Valley, and face 
obstacles such as obtaining permits and greatly increased transportation costs because of Israeli 
checkpoints.387 
The manufacturing sector has also been in relative decline in recent years, signaling a process 
of de-industrialization. As a share of WGBS trade, manufacturing and agriculture fell from 33 
percent of total trade in 1994 to 19 percent in 2010, and continued declining during the reform 
years.388 The World Bank reported that as a share of Palestinian employment, manufacturing fell 
from 17 percent of total employment in 1998 to 13 percent in 2009 and “value added in 
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manufacturing fell by about 20 percent between 2004 and 2007.”389 From 2007 to 2010, the GoI 
imposed a blockade of consumer and capital goods and raw materials in the Gaza Strip, and partially 
lifted the blockade on consumer goods in 2010. Specifically, construction inputs and raw materials 
for the private sector were not allowed in, raising production costs. Higher production costs resulted 
from controls on imported capital goods and raw materials in the Gaza Strip imposed by the IDF that 
constrained revenue by restricting access to outside markets.390 
Following long-term overall decline in manufacturing, a March 2012 World Bank report 
indicates that the manufacturing sector grew by more than 9 percent in the first three quarters of 2011 
compared to the same period in 2010, possibly indicating a positive trend and stimulation from the 
numerous investment initiatives during the reform years. However, this sector continues to face many 
trade-related obstacles.391 A 2011 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) report indicates that even more than other sectors of the economy, the manufacturing 
sector could benefit more from engaging in trade and being exposed to competitive global markets.392 
While the recent positive trend in the manufacturing sector appears promising, the improvement is 
nominal as the percentage of individuals employed in manufacturing has steadily decreased since 
1995, as has its contribution to GDP.  
Non-tradable sectors of the Palestinian economy, such as construction and related activities, 
are less vulnerable to physical controls and these sectors have grown in recent years. Although 
construction output has grown overall, productivity in this sector has fluctuated in correlation with 
conflicts and Israeli blockades. Certain inputs and raw materials needed for construction have been 
limited at times for import by Israel, particularly in the Gaza Strip. While construction had been a 
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strong driver of jobs and growth during 2009 and 2010 for West Bank Palestinians, by 2011, 
construction growth slowed considerably in 2011.393 
Initiatives to Grow the Private Sector 
A January 2012 World Bank report found that companies in the WBGS have been affected 
by years of conflict and are less sophisticated compared to companies in countries with similar 
income levels. In particular, companies were unfamiliar with how to go about accessing external 
markets and found investing in export markets challenging because it was expensive and time 
consuming. These companies found local investment more attractive and feasible. The World Bank 
suggested that technical assistance was more important to Palestinian enterprises than financial 
support in their success.394 The PA, foreign governments, and international bodies of states carried 
out initiatives during the reform years to increase the effectiveness and reach of existing companies 
in the WBGS, and to stimulate investment in Palestine.  
In 2008, seventy percent of the MSMEs operated in the wholesale, retail, and manufacturing 
sectors, generating 87 percent of private sector employment. In 2010, the PA’s Ministry of National 
Economy and the International Labour Organization partnered on a project to assess conditions for 
the development of MSMEs in the WBGS and to contribute towards the creation of more and better 
employment in the MSME sector. The project report indicated that limited access to markets and 
financing are constraining the growth of MSMEs, indicating more programs such as the World Bank 
program referenced above are needed. There are significant recent initiatives underway to fill this 
need. Microfinance institutions have begun to fill the need of financing for some of these firms, 
especially medium-sized and some small enterprises. Further, the report shows that many MSME’s 
do not participate in vertical value chains, limiting their access to markets and they often do not own 
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land, reducing physical space in which to operate and trade from, and lack collateral to obtain loans 
from commercial banks. The report suggests the PA should continue implementing policy and legal 
reforms to incentivize the formalization of many formal MSMEs by implementing measures such as 
reducing the legal and regulatory burdens formal MSME’s face.395 These types of assessments are a 
critical step in evaluating the needs of the private sector, and identifying steps the PA can take to 
support it. 
In addition to efforts by the PA and the GoI’s aforementioned initiatives in 2011, initiatives 
by international organizations also promoted private sector development and trade in the West 
Bank.396 The World Bank and the United Kingdom Department for International Development 
implemented a pilot project in the WBGS from July 2008 through April 2011 to assist Palestinian 
enterprises produce higher value goods and services and to enter new markets. Together, they created 
the Palestinian Facility for New Market Development (FNMD), which provided grants to individual 
firms and associated groups of companies to partially finance their investment projects and worked 
with clients throughout the process, and succeeded in assisting companies enter new local and export 
markets. By 2011, FNMD served 226 companies, 85 percent of which employed 20 workers or less 
from a broad range of sectors.397  
While the FNMD could not reduce investment requirements, including funding and time 
resources, they were able to successfully provide capital and technical assistance to companies. 
During the program, 8.4 percent of clients became first time exporters, companies entered new 
markets, and companies developed or improved products or services. The FNMD project is an 
example of a successful model of private sector development in the WBGS. The World Bank 
credited the success to its program design. FNMD was in no way connected to the PA, making it less 
susceptible to disruptions in aid flows, which can be halted, depending on what political party is in 
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power. For example, when Hamas was elected in 2006, FNMD was able to continue its programs in 
Gaza, whereas programs relying on PA coordination and financing were deeply hurt or unable to 
operate due to funding cuts to the PA by the international community that was boycotting the 
election results.  
In an effort to boost private sector growth, the World Bank is now in the process of 
establishing a larger and longer running project in Palestine, including a large multi-donor trust fund 
and a large private sector development intervention program.398 This investment model has shown 
that external assistance, coupled with high levels of technical assistance and independence from the 
government, has the potential to make a powerful contribution to promoting Palestinian economic 
growth.   
PNGOs as a Challenge to the Private Sector 
While some services PNGOs are critical to economic and social progress, such as job skills 
training and women empowerment, overall, the pervasiveness of PNGOs in the WBGS and their 
extensive financing and tax benefits has a negative impact on the private sector. During the reform 
years, businesses in the private sector struggled to compete with PNGOs, which received large sums 
of external financing. In an atypical situation, PNGOs paid educated Palestinians salaries four to five 
times higher than what the local private sector typically paid.399  
In May 2011, Khaled Al Sabawi, President and Founder of Middle East North Africa 
(MENA) Geothermal argued that the growing number of PNGOs made it difficult for Palestinian 
businesses to recruit professional human capital in the West Bank.400 To compete, Palestinian 
businesses had to offer higher salaries than they would without the large presence of PNGOs, which 
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reduced returns to capital and reduced Palestine’s competitiveness in attracting investments. Al 
Sabawi argues external aid and NGOs are undermining Palestinians’ ability to achieve a truly 
independent state.401  
Public Sector Challenges 
In 1994, public sector services output constituted 9 percent of the GDP.402  At that time, the 
PA had not yet been formed. State institutions and the legal framework were extremely 
underdeveloped. Hence, when the PA was established in 1995, there was an effort by the 
international community to help Palestinians develop and grow the public sector to fill basic 
governing functions within the WBGS. 
Growth in public sector services grew beyond the necessary capacity, creating inefficiencies 
and inflating PA expenditures on the PA wage bill and by offering higher paying jobs, created 
undesirable competition with the private sector. The World Bank reports that the majority of the 
service sector growth is from public sector activities including healthcare, social services, education, 
and public administration. While these activities are critical to a country, they are unlikely to lead to 
long-term sustainable economic growth and must be complimented by a thriving private sector.403 
Corruption, a form of rent-seeking, has historically been a problem in Palestine, specifically 
within the public sector. While corruption remains prevalent in the West Bank, there were serious 
efforts to curb corruption during the reform years and the dividends of these efforts will likely 
transpire in coming years. A rent can be defined as income above and beyond the returns that would 
be available in a purely competitive market free of government intervention. Rents can be dispensed 
directly by governments to beneficiaries in the form of direct subsidies or they can be created by 
policy-induced price distortions designed to benefit political clienteles. Private monopolies and 
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oligopolies also garner rents but these usually are created by government policies. Activities 
associated with seeking rents are referred to as rent-seeking. University of Kansas Adjunct Professor 
and former UN and World Bank economist Richard Lynn Ground outlines the impact of rent-seeking 
and its effects on economic activity and collective welfare in a society. Ground points out that rent-
seeking imposes large social costs on society, except by those imposing the rents, and reduces the 
real income of consumers. Time, work and money spent on seeking rents is not only wasted in a 
collective or societal sense, but it results in a deadweight loss as it does not produce anything of 
social value. Further, rent-seeking reduces overall economic activity and welfare, diverting resources 
away from efficient economic activities to inefficient ones.404  
In 2011, Transparency International reported that nepotism and using connections to 
accomplish one’s aims were widespread and “the most prevalent form of corruption in the 
governmental, civic and private sectors.” Some examples of this form of corruption include “senior 
public office appointments, and access to public services such as licenses and permits.” These are 
punishable crimes per a 2010 anti-corruption law. However, the practice is slow to change, with 41 
percent of Palestinians indicating they engaged in this behavior for public sector services in 2011.405  
 The PA has recognized that corruption is a problem that must be curbed and has passed 
legislation to spur the reform process. Building upon a 2005 Illicit Gains Law and a 2007 Anti-
Money Laundering Law, the PA passed the Anti-Corruption Law and created an Anti-Corruption 
Court in 2010. In 2009, the Coalition for Integrity and Accountability (AMAN), a chapter of 
Transparency International, was established in Ramallah and a chapter was established in Gaza in 
March 2010. Through AMAN’s Advocacy and Legal Advice Center (ALAC), it informs citizens 
about the concept of corruption, determines levels of corruption in Palestine and guides the public on 
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what can be done to combat corruption.406 In large part due to Transparency International’s work in 
Palestine, in 2010, Palestine’s Council of Ministers declared a ban on the use of government vehicles 
outside office hours, with the exception of the Prime Minister, and 6,200 cars were reclaimed from 
civil servants who were using the cars for private use.407 In April 2010, an investigation by AMAN 
uncovered cases of unions in the West Bank charging excessive fees for services. Consequently, the 
Ministry of Labor wrote to all unions to warn them that if any union was found to be engaging in the 
illegal practice it would face penalties. In 2010, ALAC identified sexual harassment in the workforce 
as a widespread problem. It organized a workshop on the topic and included many representatives 
from PA ministries, women’s groups, research institutions, and Birzeit University located in the West 
Bank, through which participants made suggestions to address the problem, including the 
promulgation of legislation defining and banning sexual harassment.408 Further, Transparency 
International reported that "In 2011, a code of conduct was developed for Palestinian political parties 
and factions" and in 2010 "The Palestinian Anti-Corruption Commission was established...to hold 
corrupt individuals to account" and "the commission has the authority to proactively investigate and 
enforce the law in cooperation with the General Attorney."409 These policies have led to many 
investigations and charges against public officials for corruption.410 
It is evident that during the reform years, the PA, along with Transparency International, has 
made a pointed effort to identify and reduce corruption. As many of these are recent efforts, 
corruption remains a persistent challenge for Palestinians and investors. While Palestine is not 
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included in Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions ranking, in 2010, for the first 
time in Palestine, Transparency International carried out some surveys and included the responses in 
its annual Corruption Perceptions Index. It should be noted that there is no distinction between 
corruption in the West Bank and corruption in Gaza. The results are included in Table 22.411  
Table 22: Palestinian Responses in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, 2010 
 
Question Percentage 
Percentage of people reported paying a bribe in 2010 51% 
Percentage of people who feel their government’s efforts to fight corruption are ineffective 17% 
Percentage of people who feel their government’s efforts to fight corruption are neither effective or 
ineffective 
65% 
Percentage of people who feel their government’s efforts to fight corruption are effective 18% 
Percentage of people who feel that during  2007-2010, their government’s anti-corruption efforts 
have increased 
22% 
Percentage of people who feel that during  2007-2010, their government’s anti-corruption efforts 
have stayed the same 
19% 
Percentage of people who feel that during  2007-2010, their government’s anti-corruption efforts 
have decreased 
59% 
Percentage of users paying a bribe to receive attention from at least one of nine different service 
providers in the past 12 months 
51% 
Source: (Riano, Heinrich and Hodess 2010) 
Within the survey, Transparency International also asked Palestinians what institution they 
perceived to be most affected by corruption and the response was political parties. By observing the 
public opinion responses to the questions in Table 22, it is evident that Palestinians experience 
corruption on a regular basis and perceived the PA’s anti-corruption efforts as being insufficient and 
ineffective. As Transparency International is new in Palestine and two significant measures by the 
PA—the Anti-Corruption Law and the Anti-Corruption Court—were developed in 2010, the survey 
is reflective of corruption up until that point and does not reflect all of the new efforts aimed at 
reducing corruption. There is a lag between the creation and passing of reforms and their 
implementation and changes in public perception.  
Corruption in Palestine reduces overall economic welfare in the country. In order to 
capitalize economically on Palestinians’ time, energy and talents, the PA must continue efforts to 
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enforce new laws and stem corruption, especially as rents cause a disproportionate welfare loss on 
those living at or below the poverty line.412 Rents add negative and unnecessary costs to the 
Palestinian economy, though no estimates are available to the amount of these costs. 
Employment, Unemployment, and Education 
The PA collects data on Palestinians employed in the private sector, the public sector, and in 
Israel and the settlements. Table 23 depicts Palestinian participation and wages in these sectors. 
Table 23: Percentage Distribution of Employed Person and Average Daily Wage in NIS for 
Wage Employees in the WBGS by Sector and Region 2000-2010 
 
       Source: (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2011) 
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Table 23 shows that employment in the public sector, private sector, and Israel and the 
settlements follow different trends for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In the West Bank, the private 
sector consistently provided more than four times more jobs than the public sector during  2000 to 
2010, whereas in the Gaza Strip, the private sector has historically only provided slightly more jobs 
than the public sector, though in 2003 private sector employment peaked, providing more than two 
times more jobs than the public sector. Further, West Bank Palestinians work in Israel and the 
settlements while Gazans have not since 2005. Palestinian employment in Israel and the settlements 
was highest in 2000 and fell dramatically during the Second Intifada. In the West Bank, employment 
in Israel and the settlements recovered to 10 percent of the working population by 2011, though it 
was still far less than in 2000, when 18.8 percent of the population worked in Israel and the 
settlements. Wages in Israel and the settlements were much higher than wages in the public or private 
sector in Palestine, at a rate nearly double what a typical employee would earn in the private sector in 
the West Bank in 2010. Public sector work paid more than the private sector in the WBGS and wages 
in the public sector grew at a faster rate than the private sector in the West Bank during the reform 
years, depressing the development of the private sector. In 2010, public sector wages were slightly 
higher than the private sector in the West Bank, while public sector wages in the Gaza Strip were 
about one and a half times the wages in the private sector.  
Table 23 provides a framework of what employees earn in various sectors of the economy. In 
2010, a Palestinian who worked in construction earned on average two times the wages of a person 
who worked in agriculture. All other employment paid on average somewhere between agriculture 
and construction.413  
Table 24 provides the percentage distribution of employed persons in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip by economic activity during 1995 to 2010. Notably, this table does not distinguish private 
sector from the public sector. 
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Table 24: Percentage Distribution of Employed Persons in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by 



















‘95 12.7 18.0 19.2 19.6 4.9 25.6 100 
‘96 14.2 16.8 16.8 18.2 4.8 29.2 100 
‘97 13.1 16.4 18.4 19.1 4.8 28.2 100 
‘98 12.1 15.9 22.0 18.2 4.7 27.0 100 
‘99 12.6 15.5 22.1 17.0 4.7 28.1 100 
‘00 14.1 14.2 19.4 17.3 4.9 30.1 100 
‘01 12.2 13.8 14.2 19.5 5.5 34.8 100 
‘02 15.3 12.7 10.7 19.8 5.5 36.0 100 
‘03 16.2 12.5 12.9 19.9 5.7 32.8 100 
‘04 16.4 12.6 11.5 19.4 5.3 34.8 100 
‘05 15.0 12.9 12.8 19.2 5.6 34.5 100 
‘06 16.7 12.3 11.0 19.0 5.6 35.4 100 
‘07 16.1 12.5 10.9 19.4 5.5 35.6 100 
‘08 14.1 12.3 10.7 19.8 4.9 38.2 100 
‘09 11.8 12.1 11.7 19.1 5.7 39.6 100 
‘10 11.8 11.4 13.2 19.3 6.0 38.3 100 
Source: (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2011) 
 
A brief analysis of Table 24 above shows that services by far employ the largest segment of 
the Palestinian population. In 2010, 38.3 percent of the workforce was employed in the services 
sector, while employment in commerce, hotels and restaurants was the second highest at 19.3 
percent. During the reform years, beginning in 2009, employment fell in agriculture. Employment 
rose in transportation, storage, and communication, and in construction. Employment in services; 
commerce, hotels and restaurants; and mining, quarrying, and manufacturing mostly stayed the same. 
The number of settlements and the number of Palestinians from the West Bank who work in 
Israel and the settlements has been rebounding. In 2010, the settler population growth rate in the 
West Bank was 4.9 percent, while the growth rate of the general population in Israel was 1.9 
percent.414 Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank grew by 20 percent during 2010 to 2011, 
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which contributed to a doubling of the number of Palestinians displaced by demolitions of 
Palestinian property near the settlements.415  Earlier, Table 14 showed that the proportion of 
Palestinians working in Israel and the settlements fell from 16.2 percent in 1995 to 8.0 percent in 
2004 and then rebounded slightly to 10.0 percent in 2011. As Table 23 indicated, Palestinians earn 
much higher wages in Israel and the settlements than they do in Palestine, so the trends of increased 
employment there have contributed to a rising living standard for Palestinians in recent years. 
The PA has indicated that as Palestinians help Israel builds settlements on West Bank land, 
Palestinians’ chances for an independent and recognized Palestinian state on that same land 
diminishes. In the midst of the reform years, in April 2010, the PA placed a ban on employment of 
Palestinians in the Israeli settlements.416 
Indeed, employment within Israel and in the settlements is riddled with risks and Palestinians 
should reduce their high dependence on these jobs. The availability of work in Israel and the 
settlements is ever changing and the ability of Palestinians to get work permits to work in Israel is 
uncertain. In the event of a peace deal with Palestinians, Israel may remove some or all of its 
settlements. Despite these risks, jobs in Israel and the settlements are highly sought after, as there is a 
shortage of jobs in the West Bank and employment in Israel or in the settlements provide double the 
wages of the Palestinian public sector, which in turn are slightly higher than in the private sector, 
which can be observed in Table 23. 
With the passing of the ban on Palestinian employment in the Israeli settlements in the West 
Bank in 2010, the PA envisioned an incremental reduction in employment in the settlements until 
there was no more by the end of 2011. While the PA acknowledged that Palestinians and the 
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Palestinian economy were dependent on those jobs, it hoped the ban would curb that dependence, 
despite already high rates of unemployment in the West Bank. In addition to passing the ban on 
employment in the settlements with threats of punishment for violating the ban, including up to five 
years in jail and steep fines, the PA unsuccessfully tried to entice international donors to contribute to 
an investment fund to create employment opportunities in the West Bank so that it could subsidize 
employment in the private sector. 417   
It turned out that no amount of national pride and fear of punishment could stop Palestinians 
from working in the settlements and the PA did not follow through with punishing Palestinians who 
violated the employment ban. In fact, a significant and growing portion of Palestinians travelled to 
work in Israel or in the settlements, either legally with permits or illegally without work permits 
during the reform years as that employment has constituted a crucial income source for West Bank 
Palestinians as there was no alternative employment. 418 
The high rate of unemployment has a serious impact on Palestinians’ everyday lives. While 
the earlier Figure 3 shows a graphical representation of unemployment trends and projections in the 
WBGS along with historical events that may have influenced unemployment rates, Table 25 provides 
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Table 25:  Percentage Distribution of Unemployed Population in the West Bank, 1995-2011 
 
Year Unemployed in 
Thousands, 15 
Years and Above 
Unemployment 
Percent, 15 Years 
and Above 
Unemployment 
Percent, 15 – 24 
years 
1995 50 13.9 -- 
1996 77 19.6 26.8 
1997 74 17.3 24.5 
1998 52 11.5 17.9 
1999 44 9.5 13.6 
2000 56 12.2 16.7 
2001 97 21.6 31.8 
2002 127 28.2 40.3 
2003 116 23.7 36.1 
2004 117 22.8 35.3 
2005 110 20.4 32.0 
2006 108 18.8 28.5 
2007 107 17.9 28.5 
2008 120 19.7 30.9 
2009 114 17.8 29.5 
2010 114 17.2 28.2 
2011 124 17.3 28.8 
      Source: (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2012) 
 
Table 25 reveals that between 1995 and 2011, the lowest unemployment rate in the West 
Bank was during the eve of the Second Intifada. In1999, the West Bank unemployment rate was 9.5 
percent. With the onset of the Intifada, the unemployment rate rose sharply to 28.2 percent by 2002. 
The unemployment rate has since fallen, yet remains high at 17.3 percent in 2011.419 The improved 
unemployment rate in the West Bank correlates with the lack of widespread conflict in the West 
Bank, a growing Palestinian economy, increased investment and jobs, and the recent increase in 
employment of Palestinians in Israel and the settlements.  
The current rate of unemployment is much higher than what Palestinians experienced in the 
mid to late 1990s, and far higher than earlier periods. The PA and GoI can further reduce 
unemployment within the West Bank in the short term on relaxing the number of individuals allowed 
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to work in Israel and the settlements and can reduce unemployment within the West Bank in the 
long-term by taking measures to stimulate private sector development and employment.  
Unemployment amongst Palestinian youth, categorized as individuals aged 15-24, has 
traditionally been much higher than the overall unemployment rate in the West Bank. The youth 
unemployment rate fell slightly during the reform years. In 2008, the youth unemployment rate was 
30.9, falling slightly to 29.5 percent in 2009, falling slightly to 28.2 percent in 2010 and rising 
slightly to 28.8 percent in 2011. While the youth unemployment rate made moderate progress, it 
remains a problem. 
Palestine enjoys a high literacy rate and widespread advanced English language 
comprehension, seemingly making Palestinians well suited employees for local and international 
businesses in Palestine.420 Basic education, defined as ten years of schooling, is compulsory and 
free.421 According to UNICEF, in the WBGS in 2010, the literacy rate for males and females ages 15-
24 was 99 percent.422 The PA’s Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MOEHE) is 
responsible for all levels of educational development in Palestine and supervises public, private, and 
UMRWA schools.423  
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Table 26: Number of Schools by Region, Supervising Authority and School Gender, 2010/2011 
 
 
  Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. “Number of Schools by Region,  
  Supervising Authority and School Gender, 2010/2011.” Palestinian Central Bureau  
  of Statistics. 2012. http://82.213.38.42/Portals/_pcbs/educatio/edua05.htm (accessed  
  December 6, 2012).  
 
 In 2011, public schools constituted 74 percent of all schools, while private schools and 
UNRWA schools each made up approximately 15 percent of schools in the West Bank. There was a 
higher proportion of private schools in the West Bank and a higher proportion of UNRWA schools in 
the Gaza Strip. In the West Bank, public schools made up 80 percent of all schools, UNRWA schools 
made up five percent of all schools, and private schools made up 19 percent of schools. Among 
higher education institutions, 18 were public, 14 were private, 13 were governmental, and three were 
UNRWA.424 The presence of private schools in the WBGS promotes competition among schools.  
                                                 
424
 PA Ministry of Higher Education. Palestinian Higher Education Statistics: 2010/2011. Palestinian National 
Authority (PA) Ministry of Higher Education, 2011. 
152 
 
Despite high levels of literacy in Palestine, businesses have indicated that Palestinian 
graduates lack critical thinking and problem-solving skills along with technology skills needed in the 
workforce. Further, as mentioned earlier, despite a pool of literate, bilingual young people, youth, 
individuals defined as between the ages 15 to 29, have a disproportionally higher unemployment rate. 
The World Bank suggests educational reform to include hands-on learning experiences and inquiry-
based exercises so that young people are better prepared and qualified for employment.425   
The PA has responded to reports of shortcomings in its education system and beginning in 
2008, it began implementing an education sector reform plan to improve the quality of education and 
relevance of graduates’ skills. It has been investing in quality improvement in curriculum to 
“promote and secure development of skills relevant to labor market needs among Palestinian 
students.”426 It will likely be many years for the efforts to make a significant impact in the Palestinian 
workforce and economy. The PA, the UNRWA, and private schools must continue to invest in 
education and improve curriculum so that graduates have skills needed for a thriving Palestinian 
workforce.  
The World Bank has taken an active role in identifying areas of weakness in the Palestinian 
education system and has launched initiatives to improve the quality of education in Palestine. The 
World Bank’s Quality Improvement Fund provided financing for a Palestinian tertiary education 
project that began in 2009 and lasted through December 31, 2012. As of September 2011, the fund 
had distributed US$11 million, aimed at helping colleges and universities, “to further strengthen the 
quality, relevance, and international competitiveness of tertiary institutions.”427 The World Bank 
called on businesses to take on a more active role in identifying the skills it needs in its workforce 
and then working with universities and technical schools to incorporate training for these skills in the 
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classroom and out of classroom. Schools and universities can also facilitate this by creating 
apprenticeship and internship programs to better prepare individuals with the practical skills they 
need to make them desirable candidates for employment. 428    
PNGOs also provide educational services in Palestine, often using volunteers and interns to 
expand their reach in a particular community. One such example is Tomorrow’s Youth Organization, 
a non-profit organization in the West Bank city of NAblus with an affiliate in the US, which among 
other things, assists women, many from refugee camps; and finds ways to transfer the skills they 
have into small businesses or help them get training in new skills to expand their employment 
options.429   
Investment and job creation in the West Bank should continue to be a priority, as a growing 
economy and declining unemployment rate translates into growth and stability for Israel and 
Palestine. 
Doing Business in the West Bank: Policies and Performance 
 The West Bank has the undesirable distinction of being a fragmented portion of an occupied 
Palestinian state that recently emerged from violent conflict with Israel. Its governing body is 
relatively new and only has partial authority over the territory. Palestinians or others considering 
engaging in business in the West Bank must determine if the West Bank will be a safe and profitable 
place to do business. While violence in the West Bank since the Second Intifada has largely been 
limited to small groups of people clashing over ideological and political differences and has not 
targeted local or foreign business owners, some individuals perceive all of Palestine a conflict-ridden 
country based on its violent past. It is therefore important to assess the business environment in the 
                                                 
428
 (The World Bank 2011) 
429
 Tomorrow’s Youth Organization. “Locations: Nablus.” Tomorrow’s Youth Organization. 2013. 




West Bank, identify threats and constraints to businesses operating in the West Bank, and the 
effectiveness of recent initiatives aimed at strengthening the business environment. 
The World Bank carries out an analysis of the ease of doing business for small and medium-
sized companies by measuring business regulations and the protection of property rights and their 
effect on businesses across 183 economies through its annual Doing Business project. The resulting 
annual Doing Business report ranks the economies according to indicators that measure the ease or 
difficulty of doing business. Within an analysis of the business environment in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, the Doing Business indicators will be referenced, though there are many limitations to the 
data.430 Table 27 includes Doing Business indicators for countries in the Middle East Region in 2012, 
along with Doing Business indicators for the WBGS in 2011.  

































Overall Ranking 128 131 34 110 96 134 71 104 
GNI Per Capita (US $)    --    27,340 2,340 4,350 2,640 9,500 9,020 
Starting a Business 173 177 43 21 95 129 61 109 
Dealing with  
Construction  Permits 
123 129 137 154 93 133 155 161 
Getting Electricity 85 85 93 101 36 83 72 47 
Registering Property 78 78 147 93 101 82 44 105 
Getting Credit 152 166 8 78 150 174 78 78 
Protecting Investors 44 46 5 79 122 111 65 97 
Paying Taxes 37 39 59 145 21 111 79 30 
Trading Across 
Borders 
114 114 10 64 58 122 80 93 
Enforcing Contracts 93 93 94 147 130 175 51 120 
Resolving Insolvency 183 183 45 137 104 120 120 125 
Source: The World Bank. “The Ease of Doing Business in West Bank and Gaza.” The World Bank. 2012.  
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/west-bank-and-gaza (accessed December 2, 2012). 
                                                 
430
 The World Bank. Doing Business. 2013. http://www.doingbusiness.org/ (accessed January 3, 2013).  
While the World Bank’s Doing Business project began in 2002 and the World Bank collected some data on doing 
business in the WBGS beginning in 2004, the World Bank only began providing rankings for the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip in 2011, so a long-term observation of Doing Business ranking trends in the WBGS is impossible. The 
Doing Business regulations are relevant to businesses in Ramallah, the largest business city in the West Bank. 
Further, the regulations are specific to a private limited liability company.  
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 Based on Doing Business rankings in Table 27, regionally, the best working environment for 
a small and medium sized-business is Israel, with Turkey and Jordan, and Lebanon, Egypt, the 
WBGS, and Syria trailing, in order. The overall WBGS Doing Business rank in 2012 was 131 out of 
183 economies, which was lower by three from 2011. With a ranking of 134, Syria was the only 
country in the region with a worse Doing Business ranking than the WBGS. 
The World Banks’s analysis in the WBGS shows that some business regulations rank well 
and others rank mediocre or poorly compared to other economies. The WBGS overall ranking was 
poor, though it received strong rankings and surpassed regional ratings in a couple of areas. The 
WBGS received strong rankings for collecting taxes and protecting investors. Namely, out of 183 
economies, the WBGS ranked 39 for collecting taxes and 46 for protecting investors in 2012. The 
WBGS received its poorest ratings with regards to getting credit, starting a business, and resolving 
insolvency, ranking at 166, 177 and 183 in 2012, respectively. Notably, resolving insolvency is a 
significant regional problem, as all countries in the region scored poorly except for Israel. There is 
simply no practice with regards to resolving insolvency in the WBGS, so this is an area that should 
immediately be addressed by developing procedures to resolve insolvency, which will result in an 
immediate improvement in the business environment and Doing Business ranking. With regards to 
starting a business, Israel, Egypt and Turkey rank relatively well, though otherwise it is a regional 
challenge. Table 28 provides information about Doing Business indicators relating to time and cost  
to comply with government regulations in Palestine that provide insight into how the WBGS was 
ranked in 2012 while Table 29 tracks Doing Business indicators related to starting a business in the 






Table 28: The World Bank Doing Business Country Tables, Palestine, 2012 
 
Source: (The World Bank 2012) 
The World Bank. Doing Business 2012: Country Tables. The World Bank, 2012.   
 
Table 29: The Ease/Difficulty of Starting a Business in the WBGS, 2004-2012 
 
 
Source: The World Bank. Doing Business: Economy Profile West Bank and Gaza. The World Bank, 2012.  
DB2012 rankings reflect changes to the methodology. 
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The WBGS does moderately well with regards to getting electricity, registering property and 
enforcing contracts, as it is ranked roughly midway amongst other economies regionally, though 
Table 28 shows that the cost to get electricity remains prohibitively high at 1,627.8 percent of income 
per capita. In the WBGS, it takes a significant amount of time and money to get a construction 
permit, at approximately 119 days and at a cost of 1,000.5 percent of income per capita.  
While the WBGS has the best environment in the Middle East to register property, aside from 
Turkey, it is ranked as the worst place in the region for trading across borders, aside from Syria, with 
costs and time to import and export high. Trade will be discussed in further detail later in this thesis.  
Table 29 shows that the paid-in minimum capital required in 2012 was prohibitively high, at 
218.8 percent of income per capita, up from 56.1 percent of income per capita in 2009. With the 
exception of Israel, getting credit is either a moderate or significant challenge regionally. This is one 
of the more challenging areas to improve in the WBGS as it is dependent on a rise in income per 
capita, which would provide Palestinians with the capital and collateral needed to obtain credit. 
There are initiatives underway to provide Palestinians with access to credit, as mentioned earlier. 
Lack of access to credit negatively impacts other Doing Business indicators. For example, if 
businesses had greater access to credit, they would have the funds to start a business, get electricity 
and have funds for construction permits, areas in which the WBGS ranks poorly.  
Costs for doing business in the WBGS, such as capital requirements for starting a business 
are prohibitively high and must be reduced. Table 27 shows that the most dramatic difference in 
Gross National Income per capita in the region is between the WBGS at US$1,523 and Israel at 
US$27,340 in 2011. Costs are particularly prohibitive to small and medium-sized local businesses, 
while larger businesses typically have more collateral and greater access to capital. 
The WBGS can make an immediate impact on improving Doing Business indicators such as 
enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency. With regard to enforcing contracts, the primary factor 
that should be addressed and improved is to dramatically reduce length of time and cost it takes the 
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court to process the claim. In 2007, a World Bank Investment Climate Assessment in the West Bank 
showed that entrepreneurs and business owners identified courts as a major impediment to doing 
business.431 Since then, the PA reduced the average court processing time from 700 days in 2009 to 
an average of 540 days in 2012.432  
The World Bank identified strengths and weaknesses of PA policies with regards to doing 
business. In a September 2011 report, the World Bank credited the PA with taking some steps 
towards creating a welcoming investment climate characterized by lower corruption, low taxes and 
good investor protection mechanisms. During the reform years, these steps were evidenced by the 
creation of the Anti-Corruption Court and subsequent charges brought to officials, public opinion 
polls that showed perceived lower levels of corruption, and strong Doing Business rankings for the 
WBGS with regards to paying taxes and protecting investors.433 Furthermore, improvements in 
security in the West Bank, more efficient service delivery as evidenced by the “establishment of the 
authority of the MoF to supervise public finances, and the building of systems and staff capacities to 
do so” and a loosening in Israeli security restrictions have improved investor confidence.434  
Figure 7 displays public and private investment as a share of GDP and real GDP growth. 
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Figure 7: Private and Public Investment in the WBGS 
 
 
          Source: Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics and staff estimates. 
          (IMF 2012) 
 
The World Bank’s Doing Business assessment identified actions by the PA that had positive 
or negative effects on doing businesses in the WBGS, which are listed in Table 30. 
Table 30: Business Reforms in the WBGS, 2008-2011 
 
Year Positive Negative 
2008 The VAT rate decreased from 16% to 14.5% and 
corporate income tax rate from 16% to 15%.  
 
2008 The public credit registry lowered the minimum loan 
requirement from US$10,000 to 0, and instructed all the 
banks to disclose all loans granted to customers without 
minimum requirements; coverage has tripled.  
 
2009 The Central Bank has set up an online system for lenders 
to access credit information.  
Fees related to construction permitting 
increased total cost by almost 20%.  
2009 The info.management system at the commercial registry 
became fully operational, cutting time to start a business.  
 
2010 New judges were recruited, appointed, and trained. 




Starting a business became more 
costly because of an increase in the 
minimum capital requirement.  
2010 Property registration was expedited through a major 
project to computerize records at the land registry. 
 
2011 More efficient processes at customs made trading easier 
in the West Bank.  
West Bank and Gaza increased the 
lawyers’ fees for incorporation.  
      Source: (The World Bank 2013) 
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Table 30 shows that the World Bank identified both positive and negative business reforms 
led by the PA in the WBGS during 2008 to 2011, with more positive reforms overall. 
While the World Bank’s Doing Business assessment is a helpful tool to gauge the working 
environment in various economies, there are significant limitations to the World Bank’s assessment 
of doing business in the WBGS. For example: the World Bank’s prognosis of doing business in the 
WBGS does not provide a completely accurate picture of what doing business is like in the WBGS as 
it does not account for: (i) doing business in the smaller cities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
aside from the business capital of the West Bank, Ramallah; (ii) different business policies in those 
cities; (iii) the vast amount of incentives, often temporary, provided to small and medium sized 
businesses by outside sources; (iv) regulations for companies other than private limited liability 
companies, and (v) implications of the Israeli occupation on doing business in Palestine.  
Certainly, there are many challenges to doing business in the West Bank. It is important to 
review what needs to be imporived, in particular by the PA and the GoI in order to improve the 
business environment in the WBGS. The World Bank argues that sustainable economic growth in the 
WBGS “requires that the Palestinian Authority improve the business environment and attract needed 
investment through such measures as expanding land registration in the West Bank; reforming the 
current collection of laws governing business; and building its own capacity to regulate the economy 
and ensure competition.”436 PalTrade identified Israeli actions constraining investment in Palestine, 
stating: “Access to the majority of the territory’s land and water (Area C) is severely curtailed; East 
Jerusalem is beyond reach; the ability of investors to enter into Israel and the West Bank is 
unpredictable; access and movement restrictions in the West Bank; and non- implementation of Paris 
Protocol.”437 In 2012, 101 Israeli permits governed Palestinian movement in the WBGS and in 
                                                 
436
 (The World Bank 2012) 
437
 PalTrade. Investment in Palestine: The Reality. Palestine Trade Center (PalTrade), 2010.   
161 
 
Israel.438  PalTrade notes that investors face a high level of uncertainty in terms of obtaining and 
renewing entry permits and visas and entering the WBGS.439  
Domestic policies impact the potential for growth of the Palestinian private sector, though the 
World Bank argues that Israeli restrictions remain the biggest constraint facing Palestinian private 
sector growth. In addition to providing security, Israel retains jurisdiction over planning and 
construction in all of Area C. This control results in a huge hindrance to economic potential, as it 
hampers the ability of the PA to build schools and other infrastructure; challenges investors who 
want to establish businesses in the area; and hampers agriculture potential in the area. The World 
Bank reports that limits on Palestinian access to the fertile lands in the Jordan Valley are “denying 
Palestinians a potential powerhouse of export-oriented high value-added agriculture.”440 Further, 
most Palestinians are denied access to East Jerusalem that Israel annexed, and has considerable 
economic potential.   
While the PA has made concrete steps towards making doing business easer as outlined 
above, there is a long list of impediments to doing business in the West Bank, some associated with 
the occupation and conflict and others are associated with governance and infrastructure. These 
challenges have been presented throughout this thesis; a few of which include: failures in the 
judiciary including a lack of adequate laws and an inactive PLC; threats of renewed conflict in the 
absence of a permanent peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians; inflated employment and 
wages in the public and nonprofit sectors, and various restrictions on movement of goods and people 
and on resources that cause increased labor and transportation costs. Despite these serious challenges 
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to doing business, the PA and other internal and external actors have made strides towards providing 
a more conducive business environment to attract investment and encourage job creation in Palestine. 
At the conclusion of the Second Intifada in 2005, the Middle East Investment Initiative 
(MEII) was created as a non-profit organization that partnered with public and private organizations 
to make credit and business financing more available in Palestine in order to stimulate economic 
activity and to create jobs. Since its creation, this organization has played a significant role in 
facilitating business in the WBGS. Among its initiatives during the reform years, the MEII 
administered a loan guarantee program in the WBGS for small and medium-sized businesses; began 
working to create effective and sustainable risk insurance to address movement of products for 
Palestinian businesses; and worked with partners to develop the first affordable home mortgage 
facility for Palestinian  families. Through its loan guarantee program, nearly 200 loans exceeding a 
total of US$46,000,000 were given out by the end of 2009.441  
The Palestine Investment Fund (PIF) initiated many projects during the reform years.442 The 
PIF owns stakes in companies and manages approximately US$800 million in assets, and made a 
profit of approximately US$60 million in 2009. In addition to providing credit through a credit 
guarantee program for small and medium size enterprises (SMEs), the PIF provides banks with 
assistance in reaching target groups and assisted SMEs to prepare work plans. In 2009, the PIF 
launched a US$4 billion investment program to last for five years, aiming to stimulate economic 
growth and create over 100,000 new jobs.443  The trade, service, and industry sectors have benefitted 
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the most from the PIF’s credit guarantee program. Its SME Loan Guarantee Facility facilitated 424 
loans totaling US$76.6 million in 2011 by providing guarantees to banks lending to SMEs.444  
PIF projects and investments in the industrial sector have been expansive, with more than 
US$25 million invested in developing an industrial zone in Nablus to host 850 shops, workshops, and 
stores.445 Another one of the investment initiatives that was launched during the reform years was the 
PIF’s National Affordable Housing Program, in which it aims to invest more than US$1.5 billion to 
build 30,000 housing units over a span of 10 years in different parts of Palestine. This project will 
create an estimated 45,000 direct job opportunities and 25,000 indirect job opportunities.446 The PIF 
has a real estate investment arm, Ammar Group, which manages the PIF’s real estate projects.  One 
of the large-scale commercial real estate projects Ammar Group is leading is the development of the 
Ersal Center in the West Bank city, Al-Bireh. The total investment capital for this project will exceed 
US$400 million once it is finished in 2015. Kicked off in 2010 by President Abbas, the Ersal Center 
will have business and office facilities, commercial and retail space, libraries, restaurants, hotels and 
apartments.447 
In terms of more traditional financial investment intermediaries, the Palestinian Securities 
Exchange, which was established in 1995 to promote investment in Palestinian companies, became a 
private shareholding company in 2010. It is the first fully automated exchange among Arab Stock 
Exchanges and is supervised by the Palestinian Capital Market Authority. Currently only stocks are 
traded and 21 of its 46 listed companies are traded. It has a market capitalization of about US$2.8 
billion across five economic sectors including banking and financial services, insurance, investments, 
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industry and services. The Palestinian Exchange comes in second regionally with regards to investor 
protection.448  
The PA encouraged local and foreign investment in Palestine in 2011 by an amendment to 
the Law on the Encouragement of Investment in Palestine (1998). Known as the Investment Law, it 
provides incentives for smaller businesses and the service sector, including tax breaks for 
investments, and it “allows the Cabinet of Ministers to create new incentives for projects that will 
bolster job creation or export potential.”449 The Law on the Encouragement of Investment fortified 
via amendment, resulted in the creation and subsequent strengthening of the Palestinian Investment 
Promotion Agency (PIPA), which is responsible for encouraging and promoting investment in 
Palestine, specifically through dealing with investors and formulating investment policy.450 As 
directed by the Investment Law, PIPA allows for exemptions and incentives on custom duties and 
income taxes for enterprises and investors for enterprises engaged in export activities, and for 
investments in hospitals and hotels. PIPA has about 400 clients, which are mostly medium and large 
enterprises.451 PIPA’s services act as a “one-stop shop” where investors can license their projects, 
acquire permits, obtain incentives, and attain income tax exemptions, among other requirements and 
enticements for investment in Palestine.452  
The largest and potentially most impactful development project currently underway in 
Palestine is the development of the new West Bank city, Rawabi, the first Palestinian city built in the 
area since 1967. The city will be located entirely in Area A, so it will be within full jurisdiction of the 
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PA. Palestinian entrepreneur and developer Bashir Masri has taken the leading role in promoting and 
getting support and approval for the city and his construction company is building the city.  
Rawabi will be a high tech suburb with business and commercial districts, parks, shopping 
malls and a country club. The city will include a privately-owned and operated vocational training 
center to bridge the gap between business needs and Palestinian skills, a small and medium enterprise 
incubator, a cultural center, national park, and an amphitheater. Rawabi is targeting ICT and ICT-
enabled industries for the core of the city’s economy, along with media and entertainment, education, 
healthcare and green industries.453 
The Rawabi initiative has exposed many of the difficulties associated with building in the 
West Bank. While the effort began in 2007, construction was on hold for years as Palestinians sought 
approval for access to a 2.8 kilometer access road that falls within Israeli-controlled area C. Further, 
the development of the city has faced strong opposition from some Israeli Knesset members, 
especially those who live in a West Bank Israeli settlement near Rawabi. These individuals are in 
part upset because all Rawabi contractors have agreed not to use materials produced in Israeli 
settlements, regardless of the costs they will entail. Nonetheless, construction began even before 
Palestinians got approval to use the access road. The access road became politicized, with the Israeli 
government using it as a bargaining chip—urging Palestinian officials to engage in direct peace talks 
in exchange for approval of the access road.454 In 2012, Palestinians gained permission to use the 
access road for one year, at which time permission for the access road may or may not be renewed.455 
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The US$850 million investment project is largely being financed by Qatar. It is estimated 
that the city will provide 3,000 to 10,000 permanent jobs, and accommodate a population of 40,000 
residents. There has been a chronic shortage of houses in the West Bank, especially with the 
hundreds of thousands of Palestinians continuing to live the poor conditions of refugee camps. The 
West Bank is in need of an estimated 200,000 housing units and Rawabi will be a positive step in 
providing more available housing to Palestinians.456  
An area of untapped potential is oil and gas. In 2000, BG Group discovered a gas field named 
the Gaza Marine in waters near the Gaza Strip that has not been developed, because Israel has 
restricted the development of the gas field. In 2012, reports surfaced that surveys showed oil near the 
West Bank Cities of Ramallah and Hebron.457 The natural gas and oil will only benefit the 
Palestinian economy if Palestinians are allowed to develop these industries and engage in trade. 
Because Palestinians have not been allowed to utilize its gas field off of the coast of the Gaza Strip, 
all gas has been imported. Neighboring Israel has no oil reserves and has faced energy shortages 
throughout the decades and has consequently built an impressive solar energy technology industry, 
with solar energy nearly cost competitive with fossil fuels and becoming cheaper each year.458 
Rawabi plans to follow the Israeli example by building a city that is energy efficient, using solar and 
wind technologies. Further, with water shortages a high concern in Palestine and Israel, the city will 
also be built to maximize water conservation.  
To support private investment in Palestine, there are many initiatives the PA should 
implement. It should work dramatically reduce the cost of doing business, and specifically should 
strengthen the legal environment and enforce existing laws, especially those relating to ensuring 
there are clear titles to property. The PA must move forward with reforming the many laws 
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governing business and must have a functioning PLC to pass new legislation. Some critical laws 
have already been drafted and are under consideration including the secured transactions law, 
companies law, competition law, leasing law, tenants law and laws around land and housing.459 
Further, the PA should continue to shift spending away from wages and remaining subsidies and 
invest money in developing public physical infrastructure and human capital. The PA should also 
promote competitiveness by strengthening Palestinian Standards Institute and the Palestinian Trade 
Center to enhance investors’ access to external markets.460  
The PA must rapidly expand land registration in the West Bank to lower the prices of real 
estate property and to increase investment. Presently, ownership of land in Area A and B is 
fragmented and only a small portion is registered and titled. Therefore, the price of land available for 
sale is extremely high. The World Bank suggests the PA not only complete the registry of public 
lands in Areas A and B, but make the registry public and prepare for a time when public land in Area 
C can be added to the registry. 461 
Overall efforts to entice investment in Palestine have not gone unnoticed. In a January 2010 
report to the U.S. Congress, Jim Zanotti reported on investments in the West Bank stating, “Several 
high-profile projects—housing developments, industrial parks, superstores, entertainment 
complexes—have been completed or are in various stages of proposal or construction in and around 
Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jericho, and the northern West Bank in an effort to jumpstart private sector 
development.”462  The PA has shown that it values private sector development, through passing 
legislation to encourage and protect investors. Many promising initiatives are underway, from the 
MEII loan guarantee program to the building of Rawabi to the growing Palestinian Securities 
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Exchange, all of which are recent initiatives that will likely result in increased investment in 
Palestine in the coming years.  
Trade Policies and Performance 
Limited control over borders and trade policies, an underdeveloped private sector, conflict, 
and inadequate institutional capacity have persistently contributed to the underdevelopment of 
Palestinian trade. While these factors are interrelated, control over borders and trade policy is 
fundamental to making progress and Palestinians and Israelis must move beyond the PER and agree 
to a more permanent agreement that gives the PA more powers.  
Trade has grown moderately overall in recent years, but has declined in real terms while 
Israel has remained the primary trading partner of the WBGS. Due to significant restrictions on 
exports during the past decade because of the terms within the agreed upon PER, the WBGS has had 
six to eight times more imports than exports, and has therefore maintained a persistent and significant 
trade deficit. In the Gaza Strip, exports were banned by the GoI during the reform years, with the 
exception of some “pre-approved shipments to non-Israeli markets of limited quantities of apparel 
and of some agricultural and horticultural products.”463 While Palestinian external trade is 
underdeveloped, small scale domestic trade is prevalent.464 Figure 8 displays imports, exports and net 
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Figure 8: Palestinian Trade: 1995-2008 
(Value in US$ Millions) 
 
 
          Source: PCBS (2008) Foreign Trade Statistics 
            PIPA. Palestine Investment Guide. Palestine Investment Conference, Bethlehem: Palestinian Promotion        
            Agency (PIPA), 2010.  
 
Figure 8 shows that the value of Palestinian imports have increased since 1995, while the 
value of exports has stagnated, resulting in an increasing trade deficit. The growing trade deficit 
reflects access to external aid, institutional, policy regulations as guided by the Oslo Accords and 
political constraints such as restrictions on trade between the West Bank and Gaza Strip placed by 











Table 31: Trade Indicators in the WBGS, 2000-2010  
(Value in Million US $) 
 








































311 235.5 189.4 217 246.1 253.4 292.6 448 499.4 N/A 488.3 
Source: PCBS. “Foreign Trade: Current Main Indicators: 2000-2010.” Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. 
2012. http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabID=3565&lang=en (accessed February 1, 2012).  
 
It is evident from Table 31 that the West Bank engages in the majority of all trade in the 
WBGS, with trade in the Gaza Strip nominal and erratic. Further, Palestinian exports to Israel have 
contracted since 2008. The IMF reports that exports of goods and services to Israel contracted by 24 
percent from 2008 to 2011.465 Construction of the separation barrier and a slowdown in Israeli 
growth were key factors contributing to a slowdown in exports to Israel. Imports from Israel have 
also contracted. In 2010, imports from Israel to the WBGS constituted 73 percent of all Palestinian 
imports. Imports from Israel fell to 65 percent of all Palestinian imports in 2011, constituting a 
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relative decrease of 2.3 percent from 2010 to 2011.466 Table 32 outlines the global distribution of 
Palestinian Trade in 2008. 
Table 32: Global Distribution of Palestinian Trade in 2008 
 
 
         Source: PCBS (2009) Foreign Trade Statistics 
        (PIPA 2010) 
 
The snapshot of Palestinian trade in the year 2008 provided in Table 32 illustrates that trade 
with Israel dominates  WBGS trade, with 80.6 percent of the WBGS’s imports coming from Israel 
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and 89.4 percent of all Palestinian exports going to Israel. The WBGS received approximately 15 
percent of its imports from Asia and Europe and 6.1 percent of its exports went to Jordan. Otherwise, 
trade with other countries and regions was nominal. Table 33 includes trade data for the WBGS, 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in 2012. This data provides a partial picture of what it is like to engage in 
trade in the WBGS in 2012. 
Table 33: Doing Business in the West Bank and Gaza: Trade, 2012 
 
 Source: (The World Bank 2012) 
OECD is an acronym for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, which includes High 
Income Economies 
 
 In 2012, the World Bank ranked the WBGS as 113 out of 183 economies with regard to 
trading across borders. While the WBGS is ranked worse than over 60 percent of all economies 
measured in the World Bank’s Doing Business report, overall, the WBGS ranks similar to countries 
in the region in most aspects of trade, while the high income OECD countries make it far easier to 
trade.   It should be noted, however, that it takes significantly more time to import in the WBGS than 
even the regional average. It takes an average of 40 days to import in the WBGS, while it takes 24 
days in the MENA and only 11 days in OECD countries to import.467  
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 Trade in the WBGS is impeded by many factors. While the PER technically governs Israeli-
Palestinian trade relations, in reality, significant aspects of it have not been followed or implemented, 
so the structure of Palestinian trade largely remained the same following its implementation. A 
critical issue with regard to trade is that the WBGS does not have any control over its borders. While 
the Gaza-Jericho Agreement was designed to enable the PA to work with Israeli counterparts at 
border crossings, Israel has removed PA participation, removing the ability of the PA to reduce the 
time goods wait at border crossings on the way to their destination.468  
The PA attempted to use its newfound authority through the PER to create  free trade 
agreements with the European Union (EU), Turkey, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 
and participated in the Greater Arab Free Trade Area of the Council of Arab Economic Unity, along 
with forming other bilateral and regional trade agreements. While the agreements presented a 
significant opportunity for export diversification and growth, Israel has not recognized the PA’s trade 
agreements so they have not been implemented.469  The PA has a free trade agreement with the U.S. 
and Canada, which is an extension of their free trade arrangements with Israel.470 
Israel maintains control over significant aspects of Palestinian trade. For example, nearly all 
external Palestinian trade must take place through Israeli ports and airports. Israeli-imposed security 
obstacles and checkpoints make the movement of goods and people time-consuming and costly. 
While Israeli barriers to movement fell overall during the reform years, in 2011, obstacles and 
checkpoints in the West Bank grew from 500 in August to 523 in December.471 Work permits are 
required to enter parts of the West Bank and into Israel, and are difficult to obtain. The IDF will not 
consider issuing a permit if the individual or if a relative of up to the fourth degree has been charged 
with an act of violence against Israel. Considering the many conflicts between Palestinians and 
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Israelis since 1948, only a small percentage of Palestinians qualify for work permits.472 A United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report on UNCTAD assistance and 
prospects of the Palestinian economy indicates that the security separation barrier has deepened 
Palestinian isolation from global markets. The report indicates that the barrier and related access 
restrictions resulted in a 30 percent decline in total exports from Palestine to Israel in 2008 to2009.473  
West Bank traders face a plethora of obstacles, a few of which, include: the lack of a body to 
report complaints to regarding the processes at commercial crossings; restrictions on pallet sizes that 
results in the use of more trucks to transport materials; refrigerated goods must be unloaded at 
crossings and undergo a lengthy inspection, which results in the spoilage of significant quantities of 
food; long processing and waiting time; and limited working hours and days at commercial crossings. 
All of these obstacles increase transaction and transportation costs to shippers and discourage 
Palestinian trade.474 
The PER called for the WBGS to be treated as one territorial unit. However, Israel controls 
the roads between the West Bank and Gaza Strip and since the election of Hamas in Gaza, Israel 
increased the limitations on movement between the areas, maintaining a land and sea blockade on the 
Gaza Strip. The blockade has had a damaging effect on trade between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
The blockade is particularly targeted towards machinery and equipment that could have dual military 
and civilian use.475 While some of these restrictions may bring about greater security, they have a 
damaging effect on business. The list of dual-use items is always changing, and if an item is on the 
list, a permit must be acquired in order for it to clear customs.476 These restrictions deprive the 
private sector of imported goods and export markets. The World Bank points out those dual-use 
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restrictions have hurt the information and communications technologies and agricultural sectors. For 
example, in 2009, Palestinian farmers had to seek more expensive and less effective fertilizers 
because those they had traditionally used contained nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium, all of which 
were being restricted because of their potential use in making explosives.477  
 In September 2011, the PLO published a document outlining key responsibilities that Israel 
agreed to in the PER that it had not implemented that were affecting the potential of the Palestinian 
economy. The following items relating to trade were included in the list: 
 Israel has violated its duty to consult and notify the Palestinians before making 
any changes to Israeli import policy or rates that affect Palestinians (as outlined in 
Article III(6)).  
 Israel continues to deny the PA full authority to implement its own import policy 
at the international border crossings in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in violation 
of Article III (14). This has meant that Israel has maintained exclusive control 
over deciding the kind, type, and quality of goods allowed into the OPT.  
 Israel refuses to recognize Palestinian standard certificates and conformity marks, 
and restricts the PA’s right to set its own petroleum products policy (in violation 
of Article III (12)).  
 Israel applies different standards for plants and animals, animal products and 
biological products than those adopted or recommended by relevant international 
organizations, resulting in trade barriers between the two parties and between 
Palestinians and the rest of the world in agricultural products (in violation of 
Article VIII).  
 Israel has attempted to prevent Palestinian dairy and meat products from entering 
East Jerusalem, which forms part of the OPT, and the Israeli market (in violation 
of Article VIII).  
 Although the parties have agreed to establish a Joint Economic Committee (JEC) 
to follow up on the implementation of the Paris Protocol, Israeli actions have 
paralyzed the JEC. For example, Israel continues to delay the implementation and 
resolution of outstanding issues, including approving goods that are already on 
Lists A1, A2, and B annexed to the Paris Protocol (in violation of Article III).  
 According to Article III, Palestinian importers should receive equal treatment at 
Israeli ports of entry. In practice, Israel discriminates against Palestinian 
importers, resulting in delays and added costs to the Palestinians.478 
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It is essential for the Palestinian and Israeli governments to create a policy environment that 
fosters intensive integration into international markets because Palestine’s domestic market is small. 
In addition to Israel, neighboring and close-by Arab as well as European markets are inviting for 
Palestinian exports because of their proximity. Expanding production and exports will allow 
Palestinian enterprises to produce at an increasingly efficient scale, which will encourage higher 
productivity and allow for higher employment rates with higher wages. Further, the Palestinian 
economy will benefit most from specializing in goods in which they possess a comparative 
advantage. 
The trade agreement under which the PA operates as stipulated by the PER was intended to 
be temporary in nature, and its continued use is unsustainable. However, it will likely remain in place 
until Israelis and Palestinians reach a peace agreement unless the parties are willing to renegotiate it 
apart from an overall peace agreement. The PA is actively seeking  to rejuvenate the Joint Economic 
Committee to pursue the implementation of PER policies with Israeli counterparts and should 
concurrently develop plans for a suitable trade regime to implement once it has reached a peace 
agreement with Israel including one with very low barriers to trade, and one that is anchored in 
agreements such as the World Trade Organization, and one that progressively phases out remaining 
barriers to trade as the government generates revenues from other places. 
Economic Summation 
 The PA outlined economic reforms in the Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State plan 
that would strengthen the state and enhance its legitimacy, advancing its ultimate goal of a viable, 
independent and recognized Palestinian state. During the reform years, the PA made significant 
economic gains in the West Bank, most visible by high economic growth and a reduced 
unemployment rate. Maintaining a stable job market and a growing economy is not only vital for the 
legitimacy of leaders in the PA, but should the economy wane, conflict could reemerge.  
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Additionally, many infrastructure projects were initiated. While the PA made significant 
strides towards fiscal retrenchment and lowered the fiscal deficit from US$1.9 billion to US$1.1 
billion between 2008 and 2011, it remains heavily dependent on external aid.479 The ability of the PA 
to effect economic change within its borders is dependent upon Israeli cooperation and limited by 
Israeli control over the WBGS. 
The types of economic activities have shifted in the West Bank in recent years.  For instance, 
traditional agriculture has become less viable as Palestinians have increasingly less access to land 
amidst growing Israeli settlements in area C.  
Rawabi illustrates these points, as it symbolizes both the progress of the PA and the stark 
reality of constraints under occupation and doing business in the West BAnk. The PA created an 
environment in which foreign investors have financed the construction of the innovative new city, 
which will provide jobs for a local, educated workforce, both during the city’s construction and after.  
However, this project is unique because the builders have been persistent despite strong interference 
and objections by Israelis throughout the process. 
A political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would have a very positive impact on 
the Palestinian economy. At a minimum, the PER is antiquated, limiting, and should be renegotiated 
or replaced in the near future.  
Nevertheless, the PA and international community can and are making solid progress in 
working towards creating a conducive investment environment which is comparable to other regional 
business environments. The PA should immediately address one of the biggest obstacles to doing 
business that is within its control by dramatically reducing the cost of starting and engaging in 
business. 
 While the PA is supportive of the growing grassroots non-violent resistance movement, 
boycotting Israeli goods from settlements has a harmful effect on the Palestinian economy. This 
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phenomenon is likely to persist until a peace agreement is reached with Israel, and seems to be a 
political necessity to allow Palestinians to voice concerns and is a far better option than violent 
resistance, which is not only harmful to individuals and the peace process, but  is incredibly 
























State and Institution Building Conclusions  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
“In a time of regional political uncertainty and instability, the global economic slowdown now 
hinders the capability of international donors to assist the PA…Thus, after three consecutive years of 
impressive economic growth in the West Bank, PA financial stability is now challenged.”  
---Report of the Government of Israel to the Ad hoc Liaison Committee, March 2012480 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
This thesis began by providing a historical account of the establishment of the governance 
framework in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) and introduced the Palestinian caretaker 
government’s state and institution building initiative in the West Bank from 2009-2011. The second 
thesis objective was then explored in subsequent chapters and in the conclusion, which included an 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the Palestinian National Authority’s (PA) efforts to implement the 
Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State plan in regards to the security landscape, judicial 
system, and economic development in the West Bank, as well as the attempt to end the occupation 
and solidify recognition as a sovereign Palestinian state. This conclusion will satisfy the final aim of 
this thesis by formulating a strategic trajectory for the PA that will make the best use of time and 
resources to advance the PA’s national interests and state and institution building aims.   
The PA’s plan garnered wide support in the form of technical and financial assistance. An 
evaluation of the initiative’s implementation in the security, justice, and economic sectors revealed 
that reform efforts did overall strengthen state institutions. The PA did not attain its ultimate aim of 
ending the Israeli occupation and achieving sufficient recognition of an independent Palestinian state 
along 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital through the implementation of the plan. The 
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PA’s efforts did, however, yield broader recognition of an occupied State of Palestine by individual 
states, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, and member-state organizations.  
The PA’s efforts and accomplishments gave it international credibility as a government, 
which was acknowledged by key bodies. In 2011, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), and United Nations Special Coordinator Office for the Middle East issued statements 
indicating that the PA had developed the core governance functions necessary to govern a State of 
Palestine. Additionally, in 2011, Palestine was admitted as a member state of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and dozens more countries recognized 
a State of Palestine. By October 2012, 138 of the world’s 195 independent countries recognized a 
State of Palestine, while key powerful states, including Israel, the U.S. and some Western European 
countries did not. Many other states accorded implicit recognition by engaging in diplomatic 
relations with Palestine.481 In 2012, the PLO was recognized as a non-member state of the UN, which 
was a notable upgrade from permanent observer status to the UN.  
Underlying Pressures on State Building in Palestine 
While the PA’s state building efforts yielded important political advances for Palestinians, 
the PA has a long way to go toward establishing an environment that is conducive to long-term 
prosperity. The PA should refocus its efforts to address the underlying constraints that have 
hampered state building efforts and that threaten to undermine the success of any future PA state and 
institution building endeavors. 
The occupation sets an unusual context for state building. The policies of the occupying 
power toward the occupied population influence the potential for progress of that occupied people. In 
this case, the policies of the GoI caused great impositions on Palestinians and their land, limiting 
their economic and social potential. The more than forty five-year occupation of Palestinian land 
beginning in 1967, (as determined by the “Green Line” borders set in 1949); the transfer of 
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population from Israel to the WBGS; the construction of barriers that impede movement and access 
to land and natural resources in the West Bank; and the extraction of Palestinian natural resources for 
the profit of the GoI are examples of how the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands has challenged 
Palestinian social and economic progress. Despite considerable security achievements in the West 
Bank, as Israeli settlements grow, so do security obstacles and checkpoints. These obstacles to 
movement will likely remain as long as the settlements are present and Palestinians and Israelis are 
separated, clearly impeding the flow of people and goods in the West Bank. The potential of the 
Palestinian economy will only be realizable once it has full control over all of its land, resources, and 
borders as an independent state. Further, as long as Palestine remains occupied, the GoI risks 
opposition and uprising amongst Palestinians. 
Limits on the PA’s powers became widely apparent during the evaluation of the PA’s 2009-
2011 state building efforts. The hastily crafted, ill-implemented and formally expired but still used 
Protocol on Economic Relations (PER) established the powers of the GoI and the PA with regards to 
the Palestinian economy and to some extent, security. It is within this antiquated economic 
framework that the PA and GoI operate. While the PER serves as a framework for relations, parts of 
the PER have not been implemented, some of which, are related to taxation, movement of people, 
and trade.  
During the analysis of the PA’s state and institution building plan, it became clear that 
ensuring Israel’s security is at the heart of many of the arrangements and interactions between 
Israelis and Palestinians. The security arrangement as established in the Oslo Accords gave Israel 
overarching control over the lives of Palestinians and the PA in order to ensure safety for Israelis 
living in Israel and the West Bank. The heavy emphasis on Israeli security guarantees within the Oslo 
Accords reflects the environment during which the Oslo Accords were created. They were created, in 
part, to help bring the violence of the First Intifada to an end, and at a time when memories of 
Palestinian violence were fresh in the minds of Israeli negotiators. 
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The following are some examples of the many GoI security initiatives in place during the 
reform years that had a negative impact on the day-to-day lives of Palestinians and their economy. 
The construction of a security fence to separate West Bank Palestinians and Israelis was a unilateral 
GoI initiative that impeded Palestinian movement goods and people. The GoI also maintained 
hundreds of road blocks and check points in the West Bank, in large part to separate and ensure the 
safety of its extensive network of Israeli communities living there. Occasionally, Israeli forces skirted 
the PA in Area A of the West Bank to retrieve criminal suspects or evidence of subversive activities. 
Israel unilaterally controlled the borders into and out of the WBGS and decided which people and 
what goods entered and exited despite provisions within the PER for PA personnel to be present at 
borders. Further, some Palestinians from the WBGS were held without charges in Israeli jails. These 
GoI security initiatives were technically permissible through the broad and vague security guarantees 
built within the PER. 
Israel has shown skepticism that a peace agreement with Palestinians will result in enhanced 
security for its citizens and has insisted upon an improved security environment and security 
guarantees from Palestinians as a prerequisite to a peace agreement. In order to make lasting progress 
towards peace, Palestinians and the international community must squarely address Israeli security 
concerns as it is a prerequisite to policy changes that will favor Palestinian security, economic 
development, and peace.  
During the reform years, the Palestinian economy continued to be highly vulnerable to Israeli 
policies. These policies had both positive and negative implications for the Palestinian economy. In 
2011, the GoI enacted many measures that contributed positively to the Palestinian economy, 
including the removal of Israel hundreds of roadblocks and dozens of checkpoints, upgrading 
commercial crossings, approving projects in Area C, increasing the number of permits for Palestinian 
employment in Israel, and advancing the building of electricity substations in the West Bank.  
Further, the GoI gave the PA permission to use an access road to the new Palestinian city being built, 
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Rawabi, that passes through Area C. While the approval of the access road contributed to Palestinian 
economic development and in future years this road may enable considerable economic development 
as Rawabi grows, Palestinians and investors worked for years to attain its approval and it was 
approved only for one year. Most investors are not willing to invest the time and money needed to 
seek Israeli approval for construction projects that are in Area C or that require roads that pass 
through Areas C. Israeli reluctance to approve Palestinian economic development projects in Area C 
hinders Palestinian economic potential. 
The analysis of the PA’s state building efforts from 2009-2011 revealed critical failures 
within the Palestinian leadership. One of the primary failures of Palestinian leadership relates to the 
rift between Hamas and Fatah. During the reform years, Hamas ruled in the Gaza Strip and Fatah 
ruled through a caretaker government in the West Bank. The two different governments for the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip resulted in different development paths and different socio-economic conditions 
for their peoples.  
Palestinian leadership in the Gaza Strip has allowed and even encouraged violence in the 
form of rockets targeting Israel. While security in the Gaza Strip was not a primary focus of this 
thesis, it has been a serious impediment to social and economic progress and prospects for peace with 
Israel, which affects all Palestinians. Hamas rulers in the Gaza Strip need to be held accountable for 
the violence they allow and enable.  
The Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) was not in session during the reform years and 
elections for the presidency and PLC were not held. The legislature is a critical and necessary 
component in any democratic system through law-making and providing checks and balances on the 
branches of government. Fatah and Hamas must prioritize mending relations and holding democratic 
elections to reinstate the PLC. Hamas will then be beholden to larger PA policies towards security 
and can be held accountable if its forces attack Israel. The continuing factional divide only hurts 
Palestinians, the economy, and their chances for peace with Israel.  
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Another critical failure of Palestinian leadership relates to security. Palestinian leadership 
failed to protect its citizens, especially citizens who lived in areas under Israeli jurisdiction. When 
Palestinians were mistreated by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) forces or by Israelis who lived in 
settlements, Palestinians and the PA had few options for recourse. During the negotiation of the Oslo 
Accords, the GoI and PLO agreed that a Joint Security Coordination and Cooperation Committee 
(JSC) would allow Palestinian and Israeli representatives to deal with security matters of mutual 
concern; alleged violations of the security stipulations in the agreements; and differences relating to 
the application or implementation of the security arrangements. The JSC was largely useless, as 
Palestinians were ineffective at successfully challenging Israeli violations of individual or collective 
rights.  
Another security concern emanates from Palestinian police forces in the WBGS who at times 
mistreated their own citizens, particularly members of Hamas. The international community should 
urge the PA to place a higher value on human life and follow the due process of law, regardless of a 
person’s political affiliation or if they are accused of a crime. It also should support the PA in seeking 
a renegotiation of the Oslo Accords so that the PA has jurisdiction over security for Palestinians in all 
of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. 
During the reform years, the PA sought external financing to fund its state and institution 
building initiatives. Initially, the international community provided the funds the PA sought but by 
2011, the PA faced difficulty in securing all the funds pledged by the international community. The 
PA hoped to reduce its need for external assistance, largely through the implementation of fiscal 
austerity measures and a growing private sector. While the PA’s dependency on external assistance 
lessened during the reform years, its continued dependence left the PA vulnerable to fluctuating 
assistance levels from external donors. While the PA aimed to create conditions for large scale 
private sector development, it did not happen during the reform years. The inadequate revenues 
resulted in a fiscal crisis for the PA and in turn the government greatly reduced budgeted 
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expenditures and borrowed up to commercial bank limits including US$137 million to meet this 
financing gap, reducing the availability of financing for the private sector. By the end of 2011, debt 
to commercial banks rose to dangerously high levels at US$1.1 billion, which is equivalent to 
approximately 93 percent of the Palestinian banks’ equity.482  
Some of the key underlying issues that must be addressed in order to create conditions for 
long-term growth include the need to create a more welcoming investment environment through 
measures by the PA and GoI, implementing some unfulfilled promises of the PER and renegotiating 
parts of it, and ultimately ending the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands. In addition to passing 
measures to stimulate private sector growth and enacting fiscal austerity measures, the PA could 
renegotiate the economic framework it shares with the GoI and help channel tax revenues to the PA. 
If all of these strategies are pursued by the PA, in the future it will be able to pay back local banks, 
offset risks from unreliable border clearance revenues transfers, and could potentially experience a 
surplus in its budget and be able to finance future state and institution reform efforts.  
Palestinians and their leaders are impacted by the actions of external actors that are either 
working to liberate Palestine or are working in ways counter to Palestinian efforts for independence 
and statehood recognition. One such influence is the Boycott Divestment and Sanctions Campaign 
and movement. While the movement may create an economic incentive for Israel to halt expansion 
of settlements in the West Bank, this growing movement hurts the Israeli and Palestinian economies 
as both Palestinians and Israelis are highly reliant on employment in Israeli settlements in the West 
Bank.  
The UN has historically played a large role in Palestine and it continued to do so during the 
reform years. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA) is the primary caretaker for Palestinian refugees, alleviating much of the burden placed 
on host countries. UNRWA services arguably allow the refugee situation to continue without resolve. 
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Further, the UN General Assembly and Security Council have played a controversial role towards 
Israel and Palestinians. The U.S. and Israel maintain a powerful alliance and while the majority of the 
UN members have sought to hold Israel accountable throughout the years for its actions deemed 
illegal towards Palestinians and its Arab neighbors, the U.S., through its voting power as a permanent 
member on the UN Security Council, has repeatedly shielded Israel from UN repercussions. Other 
powerful countries in Western Europe have also been reluctant to use the UN as a tool to hold Israel 
accountable, and these countries have been central in urging Palestinians and Israelis to settle 
differences through direct, bilateral negotiations. While Palestinian leaders have suggested they are 
committed to bi-lateral negotiations with Israel as they agreed to in the Oslo Accords, there was little 
progress made through negotiations during the reform years and Palestinians sought to improve their 
status, rights, and power through the UN during this timeframe. These efforts were met with strong 
reactions—from the temporary withholding of some U.S. financial assistance to PA institutions; 
delays in monthly clearance transfers from the GoI to the PA; and the GoI threatening to cancel the 
Oslo Accords, dissolve the PA, and reassume absolute occupying control in the WBGS. The PA must 
consider the strong repercussions it may experience when it engages the international community and 
specifically the UN in its quest to gain statehood recognition and rights.  
The aforementioned factors—the Israeli occupation; ill-suited arrangements governing 
Israeli-Palestinian relations, particularly with regard to the economy and security; the expression of 
Israeli security concerns as they relate to Palestinians; Palestinian leadership failures; and 
exceptionally high levels of involvement and influence in Israeli-Palestinian issues by the 
international community—result in unique constraints on, and opportunities for, the Palestinian state 
building process and will have a large influence on future state building for the Palestinian society. 
Palestinian leadership should do all within its control to take advantage of the opportunities for, and 
ease the constraints to, social and economic development. A proposed strategy will be presented in 
the latter section of this conclusion.  
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Key Takeaways from Reform Plan Implementation 
Overall, the PA, in cooperation with the IDF, provided an increasingly secure environment 
for Palestinians in the West Bank during 2009-2011, marked by reduced crime, more tips being 
reported, and more training offered to the PSF. The continued support by the PA of the nonviolent 
resistance movement is key to continue to channel Palestinian frustrations with the Israeli occupation 
in a non-violent manner. The successes of PA security sector reform in the West Bank was possible 
in part because Israel, the U.S. and the European Union played a strong role in the planning, 
financing, training, and implementation of security initiatives. These parties’ continued cooperation 
and support of the PA is critical for the PA to continue to build a secure environment for Palestinians 
in the West Bank.   
During the reform years, some PA security personnel continued to act outside of the law and 
received impunity within the justice system. Many of the abuses were directed towards Hamas 
members and sympathizers. Both the PA and the IDF should hold members of their respective forces 
accountable when they abuse or kill Palestinians outside of the rule of law. The Arab Spring should 
serve as a stark reminder to the PA and GoI that citizens may rise against their governments if their 
rights are infringed upon or denied.483  Further, the PA must balance Israel’s security needs with the 
rights and security needs of its people. In order to rein in the PSF to follow the rule of law, with all 
members of society, the International Crisis Group recommends the PA: “Establish…an ad hoc, 
independent mechanism to oversee the PSF” which will be possible once the PLC convenes.484  
The international community was also supportive and enabling of Palestinian justice sector 
reforms during the reform years. More judges were trained, more cases were tried and enforced in a 
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timelier manner, new courts were established, including an anti-corruption and customs court, public 
perceptions of the courts improved, judges were rotated to different governorates to reduce conflicts 
of interest, and judges and public prosecutors were selected through a more transparent process. 
These improvements provided Palestinians with a source of recourse for their grievances, enhanced 
security in the West Bank, and provided a more secure environment for businesses, and are 
components of any democratic system.  
With the Palestinian Basic Law enacted in 2002, many of the bodies that make up the 
Palestinian judiciary are relatively new creations and there is plenty of space for their further 
development. While small advances were made with regards to ensuring the separation of powers, 
any major improvement in the separation of powers requires the further development of legislation 
that clarifies the roles of the bodies that make up the Palestinian judiciary, including the Ministry of 
Justice, the High Judicial Council, and the Supreme Judicial Council. Palestinians must prioritize 
reconvening the PLC to make this possible. 
While there were advances in creating an independent and impartial judiciary, there 
continued to be high levels of corruption in the court system. Transparency International should 
expand its efforts to encourage the PA to promulgate legislation and encourage enforcement of 
existing legislation to increase transparency of public officials in the West Bank.   
The Palestinian judiciary has the potential to provide greater security to Palestinians and to 
help end the factional divide between Fatah and Hamas. The judiciary can achieve these aims by not 
tolerating abuses or other injustices based on political affiliation, and by holding security personnel 
accountable upon investigations of complaints of human rights abuses in jails. 
During the reform years, the PA made significant economic gains in the West Bank, most 
visible by strong economic growth, and a reduced unemployment rate. A few notable positive 
developments in the economy during 2009-2011 include a reduction of PA spending as a percentage 
of GDP; a reduction in the PA’s reliance on external aid; and increased access to financing and 
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technical assistance to businesses. These economic gains were partly a result of PA policies.  
The PA encouraged local and foreign investment in 2011 by an amendment to the Law on the 
Encouragement of Investment in Palestine and resulted in the creation of the Palestinian Investment 
Promotion Agency (PIPA). The PA also enacted reforms that strengthened the business environment 
in Palestine relating to property registration, courts and the ease of starting a business and to securing 
financing. PA institutions increased their transparency and the PA enacted some fiscal austerity 
measures and adopted wide-ranging reforms to its public financial management system. Some of the 
PA’s fiscal management-related reforms included the introduction of the following: a new 
commercial accounting section in the Palestinian Ministry of Finance, a Financial Management 
Information System to link the Ministry of Finance to line ministries, an electronic payment system 
that raised bank payments’ efficiency and reduced liquidity risk, a new central bank law to guarantee 
the independence of the PMA, and a credit scoring system, contributing to the rise in bank credit to 
the private sector. 
The economic gains were accompanied by instability within the Palestinian economy. A 
couple of indicators of the economic instability in the West Bank include a struggling private sector 
and GDP growth fueled by unstable funding sources. Growth was largely a result of large sums of 
external assistance to the PA and PNGOs and high paying, yet unpredictable construction and related 
jobs in Israel and in Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Further, the size of the public sector was 
excessive and employees were paid on average wages twice as high as that of private sector 
employees. In addition, trade was floundering and was marked by low levels of Palestinian exports, 
few trading partners, and slow movement of goods.  
Some PA policies made it difficult to do business in Palestine including the turnaround time 
and capital requirements to start a company. The PA should enact more policy changes that will 
improve the business environment and attract investment in Palestine. Suggestions to address other 
weaknesses in the Palestinian economy are detailed below. 
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  PNGOs are exceptionally prevalent in the West Bank. While the PA has indicated that 
private sector growth is one of its key goals, employment in the public sector and PNGOs continue to 
grow and usurp some of the most talented individuals, and hurt an already underdeveloped 
Palestinian private sector. Like the public sector, PNGOs are highly reliant on external assistance. 
Reliance on external assistance is risky because of its uncertain nature and because of the stipulations 
placed on how money can be used, which could be good or harmful to the economy. Should external 
assistance to the PA or PNGOs drop off considerably, the Palestinian economy could even collapse.  
  To help bring about successful development, PNGOs should partner and coordinate activities 
between each other and partner with Palestinian governmental institutions and the private sector. 
Further, the PA and society should be hesitant to be overly reliant on PNGOs to fill needs of 
Palestinians. For instance, some PNGOs mentor small and medium sized businesses on how to 
navigate the arduous business of engaging in trade. Their efforts may contribute to the normalization 
of the underlying structural problems with Palestinian trade that the PA and GoI need to address. 
Should the PA want to minimize the role of PNGOs in the West Bank as an effort to support private 
sector growth, it could offer PNGOs fewer tax incentives.  
  The World Bank’s Palestinian Facility for New Market Development (FNMD) is a model 
that showed that external assistance can be effective at stimulating economic growth and increasing 
trade in Palestine when coupled with high levels of technical assistance and independence from the 
government. Further, micro financing for small and medium sized businesses has proved vital to their 
success. Also, USAID programs assisting with economic development, youth and education also 
provide appreciable benefits to society. The international community can support the Palestinian 
private sector through providing technical assistance and micro loans to small and medium size 
businesses.  
  Palestinian agencies are promoting and enabling investment in Palestine. These agencies 
include the Palestine Investment Fund (PIF), which provides loans to businesses and banks and 
191 
 
invests in industrial zones; PIPA, which works with investors and formulates investment policy; the 
Middle East Investment Initiative, which provides business and home loans along with risk insurance 
to businesses; the Middle East Venture Capital Fund, which provides tech companies with risk 
capital and access to international markets; and the Palestinian Securities Exchange, which promotes 
investment in Palestinian companies.  
  The work of these agencies helped the PA achieve a strong Doing Business rating of 46 out 
of 183 economies in 2011with regard to protecting investors. The PA should continue to support and 
enable the work of these agencies. Recent PA efforts and the initiatives of the aforementioned 
organizations should lead to increased investment in Palestine and employment in the coming years. 
Accordingly, investment in the tech field and entrepreneurship is critical to Palestinian economic 
growth and should be highly encouraged with a domestic campaign involving early education skills 
development around fields such as software engineering and website design. Considering that web 
and software design fields are an opportunity to create a national brand with an export that is not 
subject to checkpoints and export controls, taking actions to support this industry much as other 
nations in Southeast Asia and Israel have done, is an innovative way to circumvent the controls that 
Palestinians face while gaining national attention and respect. 
Building a Palestinian Strategy to Reform the Israeli-Palestinian Economic and Security Framework 
The recent Palestinian strategies have devoted much consideration and energy to attaining 
statehood and state recognition as opposed to other strategies that might more directly advance 
Palestinian national interests. As opposed to fixating on the overarching goal of statehood, the 
Palestinian leadership should focus strategic attention on the internal and external obstacles that will 
constrain long term social and economic prosperity for its citizens. In essence, Palestinian leadership 
should ensure they have taken the appropriate measures to be at the negotiating table with Israel as a 
respected, organized and united body that has enacted all possible measures within their control to 
help foster peace and prosperity. 
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Also, at the heart of every Israeli decision is the consideration for how Israeli citizens’ 
security is potentially affected. By creating a united Palestinian front, there is a much broader level of 
security that the leadership can ensure for Israeli citizens as their government decides on the risks 
that might be associated with loosening economic and security controls. In order to bring Israel to the 
table for a renegotiation of the PER, which will greatly affect the long-term economic future of the 
Palestinians, the Palestinians immediate focus on statehood should be redirected to security, 
workforce ingenuity, and creating an environment conducive to doing business. In doing so, they will 
accelerate the argument for statehood much faster than an overriding focus on statehood status will.         
In September 2011, President Abbas expressed frustration with the PER and indicated the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) wanted it changed. He told reporters en route to Amman, 
Jordan from the UN General Assembly: "We want to amend the Paris economic agreement between 
the PLO and Israel because it is not fair…It (the agreement) contains restrictions that affect the 
Palestinian economy and hinder its development. The PER does not allow Palestinians to promote 
their economy.”485 While the Interim Agreement called for the creation of a Joint Economic 
Committee for the two sides to discuss the implementation of the PER and work through contentious 
issues, it has been largely inactive and failed in its role and in recent years, the PA has been trying to 
rejuvenate it. However, lack of mechanisms for enforcement of the PER have been a consistent 
challenge for the PA and has restricted Palestinian economic growth. 
Considering the PER was created as a quick solution to end conflict and provide a first step 
for intermediate relations following the First Intifada, the PA should seek to renegotiate the terms of 
the Oslo Accords and specifically the PER so that they are able to assume more responsibility over 
the Palestinian economy and security. The PA should seek to renegotiate the PER so that Palestinian 
security and rights are guaranteed in the same way that Israelis rights are guaranteed, and one group’s 
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rights are not given preference over the other. Further, the agreements should not allow for situations 
in which the rights guaranteed to the Palestinians in the agreements can be compromised for Israeli 
perceived threats. However, before the PLO seeks to renegotiate the agreement, it must create space 
and motivation for Israel to negotiate with the PLO to increase the likelihood of success. The 
renegotiation of the agreement should be one part of a larger strategy to address internal and external 
obstacles that prevent sustainable economic growth. Palestinian leadership should consider the 
following strategic outline. 
Palestinians must first create the conditions that are a prerequisite to Israeli compliance in 
negotiating the Oslo Accords and specifically the PER, by helping to provide Israel with security. 
While Palestinians in the West Bank have largely embraced non-violence since the end of the Second 
Intifada in 2005, there has been a steady stream of violence emanating from the Gaza Strip, from the 
capture and detainment of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit from 2006 to 2012, to hundreds of rockets 
being fired from the Gaza Strip into Israel each year, to bouts of violence between the IDF and 
Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Palestinian violence in the Gaza Strip undermines peaceful West Bank 
Palestinian efforts of engagement with Israel. Furthermore, while many Palestinians do not engage in 
violence, they have been slow to renounce it and may actually tacitly support the violence when 
Palestinian militants engage in violent actions. Palestinians worldwide must show their commitment 
to peace by consistently denouncing Palestinian violence of all forms. Palestinian leaders in the Gaza 
Strip should model the approach of West Bank leaders to channel citizens’ frustrations with the 
Israeli occupation through participation in nonviolent resistance activities such as the Boycott, 
Divestment, and Sanctions Campaign. 
While Palestinians in the WBGS are largely separated, their leaders are able to visit both 
territories and have occasionally travelled to the other Palestinian territory. Leaders in the Palestinian 
caretaker government in the West Bank, leaders within the PLO, and even the influential Egyptian 
leadership should actively work with Hamas leaders to seek their cooperation and acquiescence to 
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renounce violence and recognize a sovereign State of Israel (previous demands of the Quartet for 
Peace on the Middle East) even offering financial incentives, a legitimacy plan and inclusion in the 
caretaker government to ensure that they proactively cooperate in ensuring peace because of what 
they potentially stand to lose. The most important step the caretaker government can take to earn the 
respect and acquiescence of Hamas is to implement measures to extend protection and freedom of 
speech to Hamas members living in the West Bank. This freedom of speech should be complimented 
with measures via media and other outlets to create a culture embracing a unified Palestinian identity, 
and that unified identity’s commitment to peace and cohabitation with Israel. There have been 
moderate gains in this arena in recent years, though until Hamas leaders fully agree to ensure 
nonviolence, bouts of violence by Palestinian militants will continue to overshadow other peaceful 
Palestinian efforts and Israel will remain hesitant to negotiate with Palestinian leadership. 
Once Hamas commits to nonviolence, the PLO should seek to establish a peace council made 
up of key representatives, including those from Egypt, Israel, the U.S., and the EU, with strong 
representation from Palestinians and namely Hamas to show the international community and Israel 
that Palestinians are serious about nonviolence and peace.  
Palestinians face a legitimacy crisis as they are often presented as aggressors and as terrorists 
in Israeli and American media outlets based on the violent actions of minority militant groups. Upon 
the creation of the peace council, the PLO should hire an international public relations (PR) firm. The 
PR firm can assist Palestinians in developing a rebranding strategy, including mapping out the most 
effective way to present Palestinians to the international community and in the international media. 
The strategy can include drawing worldwide attention to the formation of the peace council, the new 
Hamas as an active supporter of peace, and long-standing peace efforts by Palestinian groups. Some 
of the Palestinian peace efforts that could be highlighted and promoted further include the wide-
spread showing of the film “Gandhi” in Arabic throughout the WBGS and in Palestinian refugee 
communities in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria in 2005, the transition from violent resistance to non-
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violent resistance to the Israeli occupation following the Second Intifada that ended in 2005, and the 
many Palestinians and Israelis participating in civil society organizations dedicated to advancing 
peace.486 The promulgation of the peaceful resistance ideology and culture is a crucial part of the 
plan for Palestinian betterment because it could lessen the likelihood that individuals or small groups 
would take action into their own hands and risk the success of the overall image and efforts being put 
forth.   
The PR strategy should involve a PR campaign and engage diplomats and domestic leaders. 
Palestinian diplomats could reach out to constituent groups that have traditionally viewed 
Palestinians negatively or as a people not wanting peace with Israel and that provide political and 
financial support for Israel. They could target religious groups within Israel and within Israel’s 
strongest ally—the United States— and engage these groups in the process of defining a vision of 
peace for Palestinians and Israelis. The Palestinian diplomats could embark on what could be labeled 
as an “information and idea seeking” campaign in which they directly engage U.S. and Western-
European Jewish congregations and large Jewish organizations such as J-Street and Hadassah with 
town-hall style meetings in various cities. These nationwide campaigns have the potential to 
humanize the Palestinian cause and create widespread PR efforts for a new era of Middle East 
cooperation. This, in turn, would put pressure on constituents and funding organizations on Western 
politicians and the GoI to engage the Palestinians in their peace efforts. By engaging the Jewish 
support base for Israel directly, and engaging the U.S. public with a plan to provide peace, this step 
could put  pressure on  U.S. political leaders to support Palestinian peace efforts, and urge Israel to 
listen to a large source of its external funding base, as well as the U.S. government as a military and 
strategic partner. In addition, by making the groups feel as if they are a part of the peace process, the 
campaign could make many Westerners emotionally invested in progress being made.  
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At this point, Palestinian leadership, in conjunction with the efforts of the PR firm, should 
seek the removal of a reformed Hamas from the terrorist group list maintained by the U.S. and Israel 
and Hamas should formally join the PLO. Simultaneously, Palestinian leadership and the PR firm 
should endeavor to ensure that the PLO, with Hamas’s inclusion, does not get reprimanded or 
negatively labeled. A reformed Hamas promises huge gains to not only the perceptions of 
Palestinians but to the Palestinian economy. As part of the blockade, Israel largely banned exports 
from the Gaza Strip during the reform years and a removal of the blockade and ban coupled with 
approval of an airport and seaport once used in the Gaza Strip, could reap enormous benefits for the 
Palestinian people and economy. Further, the integration of the Gaza Strip and West Bank economies 
will allow Palestinians to benefit from economies of scale and has the potential to enhance the 
movement of goods and people needed to improve trade. 
The international perception of Hamas at this stage will be very different and the PA should, 
at this point, agree to form a joint caretaker government that shares control of Palestinian-ruled areas. 
Then, the PA should hold presidential and legislative elections open to all political parties. These 
elections must be fair and not redacted once the results are in, which means that there is a possibility 
for a Hamas majority in the PLC or as president upon election completion. The fear is that Israel will 
react negatively to a scenario such as this, and will in turn withhold Palestinian value added tax 
(VAT) and border clearance revenues, and possibly engage in the persecution of Hamas members as 
has happened in the recent past. Despite peaceful, free, and fair PLC elections in 2006, when Hamas 
was elected, the GoI reacted in the aforementioned way and the donor community followed by 
suspending foreign aid and loans to the PA, ultimately crippling the PA. Such an external reaction 
would put internal pressure on the PA and Fatah to split ties with Hamas again, which would draw a 
wedge between the two groups that would be very hard to overcome in the future. Accordingly, the 
aforementioned strategic steps will help the PA avoid international fallout, a financing catastrophe, 
and a reinforcement of the division between Hamas and Fatah in the event that Hamas wins a 
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majority in the PLC or wins the presidential election. At this point, the international community, 
namely the U.S. and Pro-Israel groups, can attest to a reformed Hamas, and can put pressure on Israel 
to prevent it from reacting in a way that hampers the Palestinian economy such as withholding border 
clearance revenues from the PA or further limiting movement of goods and citizens.  
These actions should be enacted with the objective of bringing Israel to the table to 
renegotiate the PER in a serious and meaningful way. All relevant stakeholders should be reminded 
of the value of renegotiating the PER and should shift their mindset from providing Palestinians with 
a short-term fix to assisting Palestinians reach a long-term solution. The U.S. should be particularly 
committed to this process as it provides hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars aid annually to support 
the Israeli and Palestinian governments. Through the renegotiation of the PER, the need for external 
assistance will be reduced or eliminated. The ideal outcome should be to address some of the 
structural flaws of a protocol that was intended to serve as a temporary guideline for economic 
relations between Israel and Palestine. As such, Palestinians should aim to gain economic freedoms 
that allow Palestinians to increase economic independence and prosperity, which is necessary to 
guarantee Israeli security. 
Israel will face fewer threats from a Palestinian middle-class population who want to promote 
peace to maintain the security of their lifestyle and opportunity for their children’s futures, as 
opposed to a financially struggling Palestinian people with less to lose who would be more likely to 
seek change through violence. The economic well-being of the Palestinian people is the crucial 
component to Palestinian-Israeli peace. Palestinian people with nothing to lose will embrace conflict, 
whereas people with everything to lose have nothing to gain from there being any regional conflict. 
That is the point at which the Palestinian society itself becomes an agent of peace against terrorism, 
and the trust between the two nations can truly be formed.    
The Joint Economic Committee (JEC) was supposed to be the body that provided some 
oversight to the implementation of the PER. However, since it has not been an effective oversight 
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body and has not met regularly, it is time for the PA to seek to renegotiate and overhaul the PER so 
that it has the tools to stimulate the Palestinian economy in a sustainable way and it can better serve 
Palestinian economic interests.  
The following are some of the key structural flaws of the PER that Palestinians should aim to 
renegotiate with the GoI. The PA should aim to implement parts of the existing PER such as joint PA 
and GoI presence at borders to ensure proper taxes are collected on goods and to reduce the amount 
of time it takes to import and export Palestinian goods. The PA should seek to make free trade 
agreements with other states, enabling the expansion of export and import markets. The PA should 
also seek to establish an independent body to allow West Bank traders to report complaints regarding 
the processes at commercial crossings. The PA should also seek to reduce other limitations on trade, 
and renegotiate customs and tax rates in a more favorable way to the PA. One area that promises a 
significant increase in revenues to the PA so as to reduce and possibly eliminate the need for external 
assistance is from indirect imports. While the PER stipulates that clearance revenues should be based 
on final destination, Israel collects customs revenue from indirect imports destined for Palestinian 
consumers. 
Area C contains enormous economic potential for Palestinians. The PA should seek to gain 
further jurisdiction over Areas B and C or at a minimum reduce restrictions on Palestinian economic 
activity in Area C of the West Bank and seek an easier land registration process in Area C. This way, 
Palestinians can pursue more development projects like Rawabi that would be either located in Area 
C or have access roads passing through Area C to Areas A or B. Within Area C, the Jordan Valley is 
an area ideal for agriculture and Dead Sea mineral extraction for cosmetics, industries already 
developed by Israeli settlement communities that have benefitted the Israeli economy. In 2012, 
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Oxfam estimated the land’s economic contribution “could be US$1 billion a year to the Palestinian 
economy, or 9 percent of gross domestic product.”487   
As it stands, Israel receives the VAT taxes from the Area C lands that Israel has essentially 
annexed via settlements, instead of the PA receiving those tax revenues, despite the businesses and 
individuals being located on internationally-recognized Palestinian land. It would potentially be more 
beneficial to the PA if Palestinian jurisdiction was established over these parts and any businesses 
established in Area C paid VAT taxes to the PA.  
One of the most critical points of the PER that the PA should aim to renegotiate is the system 
of conditional monthly clearance revenues transfers from the GoI to the PA, which constitute 70 
percent of PA revenues exclusive of foreign aid. The present system in which Israel delays clearance 
revenues transfers to the PA as political leverage causes great financial instability to the PA. Further, 
the PA should seek its right to be at border crossings as stipulated in the Oslo Accords so that it can 
reduce leakages, which was a significant problem during the reform years. The IMF reported that a 
five percent increase in clearance revenues would increase the PA’s 2012 budget by US$75 million. 
Alternatively, the PA could vie to collect the clearance revenues itself or develop an enforcement 
mechanism to encourage the GoI to transfer funds to the PA in a timely manner. 
The PA should also aim to clarify any areas of the PER that are vague or open to 
interpretation. For example, while the PER calls for the unimpeded flow of people and goods in the 
territories and between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, it also stipulates that the provisions of the 
PER are overridden by Israeli security concerns. Furthermore, travel and trade between the West 
Bank and Gaza has been severely limited in recent years, and a linkage between the two areas would 
increase the domestic market. Such a linkage should be pursued rigorously by the PA during the 
renegotiation of the PER. However, considering the relatively small total market, it is more important 
than ever before for the PA to renegotiate its trading terms with Israel to reduce trade barriers and 
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make free trade available. The emphasis on free trade with the rest of the world would be a means to 
prosperity, and would contribute to the convergence of price and income levels.  
Summation and Recommendations 
 The PA’s state and institution building initiative in the West Bank during 2009-2011 was a 
unique and impressive endeavor. Given the legacy of poor leadership and violence in the West Bank 
and the growing constraints to state and institution building faced by the PA, the efforts and results 
should be recognized as a turning point in Palestinian history. Progress was possible in part, because 
of unprecedented Palestinian leadership in the West Bank during the reform years and international 
financial and technical assistance to the PA and to its citizens. All progress remains fragile and the 
PA must work diligently to remedy immediate internal and external challenges and threats to its 
achievements. The PA would be wise to capitalize on its successes and achievements for Palestinians 
and Israelis through a PR campaign to demonstrate a model of state and institution building in the 
West Bank. This publicity could initiate a shift in the image of Palestinians so prominently displayed 
in U.S. and Israeli media—from Palestinian terrorist aggressors—to Palestinian partners in economic 
development and security. It can use its increased credibility as leverage to further its strategic long-
term objectives, including a renegotiation of aspects of the Oslo Accords and specifically the PER to 
facilitate greater economic prosperity and security in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and to advance 
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The Evolution of Palestinian National Aspirations  
Origins and Transformation of Palestinian Nationalism  
 
Nearing the end of the implementation of the Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State 
plan in 2011, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) increased its efforts to seek international 
recognition of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, including East Jerusalem. To 
understand the present day pursuit of state recognition, it is necessary to understand who the 
Palestinian people are and to review how events have shaped Palestinian national identity. 
Palestinian identity largely developed during the twentieth century, and was critical to the formation 
of statehood aspirations.  
Critics have contested the existence of Palestinian national identity. One person they have 
widely cited is the late Zuheir Mohsen, a Palestinian Muslim and member of the PLO. Mohen 
challenged the existence of a Palestinian identity and instead called attention to Palestinian Arab 
identity.488 Mohen has been widely quoted from an interview he gave that was published in the Dutch 
newspaper Trouw in 1977, in which he said:  
"The Palestinian people does [sic] not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a 
means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality 
today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for 
political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, 
since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct ‘Palestinian 
people’ to oppose Zionism.”489  
 More than three decades later, U.S. presidential candidate Newt Gingrich echoed similar 
sentiments in an interview in December 2011, remarking: "Remember there was no Palestine as a 
state. It was part of the Ottoman Empire. And I think that we’ve had an [sic] invented Palestinian 
people, who are in fact Arabs, and were historically part of the Arab community."490 
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This viewpoint misunderstands the historical development of Palestinian national identity. 
Indeed, opposition to the State of Israel has in part defined that identity and Palestinians 
simultaneously hold Arab loyalties, but the remarks quoted above reflect an incomplete, narrow 
assessment, which could have negative repercussions for the present-day Palestinian bid for state 
recognition. Rashid Khalidi, who is a Palestinian-American, notes that there is a distinct Palestinian 
identity, and that Palestinian identity it is one of “several overlapping senses of identity.” Khalidi 
admits those senses of identity “can be misunderstood or misinterpreted by others.”491 Other 
identities Palestinians hold include Arab, religious and local loyalties.  
An overview of key events that have shaped Palestinian national identity follows. It should 
be evident from a historical analysis that throughout the years, Jews in Israel have also formed a 
distinct national identity and share a connection to the same land where Palestinians seek recognition 
of a nation state. Various names have been used to describe the geographic region “from the 
Mediterranean [Sea] to the Jordan River, from the deserts in the south to the southern foothills of the 
Lebanese mountains and Mount Hermon in the North” that constitutes modern-day Israel, the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip, which is depicted in Map 1 in Chapter 1.492  
Some of the historic names used to describe the region include Land of Israel, Kingdom of 
Israel, Zion, Holy Land, Palestine and Syria Palaestina. This region is home to Jerusalem, a holy city 
coveted by Muslims, Christians and Jews. The Hebrew Bible and the closely corresponding Old 
Testament use the term "Land of Israel" to describe the majority of this geographic region and use 
the term Philistia to describe a small strip of land that encompassed the approximate geographic 
region of the modern-day Gaza Strip. Some Jewish adherents of the Hebrew Bible and Christian 
adherents of the Old Testament believe this geographic region, and most importantly, Jerusalem, to 
be God-given land for the Jewish people.493  
 
The Land of Israel Before the First Aliya 
 
 Around 1200 BCE, after unsuccessfully attacking Egypt, a people likely of Aegean origin, 
settled in the southern Levant by the Mediterranean Sea and ruled five city states extending along the 
seacoast of present-day Gaza, the southwestern and central seacoast of Israel and inland into present-
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day central Israel. The people became known as the Philistines, and the land became known as 
Philistia.494 Around 1000 BCE, according to the Hebrew Bible, in response to continuing threats by 
the Philistines, Jewish tribes united to form the powerful Kingdom of Israel in the Land of Israel, 
with Jerusalem as the capital. The Hebrew Bible depicts the Philistines and the Israelites as 
archenemies. The united monarchy existed until 922 BCE, when it split into the Kingdom of Israel 
(Samaria) in the north and the Kingdom of Judah in the south.495 
 Throughout the centuries, Jews were subjected to various rulers and oftentimes exiled from 
the land of Israel. This was especially pronounced during the Babylonian rule in the middle of the 
fifth century BCE and later under Roman rule. Nonetheless, in varying populations, the Jewish 
people continued to exist as a distinct ethnic and religious group in the Land of Israel. By contrast, 
the Philistines were faced with an increasingly diluted identity as subsequent peoples ruled the region 
and they eventually disappeared as a distinct culture first though the process of subjugation to 
Assyrian rule and later through full assimilation into the Babylonian and Persian Empires.496  
 Following the advent of Christianity in the Land of Israel in the first century CE, Jews faced 
discrimination under the rule of the Roman Empire, though succeeded in briefly establishing an 
independent Jewish State of Israel in Jerusalem and its surrounding area. The Jewish state was 
toppled in just over two years in 135 CE, and in an effort to destroy the Jewish people and their faith; 
the Roman Empire expelled many Jews and forbade them from practicing their faith. The Romans 
renamed the Roman province of Judea (formerly the Kingdom of Judah) Syria Palaestina, a cognate 
of the earlier term Philistia, a term which carried negative connotations for Jews.497 While the term 
Palestine had been used to reference the land of Israel as early as mid-fifth century BCE by 
Herodotus, the term Palestine expanded in use after Romans named the geographic region Syria 
Palaestina.498  
 Christians also faced discrimination in the Roman Empire; but the Christian religion grew in 
popularity and by 380 CE it was the official religion in the Roman Empire, with Palestine initially 
serving as the center of Christianity though Rome soon became the center of Christianity.499 With the 
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advent of Islam in the seventh century CE, this new religion spread throughout the Middle East 
rapidly. Palestine was conquered by the Islamic Empire in 636 CE, leading to a rapid growth of 
Muslim Arabs in Palestine who spoke the Arabic language, surpassing the Christian and Jewish 
populations.500 The historical changes in the population of the three main religions groups in 
Palestine can be observed in Table 1A. 
Table 34:  Population in Palestine West of the Jordan River, by Religious Groups, 1st Century – 2000 
(Rough Estimates, Thousands) 
 
 
Source: DellaPergola, Sergio. “Demography in Israel/Palestine: Trends, Prospects, Policy Implications.” Paper 
presented at the XXIV International Union for the Scientific Study of Population General Population Conference, 
Salvador de Bahia, 2001. 
 
 Following the Islamic conquest of Palestine, Arab Muslims retained their majority status in 
Palestine for more than a millennium, with small Christian and even smaller Jewish communities 
existing in Palestine. The Ottoman Turks occupied Palestine in 1516 CE and Palestine became part 
of the Syria Province of the expansive Ottoman Empire, though the term Palestine continued in 
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use.501 Under Ottoman rule, provinces such as Syria enjoyed much autonomy and populations were 
largely subjected to local rule.502  
 
Jewish Immigration to Palestine 
 
 In the late nineteenth century, Jews began emigrating to and settling in Palestine, marking the 
beginning of a historic religious demographic shift. Facing oppression in Eastern European countries 
in the early 1880s, Jews formed organizations to provide financial and technical assistance to 
facilitate the transfer of Jews to the Ottoman Empire, specifically to Palestine. Jews from other 
countries, notably Yemen, also began immigrating to Palestine. This wave of Jewish immigration to 
Palestine is known as the first aliya, and it occurred during 1882 to 1903. The Jews that immigrated 
were largely secular, and did so in pursuit of economic opportunities and a better life.  
 Often with the help of middle-men and Ottoman officials, Jews arriving in Palestine 
purchased land from Arab merchants or absentee landlords. Large tracts of land were concentrated in 
few hands, facilitating the sale of Arab land to Jewish immigrants.503 The Jewish settlers developed 
the land, which resulted in some Arab displacement, as many Arabs did not own the land they lived 
on and worked. Oftentimes, however, Jews that were part of the first aliya hired Arabs to work the 
land or Arabs leased the land from the new Jewish owners.504 During this time, sovereign states were 
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not yet established in the Middle East region, but national identities were emerging and growing, 
notably Palestinian Arab and Jewish identities.505 
 In 1897, the nature of the reasons for immigration to Palestine shifted with the advent of 
Zionism. As envisioned by its founder Theodor Herzl, the movement called for the Jewish return 
from exile to Zion (Jerusalem) and the establishment of a sovereign Jewish national homeland in 
Palestine.506 The Zionist Organization held its first annual congress that year, during which Jews 
articulated the aims of Zionism.507  Zionists made up a large part of the second wave of Jewish 
immigration, known as the second aliya, which lasted from 1904 to 1914. Jews fleeing persecution, 
particularly those from Russia, were also part of the second aliya.508    
 Khalidi points out that a popular Zionist concept was that there were few or no inhabitants in 
the land of Palestine, making it particularly suitable for Jewish settlement. A popular Zionist slogan 
of the era was “A land without a people for a people without a land.”509 When Zionist Jews arrived in 
Palestine, they set out to improve the land. However, unlike the Jews of the first aliya, the Zionists 
used exclusively Jewish labor and created Zionist land purchase and settlement agencies to facilitate 
the process. The result was the displacement of Palestinian Arabs that lived and worked on land but 
did not own it. Zionist Jews faced hostility by many Palestinian Arabs, who perceived Jewish 
immigration as a threat to their land. Jews created the Hashomer, a Jewish defense organization to 
defend the many new Jewish settlements.510 This experience marks the beginning of the modern-day 
conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. 
 Not all of the Jewish immigrants from the first and second aliya settled permanently in 
Palestine. Notably, of the 30,000 Jews that immigrated to Palestine from Eastern Europe and Russia 
during the second aliya, 80 percent returned to Europe, in part due to the economic difficulties 
immigrants faced in Palestine.511 Nonetheless, the Jewish share of the population of Palestine 
increased, as can be observed in Table 1A.  In 1890, Arab Muslims constituted 81 percent of the 
population, and Jews constituted eight percent. As a result of Jewish settlement in Palestine, by 1914, 
Jews made up 14 percent of the population and Arab Muslims made up 76 percent of the population.  
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The press played an important role in educating Palestinians, immigrants, and Ottoman 
Parliament Officials about the Zionist project, which was not fully understood by most people at the 
time.512 While most Palestinians were unorganized peasants, some Palestinians held representation in 
the Ottoman Parliament and petitioned the Ottoman Empire to limit Jewish immigration and to stop 
land sales to Jews. They warned that the well-organized Zionist project would lead to continued 
purchases of Palestinian land, often from absentee landlords and many times unbeknownst to the 
native peasants living on and working the land, which would contribute to growing frustration 
amongst the Palestinian Arab peasants. One such Palestinian was Ruhi al-Khalidi, the representative 
of Jerusalem to the Ottoman Parliament. In May 1911, he informed the parliament of the extent of 
Zionist settlement in Palestine, and presented it as a threat and danger to Palestine. He suggested that, 
“The Jews are a great people and the country benefits from their expertise, wealth, schools and 
knowledge, but they should settle in other parts of the Empire and should acquire Ottoman 
nationality.”513 The influx of Jewish settlement in Palestine and the Palestinian Arab reaction to it 
contributed to the formation of Arab and Palestinian identity and loyalties. 
 
World War I 
 
 World War I  led to political changes in the region. With Russian assent, in 1916 the British 
and French devised an understanding between themselves, in which they planned to divide Arab 
provinces of the Ottoman Empire should the Allies win the war. The plan became known as the 
Sykes-Picot Agreement, and within it, the British and French indicated they were prepared to 
recognize an independent Arab State or confederation of Arab States, with the British and French 
taking leading roles in administering the new state(s).  
 Soon afterwards, the British enlisted the help of Arabs to help overthrow the Ottoman 
Empire.514 They did so in large part by promising Arabs independence in either the form of a group 
of Arab-majority states or a large Arab-minority state. With British reassurances on the question of 
independence, Arabs began revolting against the Ottoman Empire in June 1916. Complicating British 
promises to Arabs was the British decision to simultaneously provide support to the World Zionist 
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Organization, with hopes the support would attract Jewish sympathy for the Allied Forces.515 The 
British government issued a formal statement of policy known as the Balfour Declaration of 1917, 
announcing British support for the creation of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine.516  
Palestinian Arabs flatly rejected the Balfour Declaration on the grounds that Palestine was 
the national homeland of the existing Arab peoples populating the land. Columbia Professor Edward 
Said, a well-known Palestinian writer, said of the declaration: 
“The declaration was made (a) by a European power, (b) about a non-European territory, (c) 
in a flat disregard of both the presence and the wishes of the native majority resident in that 
territory, and (d) it took the form of a promise about the same territory to another foreign 
group, so that this foreign group might, quite literally, make this territory a national home for 
the Jewish people.”517 
Three weeks following the Balfour Declaration, the Russian Bolsheviks released a copy of 
the Sykes-Picot agreement, embarrassing the Allied forces and upsetting Jews and Palestinian Arabs 
as plans were being made about their future without their consent.  
 In January 1918, US President Woodrow Wilson challenged the European-world order, 
which he considered to have contributed to World War I, and presented “fourteen points” for a 
postwar order. His 12th point read: “The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be 
assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be 
assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous 
development.”518 These principles provided hope for Palestinian Arabs and other Ottoman-ruled 
Arab populations seeking independence. 
The conflicting policies towards Arabs and statehood led to growing distrust of the Allied 
Forces among Arabs and prompted Palestinians to form a Palestine Arab Congress that met for the 
first time in January 1919. The Congress discussed the future of Palestine, and later the Congress 
communicated its concerns over the Balfour Declaration and unsuccessfully lobbied the British to 
repeal it.519   
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When asked why self-determination might not be applied to the Arab inhabitants of Palestine, 
British Foreign Secretary, Arthur James Balfour, who issued the Balfour Declaration, wrote in 
February 1919: 
“The weak point of our position of course is that in the case of Palestine we deliberately and 
rightly decline to accept the principle of self-determination. If the present inhabitants were 
consulted they would unquestionably give an anti-Jewish verdict. Our justification for our 
policy is that we regard Palestine as being absolutely exceptional; that we consider the 
question of the Jews outside Palestine as one of world importance and that we conceive the 
Jews to have an historic claim to a home in their ancient land; provided that home can be 
given [to] them without either dispossessing or oppressing the present inhabitants.”520  
An armistice went into effect on November 11, 1918 that ended fighting and on June 1919, 
the Treaty of Versailles brought war between Germany and the Allied forces to a formal conclusion. 
 
Palestinian Nationalism after World War I 
 
 Following World War I, Palestinian Arabs no longer held Ottoman loyalties. Faced with a 
threat to their homeland, nationalist sentiments and Arab loyalties grew while religious loyalties 
diminished. In the face of British and world policy favoring Jewish settlement in Palestine, 
Palestinian Arab objections grew and efforts to quell Jewish immigration increased. Arabs began to 
target British and Zionists forces. Some of the worst clashes were the riots in Jerusalem in 1920—
which led to the formation of the Jewish paramilitary organization, the Haganah. Violent clashes 
continued throughout the 1920s.521  
 The end of WWI led to the creation of the intergovernmental organization, the League of 
Nations. The League of Nations was responsible for administering territories on behalf of the 
League’s Mandate system that had previously been controlled by states of the Ottoman Empire that 
were defeated in WWI. Territories were designated as Class A, B or C Mandates. Class A mandates 
included Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine. Class A mandates were given provisional independence, 
though they were still subject to administrative control by the French or British until the League of 
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Nations deemed they were ready for self-rule.522 The Covenant of the League of Nations indicated, 
inter alia, that: "Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage 
of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject 
to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are 
able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the 
selection of the Mandatory.”523  
The Mandate for Palestine was issued by the British and Allied Forces in 1922. What made 
Palestine unique from other Class A Mandates was a clear British commitment to Zionist aims to 
establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine, in part due to strong influence by Zionist Organization 
leaders. The Mandate stipulated that the British government, with the support of the Principle Allied 
Powers, was in “favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it 
being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious 
rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.” It further supported the creation of a Jewish 
agency to facilitate Jewish immigration to Palestine: “to secure the cooperation of all Jews who are 
willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish National Home.”524 The resulting Jewish Agency 
for Palestine actively facilitated Jewish immigration to Palestine.525  
 In 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, on the one hand, by the United Kingdom, 
France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, and the "Serbo-Croat-Slovene" State and by Turkey on the 
other. The treaty formalized the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the enactment of the Palestine 
Mandate, and the British administration of the new State of Palestine.526 Documents from the period 
referred to the mandates as states. For example, an excerpt from Article 46 of the Treaty of Lausanne 
reads: 
The Ottoman Public Debt… shall be distributed under the conditions laid down in the present 
Section between Turkey, the States in favour of which territory has been detached from the 
Ottoman Empire after the Balkan wars of 1912-13, the States to which the islands referred to 
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in Articles 12 and 15 of the present Treaty and the territory referred to in the last paragraph of 
the present Article have been attributed, and the States newly created in territories in Asia 
which are detached from the Ottoman Empire under the present Treaty. All the above States 
shall also participate, under the conditions laid down in the present Section, in the annual 
charges for the service of the Ottoman Public Debt from the dates referred to in Article 
53.”527 
 Out of the Mesopotamia Mandate, Iraq gained formal independence in 1932, and from the 
Syria Mandate, Lebanon gained independence in 1943 and Syria in 1946. The situation on the ground 
in Palestine was complicated because of competing interests and the British continued administering 
the Mandate. John Quigley notes that Great Britain’s role in the Palestine Mandate did not negate 
statehood. He says, “Palestine, under “tutelage,” had the capacities of a state, even as the exercise of 
those capacities rested with Great Britain as the mandatory power.”528 
 Throughout the 1920s, Jewish immigration to Palestine increased as did deadly violence 
between the British troops, Jewish immigrants and Palestinian Arabs. In addition to finding each 
other to be a threat, Jews and Arabs protested British rule. While the British had originally supported 
Jewish immigration to Palestine, the rate of immigration was higher than they had anticipated and in 
light of the violence, the British tried to limit immigration. However, British and Arab efforts to quell 
Jewish immigration were met with violence by the Haganah and large scale Jewish immigration to 
Palestine continued.529 As shown in Table 1A, by 1931, Jews made up 17 percent of the population 
of Palestine and Muslims made up 74 percent of the population.530  
While Palestinian nationalist aims were developing, but not yet clearly articulated, two 
mainstream Zionists factions existed at the time and had developed dramatically different visions for 
a state. Labor Zionists wanted a socialist state in which Jews and Arabs would live and work 
together, and Revisionists wanted a state in all of Palestine and east of the Jordan River (Transjordan) 
for the Jewish people and excluding Arabs. Voluntary or compulsory transfer of the Palestinian 
Arabs or war would be necessary to make the Revisionists’ vision a reality.531 
Despite espousing the same national goals and holding the same frustrations over Jewish 
immigration to Palestine, Palestinian leadership was polarized in the 1930s between the feuding 
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Nashashibi and Husayni families.532 The British had boosted the power of the Husayni family when it 
decided to retain the religious position of Mufti of Jerusalem from the Ottoman Empire. The post was 
renamed as the Grand Mufti of Palestine and its authority was expanded. Hajj Amin al-Husayni was 
chosen for the position and also delegated as the president of Supreme Muslim Shari’a Council. An 
unlikely candidate in his mid-twenties, Husayni was from a largely secular background, having 
served in the Ottoman army throughout WWI. In exchange for recognition and status, the Mufti was 
expected to be loyal to the British interests, which Husayni largely honored throughout the 1920s.533 
 
The Arab Revolt 
 
A decade after the Mandate system was put into place, Palestinians sought to end British rule, 
in what the Israeli historian Simha Flapan considers a reflection of a burgeoning Palestinian national 
consciousness.  By the mid-1930s, the Mufti Husayni shunned his loyalties to British interests and 
instead supported the increasingly popular Palestinian nationalist demands. With mounting 
Palestinian nationalist sentiments and demands for an end to Jewish immigration, in the spring of 
1936, the five leading Palestinian clans, including the Nashibis and Husseinis, came together to form 
the Arab Higher Committee (AHC). So began the Arab Revolt. During the first phase, a general 
strike ensued and was marked by the nonpayment of taxes, with Arab workers and businesses calling 
for an end to Jewish immigration. Led by urban students, the six-month strike engaged various 
groups of Palestinian society, with Muslims, Christians and Druze participating. While the AHC 
originally supported the strike, there was internal dissension over the direction of the strike, and some 
landowners wanted it to end when it was time to harvest citrus crops. 534 
With exhausted resources, the strike eventually ended in the fall of 1936, and despite calls by 
the AHC to remain peaceful, rural Arab communities led a violent resistance movement targeting 
British forces known as the 1936-1939 Arab Revolt in Palestine.535 This was the strongest effort 
made by Palestinian Arabs to seek independence and to halt Jewish immigration to Palestine. The 
British enlisted the help of Jewish settlers to defeat the Arab revolt and provided the Jewish 
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enlistments with arms and training.536 The British lost control of major cities, requiring an influx of 
additional British military personnel.537 
During the Arab Revolt, the British government authorized the Palestine Royal Commission, 
headed by Earl Peel, to investigate the causes of the strike and the Arab uprising. The Peel 
Commission Report that followed contained suggestions for changes to the British Mandate of 
Palestine. Most significantly, the commission found Jewish and Arab interests irreconcilable and 
suggested the partition of Palestine into a Jewish state, a small British mandate area and an Arab state 
united with Transjordan.  
The Arab Higher Committee wanted a state in all of historic Palestine and did not support 
partition. Palestinian Arabs rejected the plan in August 1937.  In reaction to the official rejection of 
the plan by the AHC, the British banned the AHC and its members were arrested or exiled. The 
Mufti fled and eventually settled in Germany. 
Some Zionists, notably the chairman of the executive committee of the Jewish Agency for 
Palestine and eventual first prime minister of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, supported the Peel 
Commission partition plan, insisting it was an opportunity for Jews to have sovereignty over a 
territory, strengthen Jewish moral and political claims to the land and could be a step toward 
achieving a state in all of Palestine.  The Twentieth Zionist Congress, on the other hand, officially 
rejected the Peel Commission and its findings “that Jewish and Arab aspirations were irreconcilable 
and that the existing Mandate was unworkable.”538   
The Arab Revolt was met with harsh resistance by the British, and as a result by the time it 
was over in September 1939, “over 10 percent of the adult male [Arab] population was killed, 
wounded, imprisoned, or exiled” with Jewish and British casualties a fraction of those sustained by 
Palestinian Arabs.539  
Simha Flapan says the general strike and Arab Revolt were “the first significant reflection of 
the developing Palestinian national consciousness.”540 Because many Palestinian leaders either fled 
after the revolt or were exiled by the British, the revolt was devastating to Palestinian leadership and 
Palestinian nationalism.541 As a leader of the Palestinian national movement, Hussayni had become a 
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threat to British and Zionist interests. The British government sought to arrest him for his role in the 
general strike and uprising but he fled.  
The Revolt resulted in a significant policy reversal by the British government, which issued 
the White Paper of 1939 setting limits on Jewish immigration. The British government conceded that 
that the Peel Commission suggestions were unworkable and instead called for the creation of an 
independent Palestinian state within ten years to be governed by Palestinian Arabs and Jews. On the 
grounds that the British had fulfilled its commitment to allowing Jewish immigration to make a 
Jewish national homeland in Palestine, the policy paper set limits on Jewish immigration and set 
limits on the rights of Jews to buy land from Palestinians.542 The implementation of the White Paper 
turned out to be impractical and impossible to enforce, largely because of the political realities of the 
era.  
 
World War II and Immediately After 
 
German and other European Jews were increasingly fearful for their property and lives as 
Germany’s Nazi Party leader Adolph Hitler social agenda began to unfold. Prior to and during World 
War II, which began in 1939, many Jews fled their European homelands in search of safety from 
what was thereafter known as the Holocaust. In part because many countries, including the U.S., 
restricted or prevented Jewish immigration, many Jews resorted to immigration to Palestine in 
numbers exceeding the legal quotas held by the British.543 The massacre of six million Jews during 
the Holocaust strengthened the resolve of the Jewish settlers to establish a safe haven for Jews 
worldwide in the historic Kingdom of Israel, and instilled a very security-driven mentality within the 
Jewish community. 
In Palestine, some Zionist groups violently rebelled against British rule and its policies on 
immigration. Jewish immigration to Palestine was possible through the efforts of underground 
Zionist military organizations such as the National Military Organization (Irgun), the Hagana and the 
LEHI (Israel Freedom Fighters).544  
The Arabs had assisted the British during WWI by revolting against the Ottoman Empire in 
exchange for promises of independence. As independence remained elusive for many Arab states, 
their loyalties shifted to the Axis powers. Simha Flapan explains: “Motivated both by longstanding 
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anti-British sentiment and by the belief that the Axis powers would be victorious, many Arab 
leaders…tried to cut their ties with Great Britain and collaborate with Germany in the hope that after 
the war they would be in a position to liberate the Middle East from British domination.”545  With 
German promises of Arab Independence, from Berlin, Husayni “engaged in German propaganda and 
attempted to mobilize Yugoslavian Muslims for the German Army.”546 In light of the Mufti’s support 
of Hitler, the AHC was stigmatized. 
 By the war’s end, approximately six million Jews were killed by Hitler and his allies.547 The 
genocide of the Jewish people played a key role in Jews’ determination to establish a secure 
homeland. In 1942 Zionist leaders met at the Biltmore Hotel in New York City. Known as the 
Biltmore Conference, the AHC sought unlimited Jewish immigration to Palestine and announced the 
goal of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine.548 Due to a tremendous influx of Jewish immigrants 
to Palestine and their resolve for a Jewish state, a state for Arabs seemed less likely.   
In 1945 the United Nations (UN) was formed and it effectively assumed the role in Palestine 
the League of Nations had held until it dissolved in 1946.549 Arabs and Jews, along with the world’s 
leading superpowers—the US, the Soviet Union and key European countries—were particularly 
interested in a solution to growing political pressures from Jews and Arabs who by that time were 
both actively seeking a state in Palestine. In 1945, the Arab League created a political committee that 
was made up of Arab heads of state who were tasked with handling the Palestine problem. While the 
AHC had been dissolved by the British government during the Arab Revolt, it had reemerged and 
dissolved several times, due to internal divisions. In 1946, it reemerged for the fourth time, and in 
ensuing years it was often at odds with the Arab League’s political committee.550  
Faced with ongoing turmoil in Palestine, in May 1947, the British requested that the UN 
make recommendations for the future of Palestine. In response, the UN formed the United Nations 
Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to investigate the challenges in Palestine and to offer a 
solution. Zionist groups cooperated with the UNSCOP, meeting and discussing options for the future 
of Palestine. Jewish participation in the investigation was organized, efficient and diplomatic. During 
discussions, some influential Zionist leaders began distancing themselves from the Biltmore program 
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and explored alternative options for the future of Palestine, including partition of the land for the 
Jewish and Arab peoples. Conversely, the AHC did not cooperate with and even protested the 
UNSCOP, underestimating its importance. The AHC held an uncompromising position, insisting that 
an independent Arab state in all of Palestine was a self-evident right, as Arabs populated the majority 
of the land.551 Although the Jewish share of the population had grown to 32 percent, with 60 percent 
of the population of Palestine in 1947, Muslims still constituted a clear majority.552 While the AHC 
refused to meet with the UNSCOP, the Arab League's political committee met with the UNSCOP in 
July 1947 and made unyielding and unrealistic demands. The Arab committee wanted to end Jewish 
immigration and land purchases and sought the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state and rejected 
political Jewish representation as part of the state. Eventually, in the critical days before the 
UNSCOP revealed its recommendation, the Arab committee relented and suggested an Arab state 
with a unitary government, giving the Jewish population protected minority status and political 
representation.553 
The UNSCOP confirmed that both Arab and Jewish national aspirations were valid and 
entertained many ideas for the future of Palestine. The most popular options were the creation of a 
bi-national state, and partition of the land into an Arab and Jewish state. With some support from 
Great Britain, King Abdullah of Jordan advocated halting Jewish immigration and creating a Greater 
Syrian state that would incorporate Syria, Palestine and Jordan, which he would rule. Arabs warned 
the UNSCOP against partition, insisting this option would lead to war between Arabs and Jews. 
Complicating the crucial task of the UNSCOP, the British government announced it would not 
support a solution that was not accepted by both sides and would not be responsible for 
implementing the UNSCOP recommendations. This worrisome development indicated the British 
were ready to leave Palestine and skirt the responsibility of implementing a solution. The British 
threat was alarming to the UNSCOP and other key world leaders including the US and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).554    
Despite British threats and significant reservations amongst committee members that 
indicated Jewish and Arab claims to the land were irreconcilable, the UNSCOP published its 
recommendations on September 8, 1947. The UNSCOP recommended ending the British Mandate 
and establishing two independent states in the land of Palestine. Further recommendations included 
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the internationalization of Jerusalem as a holy city open to all and an economic union between the 
two states. The Jewish Agency supported the partition plan and Jewish involvement and influence 
during the process is reflected in the details of the partition plan. The partition allocated 55 percent of 
mandatory Palestine for a Jewish state, with two-thirds of the coastline of Palestine. Following the 
recommendation, on September 26, the British announced it would end the Palestine Mandate.  
On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly implemented a critical policy reversal 
toward Palestine by narrowly passing Resolution 181. Also known as the Partition Plan for Palestine, 
the resolution was a manifestation of the UNSCOP recommendations and called for an end to the 
British Mandate by August 1, 1948 along with the establishment of an Arab and Jewish state side by 
side by October 1, 1948.555 The AHC and Arab League insisted the plan was unfair and rejected it. 
On grounds that Arabs constituted a significant majority of the population and were the native 
inhabitants of the land whereas the vast majority of Jews were newly arrived refugees, they wanted a 
single Arab state in all of Palestine.556 The less powerful Palestinian–Arab communist political party, 
The National Liberation League in Palestine, was an exception and supported partition.557  
Upon the UN General Assembly vote, fighting erupted in Palestine between Jewish and Arab 
communities. Known as the 1947-1948 Civil War, disorganized Palestinian Arabs suffered many 
military defeats against the Jewish military forces. Jews captured large portions of Palestine, 
including Jaffa and Haifa, both major Arab cities. Khalidi reflects: “Their [Jewish] decisive victories 
over the Palestinians brought about the wholesale flight and expulsion of much of the Arab 
population of Palestine, beginning a demographic transformation of the country with long-lasting 
consequences.”558    
The UN was to oversee the transitional period until both states were created but this did not 
happen as the partition plan proved to be problematic, divisive and impossible to implement. In 
March 1948, the British reaffirmed it would not enforce the partition plan and announced the 
Mandate would end May 15, 1948. In response to British reluctance to implement the plan and 
fighting in Palestine, the US retracted its support and suggested instead a UN trusteeship for 
Palestine. On March 25, President Harry S. Truman stated:  
"Unfortunately, it has become clear that the partition plan cannot be carried out at this time 
by peaceful means...The United Kingdom has announced its firm intention to abandon its 
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mandate in Palestine on May 15. Unless emergency action is taken, there will be no public 
authority in Palestine on that date capable of preserving law and order. Violence and 
bloodshed will descend upon the Holy Land. Large-scale fighting among the people of that 
country will be the inevitable result. Such fighting would infect the entire Middle East and 
could lead to consequences of the gravest sort involving the peace of this Nation and of the 
world.”559  
The failure of the partition plan had considerable consequences for the Palestinian case for 
statehood. While the majority of Palestinian Arabs were insistent on a state in all of Palestine, by 
rejecting the partition plan, they forfeited a historic opportunity to gain independence and in part of 
Palestine. 
The British began withdrawing their personnel prior to the end of the Palestine Mandate. 
John Quigley contends that Palestinian statehood was not negated by the departure of the British. He 
said: “As Britain withdrew from Palestine after World War II, the international community, through 
Article 80 of the UN Charter, preserved rights that had been accorded under the mandate, including 
the statehood of Palestine. Palestine statehood was not renounced, nor was it extinguished. Egypt and 
Jordan protected sectors of Palestine. The League of Arab States assumed an ancillary role in 
preserving Palestine statehood.”560 
With no agreed upon alternative to the partition plan, Jewish leaders declared the independent 
State of Israel on May 14, 1948, the day before the British Mandate was to end. The unilateral 
declaration, which notably did not specify territorial borders, ended negotiations with Arabs and the 
international community. Not specifying borders left open the opportunity to expand Israeli borders 
beyond those in the partition plan. This strategically undermined the viability of a future Palestinian 
state as Jewish forces were able to capture far more land than they would have been allocated 
through previously considered agreements. 
Jewish leaders understood the implications of unilaterally declaring an Israeli state, as Arab 
leaders had previously stated partition would lead to regional war. Despite the regional ramifications, 
this bold move prompted immediate recognition of the State of Israel by the U.S.561 
Palestinian Arabs did not recognize the Israeli state as legitimate and called for its 
destruction.562 On May 15, 1948, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, Abdul Razek 
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Azzam Pasha, sent a cablegram to the UN Secretary-General outlining the Arab states’ rejection of 
the two-state plan and their intention to intervene to protect Palestinians’ lives and property and 
create a “United State of Palestine.” The cablegram highlighted Arab support of the Allies in WWI 
including:  
 “The Arabs have constantly been seeking their freedom and independence…the Arabs 
 sided with the Allies and placed all their means at their disposal and in fact fought with 
 them for the realization of their national aspirations and their independence...such a 
 solution was prejudicial to the rights of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine to independence 
 and was contradictory to democratic principles and to the League of Nations as well as 
 the United Nations Charter.”563  
 Small and disorganized Egyptian, Iraqi, Transjordanian, Lebanese and Syrian armies 
immediately entered the disputed territory, marking the beginning of the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. 
King Abdullah of Transjordan posed the most significant challenge to their effort. Motivated by 
hopes of territorial expansion and in secret collusion with Jewish leaders, the Transjordanian army at 
times operated independently from other Arab armies.564 From the start, the combined Arab armies 
were smaller than Israeli forces and were exceedingly underprepared for a confrontation. In addition 
to no command structure and little coordination and conflicting aims among the armies, Arab soldiers 
were not experienced in battle and were under equipped in comparison with Israeli soldiers.565    
The UN immediately attempted but failed to establish a ceasefire to the fighting. Israel won 
decisive victories and hostilities officially ended when Israel signed armistice agreements with 
Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria in 1949. During the war, there was an exodus of more than 
700,000 Palestinian Arabs, who largely settled as refugees in neighboring Arab countries and in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip.566 Some resettled as far away as Chile.567 Many had intentions of 
returning to their homes once calm was restored. 
The fighting resulted in a single Israeli state with borders extending beyond those called for 
in UN Resolution 181 and the remaining land, including the West Bank and Gaza Strip, were 
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occupied by Jordan and Egypt and remained a Palestinian Arab state, but lacked independence.568 
Jordan occupied the West Bank and East Jerusalem and annexed them, while Egypt occupied the 
Gaza Strip. Palestinians in Transjordan were given Transjordanian nationality, while Egypt did not 
annex the territory nor give Palestinians Egyptian nationality.569 The remaining Palestinians in the 
new State of Israel (less than 200,000) faced a tumultuous new reality and were given Israeli 
citizenship and barred from expressions of Palestinian identity.570  Israeli historian Tom Segev 
reflects on their new reality: “As Israeli citizens, they were entitled to vote and run for the Knesset, 
but they were not Israelis with equal rights, or equal duties. Very few served in the IDF. The state 
viewed them as a security risk, and since Israel’s establishment they had been subject to martial 
law.”571 
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights hold that the right of return to one’s own place of origin is a human right. The UN 
reaffirmed this right by passing Resolution 194 on December 11, 1948, affirming the right of 
Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and property.  
 Nonetheless, Israel enacted measures to prevent Palestinians from returning to their homes 
and property. The Absentees’ Property Laws, the Land Acquisition Law of 1953, the Law for the 
Requisitioning of property in Time of Emergency of 1949 and the Prescription Law of 1958 allowed 
the Jewish National Fund to expropriate Arab land. Coupled with the Israeli Law of Return, which 
allows Jews worldwide to settle in Israel and gain Israeli citizenship, Israel acquired the depopulated 
land and facilitated the settlement of Jewish communities in place of Palestinian communities.572  
The denial of the right of return to Palestinians compounded hostilities between Israelis, 
Palestinians and neighboring Arab countries. Fledgling Arab countries did not have the capacity or 
desire to absorb the newly arrived Palestinian refugees, and many Palestinians have remained in 
refugee camps since the 1948 war, with the support of the UN, which created a specialized agency 
for Palestinian refugees, the UN Works and Relief Agency for Palestinians in the Near East. The war 
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also had a significant impact on Jewish populations. It is important to note that 1948 marked the 
beginning of a Jewish exodus from Arab and Muslim countries. In the coming decades, hundreds of 
thousands of Jews left, fled, or were expelled from their homes in Arab countries and settled in 
Israel.573  
 
Palestinian National Aspirations after 1948 
 
 In 1949, Israel was accepted as a state by the international community through its acceptance 
as a member state of the UN. The experience and failures of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and the newly 
established State of Israel solidified Palestinians’ resolve to establish a nation state of their own. 
These events, however, made the pursuit much more difficult as Palestinians had suffered a major 
defeat and were subsequently geographically dispersed. Nonetheless, Palestinian nationalism 
persisted. For many, the goal was not only the creation of a Palestinian state, but the destruction of 
the newly formed State of Israel with the hopes of establishing a Palestinian state in its place, 
covering all of the territory in the former Palestine Mandate.  
 Palestinian refugees were seen as a burden and threat to their host countries. Subsequently, 
however, some host countries allowed them significant freedom in organizing and making demands 
for repatriation to Israel. This organization process included electing representatives of the refugee 
population and setting up committees, establishing contacts in governments and philanthropic 
organizations worldwide, and launching media campaigns.574  
 Whereas during the first part of the twentieth century, Palestinian nationalism was expressed 
through the struggle against Zionism and Great Britain, beginning in the 1950s, it was expressed 
through a network of Palestinian nationalistic organizations made up of members of the Palestinian 
Diaspora. Competing nationalist ideologies were prevalent. King Abdullah of Jordan continued to 
advocate for the creation of a Greater Syrian state while Arab nationalism and Pan-Arabism led to 
calls for the unification of Arab states into one single nation or unions between some Arab states.575 
The president of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, was the chief advocate of Arab nationalism—thus the 
ideology became known as Nasserism.576 Militant Islamic fundamentalism with aims to liberate 
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Palestine was introduced in the 1950s, but gained less support amongst Palestinians than other 
secular ideologies.577   
 
The Establishment of the PLO 
 
 While Arab regimes gave Palestinian refugees freedom to organize themselves and make 
demands of Israel, they began feeling the pressure of Palestinian demands. In 1964, representatives 
of Palestinian Arab communities convened in Jerusalem, and with the support of the Arab League, 
formed the Palestine National Council (PNC) to represent the dispersed Palestinian people. Tasked 
with serving as a policy-making body, the PNC created the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
to serve as its governing body. The PNC also created the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) to protect 
and extend territory in Palestine by force.578 The creation of the PLO was a defeat for King Hussein 
as it reduced the likelihood his plans for a Greater Syria would succeed. Representative bodies were 
immediately set up throughout the Arab world. One of the PLO’s first activities was adopting the 
Palestinian National Charter in 1964.579 The creation of the PLO signaled an organized expression of 
Palestinian nationalism.  
The Emergence of Fatah 
 One of the most notable Palestinian nationalist organizations came into existence in 1959 
when members of the Palestinian Diaspora, most notably Yasser Arafat, founded the nationalist 
revolutionary movement “Palestinian National Liberation Movement,” which is known as Al-Fateh. 
More widely known as Fateh or Fatah, the aim of Fatah was to unify stateless Palestinians, liberate 
historic Palestine by armed struggle and establish a Palestinian state in the place of Israel. Along with 
a central committee that served as the leading political body and a revolutionary council that serves 
as the decision-making body, Fatah originally included militant and terrorist groups.580 
 Khalidi reflects on the early Palestinian nationalist organizations and concludes that they had 
unrealistic aims: “Some of them unreflectively talked of “liberating” Palestine. This meant restoring 
an Arab Palestine that had never been a sovereign state, and whose social basis was irrevocably gone 
with the flight of over half the Palestinian people and the expropriation of most of their land.”581 
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From the 1960s to the mid-2000s, the Fatah movement was the dominant force in Palestinian 
politics and has always been the largest faction in the PLO. Over time, it shifted its focus from armed 
struggle to a diplomatic approach toward negotiating a two-state solution with Israel.  
The 1967 War 
 Nearly two decades after the historic Palestinian exodus, Palestinian refugees continued to be 
perceived as a burden to Arab countries as Palestinians had not been compensated or permitted by 
Israel to return as stipulated under UN Resolution 194.582 Palestinians in the West Bank were an 
exception. They had been given Jordanian citizenship, but like Palestinian refugees elsewhere, they 
had developed a common Palestinian identity and an articulated desire for a Palestinian nation state, 
so they, too were a burden to Jordan. Rising tensions between Israel, Palestinian nationalist 
organizations targeting Israel and neighboring Arab countries resulted in the1967 Six-Day War, 
which was fought by Israel against Egypt, Jordan and Syria between June 5 and June 10, 1967. By 
war’s end, Israel had won a decisive victory and occupied land in neighboring Arab countries. Israel 
captured the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt; the Shebaa farms from Lebanon; the Golan 
Heights from Syria; and the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan. As the land was acquired 
and occupied by force, Israel assumed the position of a belligerent occupant. The International Court 
of Justice, UN Security Council, UN General Assembly and the Supreme Court of Israel have 
deemed Israel’s position in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a belligerent occupancy.583 Israel 
extended Israeli law to East Jerusalem, a move that proved to be a step towards Israel’s eventual 
annexation of East Jerusalem, a violation of a belligerent occupancy.584 The international community 
became involved, and on November 22, 1967, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 
242, which called for the following actions: 
1.  Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; 
2.  Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and 
their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts 
of force."585   
 Currently, all sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict generally cite UN Security Council 
Resolution 242 as the basis for peace, though it has been a contentious resolution. The PLO initially 
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rejected the resolution, partly on grounds that it did not recognize Palestinian rights for self-
determination, and partly because the PLO continued to call for the liberation of Palestine and was 
not satisfied with the liberation of merely the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. The revised 
Palestinian National Charter was adopted in 1968 and called for the total liberation of all of the 
former Mandate of Palestine. It also stipulated that only Jews “who had normally resided in Palestine 
until the beginning of the Zionist invasion” would be allowed to stay in the democratic secular State 
of Palestine the PLO aimed to establish.586  
 Despite explicit Israeli support of UN Security Council Resolution 242, there was and 
continues to be implicit opposition. On May 1, 1968, Israel accepted the resolution, though it did not 
withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS). Instead, Israel assumed various functions of 
governance in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, while allowing a combination of local Palestinian 
institutions, including Islamic courts, to continue to exist, and allowed Jordan to continue to pay the 
salaries of employees in public service and charitable society institutions.587   
 Some Israelis favored using the land as leverage, hoping to exchange the land for peace with 
Arab neighbors and with Palestinians.588 Others indicated Israel should keep the WBGS, which 
would create a buffer and security zone between Israel and her neighbors.589 More Israelis supported 
the latter position and soon Israelis began moving to the occupied West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan 
Heights and East Jerusalem to build settlements in an effort to create a “defense line,” violating the 
laws accorded to a belligerent occupier.590 The laws governing the behavior of a belligerent occupant 
include the Hague Conventions of 1907, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and customary 
human rights laws. Specifically, the UN Security Council, UN General Assembly, International 
Committee of the Red Cross, International Court of Justice and the High Contracting Parties to the 
Convention agree that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies in this situation.591 Article 49 of the 
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Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 forbids a state from deporting or transferring "parts of its own 
civilian population into the territory it occupies."592 The United Nations General Assembly and the 
Security Council have cited Israel’s transfer of its population into the territories as a violation of 
international laws. One of the first resolutions to state this was UN Security Council resolution 446, 
which stated that the settlement policy was not only unlawful but “a serious obstruction to achieving 
a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East.”593 Further, Israel annexed East 
Jerusalem, a move the UN first admonished through UN Security Council Resolution 476 stating: 
“all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which 
purport to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem have no legal validity and 
constitute a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention.”594  
 Israel maintains that the Fourth Geneva Convention does not apply in this situation, citing 
that the territories are “disputed” and not “occupied” because it claims the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
were not taken from a recognized sovereign state during the 1967 War, but rather from Jordan and 
Egypt that had occupied the lands. Therefore, Israel claims that the building of settlements in the 
disputed territories is in accordance with international law.595 The movement of Israeli population 
into the occupied territories threatens the viability of an independent Palestinian state.596  
 
The Evolution of the PLO following the 1967 War 
 
 Arab states had originally sought to control the PLO in an effort to contain Palestinian 
pressures. Further, key Palestinian nationalist organizations originally rebuffed the PLO.  However, 
Palestinians were disillusioned by Arab failures in the Six-Day War, and moved further away from 
Arab nationalism. The PLO grew in strength, as more secular Palestinian groups gave credence to 
and joined the PLO including Fatah in 1967 and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in 
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1968, shaping the PLO’s Palestinian-centric character. Hence, Arab governments enjoyed less 
control over Palestinian affairs and Palestinians nationalist demands were more unified.597 The PLO 
was neither Arabist nor Islamist, but rather espoused secular Palestinian nationalism and had popular 
support. 598 The war reinvigorated the Palestinian cause because Israel now not only existed in what 
Palestinians perceived to be their land but also occupied lands where Palestinians lived. Khalidi 
reflects on the PLO’s creation and development: “Although it was thus initially not an independent 
actor, the Arab states quickly lost control of it, as it was refashioned by these organizations into the 
primary vehicle of Palestinian nationalism, a process which was completed by 1968.”599  
 In 1970, an unruly faction of PLO guerrilla forces, the PFLP, led a series of aircraft 
hijackings and some even aimed to overthrow the Jordanian Monarchy. The Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan reacted by driving the PLO out of Jordan in a conflict known as Black September, leading to 
the entrenchment of the PLO in the West Bank and Lebanon.600 Although demographically dispersed 
and not always unified in vision, the PLO has persisted throughout the years, surviving conflicts in 
Jordan and Lebanon and conflicts with Israel.  
 Since its inception, the military wing of the PNC carried out violent attacks against Israel in 
an effort to end the occupation.601  Faced with an entrenched Israeli occupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip and given Israel’s military strength, Palestinian nationalist aims gradually shifted.602 In 
the 1970s, Palestinians, led by PLO chairman Yasser Arafat, began exploring options in addition to 
armed struggle, the latter of which had failed them miserably. Palestinian political leaders began 
advocating a diplomatic effort to negotiate a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to 
achieve recognition of a Palestinian state.603  The PLO was increasingly viewed as the representative 
of the Palestinian people as is evidenced by its acceptance into international organizations of states 
such as the Economic Commission for Western Asia, an  organ of the UN.604 In 1974, at an Arab 
summit that year, the PLO was deemed to be the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
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people and it became a member of the Arab League, which contributed to the PLO shifting its 
primary work from Arab countries into the occupied territories.605  
 Large segments of Palestinian society were adjusting to the reality that they would have to 
give up the failing struggle for a state in all of historic Palestine and instead work towards liberating 
the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip to establish a Palestinian state in 22 percent of 
Mandate Palestine, later termed the “two state solution.” The historic shift in Palestinian nationalistic 
aims eventually made Palestinians a more attractive negotiating partner to Israel and have influenced 
subsequent peace efforts.606   
 The UN took notice of the PLO’s growing legitimacy and began putting in place resolutions 
supporting Palestinian statehood, and invited the PLO to take an active role in the UN with a 
permanent observer status. In many ways, the UN was treating the PLO as the representative of a 
Palestinian state.  
 While the PLO officially explored diplomacy and peace, many of its groups continued to 
engage in armed struggle against Israel in an effort to liberate Palestine. During the 1970s and 1980s, 
the PLO’s popular support, representative status, organization and attacks on Israel posed a threat to 
Israel, so Israeli forces routinely targeted its members. In 1976, the PLO held municipal elections in 
the West Bank, and PLO candidates won the majority of seats whereas pro-Jordanian candidates had 
dominated in the past. Seen as a threat, Israel reacted harshly towards the PLO candidates, many of 
whom were imprisoned or expelled by Israel.607 During the 1978 US-brokered Camp David Accords 
between Israel and Egypt, efforts were made to legitimize Palestinians’ right to self-determination. 
But despite widespread recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, at 
this time, the US and Israel were not willing to accord the PLO this status.608 
 By the late 1970s, many Palestinians felt the PLO’s diplomatic efforts had yet to bring about 
real political change. The PLO’s shift towards compromise and acceptance of a two-state solution, 
which meant the acceptance of an Israeli state, alienated some of its previous supporters, who 
continued to engage in armed struggle against Israel. Islamic groups, such as the Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad (Al-Jihad), which was formed in 1979, quickly filled the vacuum created by the PLO’s failure 
to end the occupation and its shift in ideology.  
                                                 
605
 Said, Edward W. “Intifada and Independence.” In Intifada: the Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation, 
edited by Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin. Boston: South End Press, 1989, 9. 
606
 (Khalidi, The Iron Cage 2006, 207) 
607
 GlobalSecurity.org. “PLO-Jordanian Relations.” GlobalSecurity.org. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/plo_jordan.htm (accessed December 1, 2012).  
(Said, Intifada and Independence 1989, 5-22) 
608
 (Quigley, Statehood of Palestine 2010, 140-141)  
253 
 
While secular Palestinian nationalism was and continues to be the most popular political 
ideology amongst Palestinians, Islamic groups were growing in strength, in part due to the PLO’s 
ineffectiveness. Islamic factions, Khalidi writes, “subsume Palestinian nationalism within one or 
another form of Islamic identity.”609 According to Said, “They offer…one intellectual and cultural 
alternative to the conventional one [the secular PLO].”610 Said points out the Islamic groups oppose 
both US-style values and Israel, treating the latter as an occupying force that must be dealt with by 
force.  
 
The First Intifada, Hamas, and Peace Talks 
 
 In 1987, a combination of a frozen political process between Israelis and Palestinians; 
expanding Israeli settlements; expropriation of land in the occupied territories; and restricted access 
to water and other resources culminated in a popular uprising spanning the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, which aimed to bring about an end to the Israeli occupation, including a full Israeli withdrawal 
from the WBGS and Palestinian independence. While the uprising was initially characterized by 
nonviolent civil disobedience and protests, it became violent, with Israeli soldiers using force against 
Palestinian protestors and using force against Israelis. Further, Palestinians turned on other 
Palestinians, accusing them of collaborating with Israel. An estimated 1,491 Palestinians were killed 
by Israeli civilians and the Israeli military and another 1,000 Palestinians were killed by Palestinians 
as alleged collaborators with Israel. Approximately 185 Israelis were killed by Palestinians during 
the Intifada.611  
 The powerful Palestinian militant Islamist organization Islamic Resistance Movement 
(Hamas) emerged during the First Intifada in early 1988 as an offshoot of the world’s most 
influential Islamist Movement, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Consisting of social, political and 
military wings, Hamas set out to liberate Palestine from Israeli occupation and use all means 
possible, including violence, to establish an Islamic state in the area that is now Israel, the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip. Hamas did not recognize Israel’s right to exist. The party grew in power in the 
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Gaza Strip, as its civil welfare services were essential to Palestinians suffering from Israeli attacks.612 
Notably, Hamas did not join the PLO, but rather found itself, “competing with the PLO over the 
identity, direction, and leadership of the Palestinian society.”613 Hamas differs from Fatah in that it 
does not believe that engaging in negotiations with Israel will bring about a recognized Palestinian 
state, and it has denounced the concessions Fatah party leaders have made with Israel.  
 Media coverage of the events during the First Intifada resulted in worldwide concern for the 
harsh Israeli military retaliation towards the Palestinian uprising and ultimately, advanced 
Palestinians’ aim of self-determination.614 While the First Intifada was characterized by violence, the 
PLO actually moderated and shifted towards working with Israelis diplomatically to achieve a 
peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Avi Shlaim argues that the “success of the 
intifada gave Arafat and his followers the confidence they needed to moderate their political 
program.”615  
 The PLO reacted to popular demands for an end to the Israeli occupation by preparing to 
declare a Palestinian state. Jordan reacted to this development by retracting its claim to the West 
Bank, which meant that Palestinians in the West Bank no longer held Jordanian citizenship and 
Jordan discontinued paying 21,000 salaries of individuals working in charitable societies. Notably, 
the Jordanian government continued to pay for the salaries of 2,000 staff taking care of religious and 
holy sites.616  As part of a Palestinian peace initiative, on November 15, 1988 the PLO’s Palestine 
National Council (PNC) adopted a declaration of independence on all Palestinian land captured by 
Israel during the 1967 Six-Day War, including the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip.617 The 
declaration announced the existence of a Palestinian state and suggested it was a state based on the 
Treaty of Lausanne and the Covenant of the League of Nations.618  The declaration cited UN General 
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Assembly Resolution 181, calling for the partition of Palestine and the establishment of two 
independent states.  The next month at the UN, Arafat recognized UN Resolution 242, recognized the 
State of Israel and presented further details of the Palestinian peace initiative.619 Further, the PLO 
accepted all UN resolutions relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The initiative sought UN 
intervention in Palestine to supervise the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the WBGS, indicating the 
PLO would “work to reach a comprehensive peaceful settlement between the sides involved in the 
Arab-Israeli struggle, including the State of Palestine and Israel, as well as the other neighboring 
states, within the framework of an international conference for peace in the Middle East…”620  
 The Declaration of Independence resulted in recognition of a State of Palestine by about 100 
countries and the establishment of varying levels of diplomatic relations with these states and new 
interaction in the form of “general delegations” with other states. In particular, the US initiated 
dialogue for the first time with the PLO. The UN reacted by passing a resolution to affirm 
Palestinians’ rights to exercise sovereignty in the Palestinian Territories and designated the name 
Palestine instead of PLO as the name of their observer status at the UN. While the State of Palestine 
gained recognition by a majority of the world’s states, the declaration did not bring about an end to 
the Intifada or recognition of a Palestinian state by Israel and the U.S.621 The declaration revealed, 
however, that the PLO was willing to accept a two-state solution as a framework for peace talks with 
Israel and Israel came to view Palestinians as a people with a unique identity, though it did not accept 
the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.622 
 After the declaration of independence, the PLO began functioning more like a governing 
body in the WBGS. Yasser Arafat was selected to serve as president of Palestine by the PLO’s 
Central Council, the PLO signed important treaties on behalf of the State of Palestine and the PLO 
applied to join many multilateral organizations.623  
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 Following Arafat’s proclamation and amidst the Intifada, Israel presented a peace initiative in 
1989 that was based on the Camp David Accords. Notably, the initiative outlined four non-negotiable 
basic premises, including:  
a. Israel yearns for peace and the continuation of the political process by means of direct 
negotiations based on the principles of the Camp David Accords. 
b. Israel opposes the establishment of an additional Palestinian state in the Gaza district and in 
the area between Israel and Jordan. 
c. Israel will not conduct negotiations with the PLO. 
d. There will be no change in the status of Judea, Samaria and Gaza other than in accordance 
with the basic guidelines of the Government.624 
 The initiative addressed Israel’s stance towards Palestinian statehood aspirations in the 
context of an overall Middle East peace settlement. With regards to Palestinians, the initiative aimed 
to improve refugee conditions through international efforts and outlined a plan for Palestinian 
elections and interim self-rule for a period of five years leading to a permanent solution. While 
Israel’s peace initiative was not accepted or implemented at that time, it was referenced and used in 
subsequent peace initiatives. 
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The Case for Palestinian Statehood  
Introduction to Palestinian Statehood Claims 
 
Throughout the decades, Palestinians have expressed a desire for a nation-state in many 
ways, while their vision for the territorial dimensions of a Palestinian nation-state and methods to 
achieve it have varied. In recent decades, Palestinians have increasingly used diplomatic means to 
seek recognition of a Palestinian state in a reduced portion of their ancestral homeland—in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. The majority of governments worldwide have recognized an occupied 
Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; however, some countries still do not recognize a 
Palestinian state.625  Palestinians hope that a recognized Palestinian state will result in security for the 
Palestinian people; space for Palestinian refugees to return; increased chances for an end to the Israeli 
occupation and independence; and more favorable terms in a peace agreement with Israel. For 
example, as a state, Palestine could be integrated into the international system and could sign the four 
Geneva conventions of 1949 on warfare, join the UN, apply for membership to the UN Human 
Rights Council, and become party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. These 
opportunities would provide the PLO with a means to secure rights for the Palestinian people, and 
would increase its accountability regarding the treatment of Palestinians and others to these bodies 
governing bodies.626 In order to understand   Palestinian claims to statehood, it is important to clarify 
what constitutes a state and how an entity becomes a recognized state.  
 
What Constitutes a State? 
 
A professor of law and human rights at the Moritz College, John Quigley addresses statehood 
issues in his 2010 book, The Statehood of Palestine. Quigley identifies a fundamental dilemma for 
Palestine with regards to statehood. He writes, “Strange as it may seem, the international community 
has not developed hard and fast rules about statehood.”627 There are no specific conventions or 
treaties that have been created to regulate the process of an entity becoming a state. Further, there is 
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no organization responsible for granting an entity definitive statehood status. Nonetheless, it is 
possible to recognize patterns when observing the paths that entities have followed to become 
recognized states. These patterns should be considered in order to apply the lessons to the case of 
Palestine.  
The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States is widely cited as 
containing relevant statehood criteria. At the time the convention was created during the Seventh 
International Conference of American States, 19 states signed the convention. The convention was 
signed in the context of an effort to get the US to respect the territorial integrity of Latin American 
states.628  While the convention was not created for the purpose of providing statehood criteria, the 
international community loosely relies on points in the convention relating to statehood. The relevant 
statehood criteria are in Article 1 and Article 3 of the Convention. Article 1 states,  “The state as a 
person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b)  
a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.” 629 
Sovereignty and independence are attributes that most states have, though these attributes are not 
criteria for statehood as defined above.  
 
How Entities Become Recognized as States 
 
Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention states: “The political existence of the state is 
independent of recognition by the other states.”630 While entities may be a state without recognition, 
for practical purposes such as negotiating trade arrangements with other states, it is important to gain 
statehood recognition by other states. Article 7 of the Montevideo Convention holds: “The 
recognition of a state may be express or tacit. The latter results from any act which implies the 
intention of recognizing the new state.”631 Accordingly, aspiring states seek both express and tacit 
recognition from other states to build legitimacy. Quigley notes the importance the international 
community plays in legitimizing an entity as a state. In cases where it is not clear if an entity meets 
all criteria in the Montevideo Convention, recognition can override the criteria. For example, Quigley 
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states “legitimacy as endorsed by the international community plays an important role in the 
acknowledgment of statehood and sometimes overrides an ineffectiveness of control.”632 
In practice, states generally extend statehood recognition when: (i) extending recognition is a 
politically viable option and (ii) the entity meets most or all of the criteria in the Montevideo 
Convention. The relevance of political viability was captured by UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, 
who in 1950 said, “While States may regard it as desirable to follow certain legal principles in 
according or withholding recognition, the practice of States shows that the act of recognition is still 
regarded as essentially a political decision, which each State decides in accordance with its own free 
appreciation of the situation.”633 With no law requiring states to recognize other states based on 
certain criteria, attaining statehood recognition is often a gradual process that requires an entity to 
promote itself as a viable state to other states. Further, there is no established threshold for the 
number of states that must recognize an entity to legitimize its claim to statehood. As such, many 
entities are widely regarded as states, despite the fact that they do not enjoy universal recognition by 
all governments.  
Because statehood is a condition of membership to the UN and its agencies, many aspiring 
states apply to be a member state of the UN or its agencies. The UN downplays its role in state 
recognition by insisting, “The United Nations is neither a State nor a Government, and therefore does 
not possess any authority to recognize either a State or a Government.”634   
In reality, however, an entity’s claim to statehood is greatly substantiated when it is accepted 
as a member of the UN, though individual states may continue to withhold formal recognition. 
Quigley acknowledges this saying, "Membership in the United Nations... may be taken as evidence 
of statehood, since admission to membership involves a judgment that the entity is a state."635 Even if 
an entity is not accepted as a member of the UN, there is still a motivation to apply as the result is 
often increased recognition by individual governments of that entity as a state. Entities may resubmit 
a UN membership application if they do not immediately gain acceptance.  
States with varying levels of recognition may seek acceptance into the UN and UN agencies. 
UN membership “is open to all peace-loving States that accept the obligations contained in the 
United Nations Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able to carry out these 
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obligations.”636 The multi-step process of UN state recognition requires a state to submit an 
application to the UN in which it accepts the obligations under the UN Charter. At least four of the 
ten non-permanent UN Security Council Members and all of the five permanent Security Council 
members must recommend the state’s acceptance. Then, at least two-thirds of the UN General 
Assembly must vote in favor of accepting the new state to the UN.  
Acceptance into the UN as a state is political in nature. Acceptance is not certain for states, 
even if they are widely perceived to have met Montevideo statehood criteria and are recognized as a 
state by many UN member states. Acceptance is even less certain for an entity which may not fully 
meet Montevideo statehood criteria and or has limited statehood recognition by states and 
international bodies. The permanent UN Security Council members wield great power. They can and 
have used their veto power when a legitimate state has submitted an application to become a member 
state of the UN. The political nature of statehood recognition is brought to light in instances where 
states are accepted in specialized UN agencies, where the international community can vote in favor 
of accepting a state without threat of a Security Council veto, but the state is not accepted as a 
member of the UN. 
 
Paths to Statehood 
 
Each entity’s path to becoming a recognized state is unique. However, it is possible to 
observe the paths that have been taken to recognized statehood and the influence the UN had during 
the process and compare the path to that the Palestinians are taking to legitimize their statehood 
claims. Since seeking acceptance as a state to the UN or its specialized agencies advances an entity’s 
legitimate claims to statehood, many entities seek this recognition, even if there is ambiguity as to 
whether they meet all of the Montevideo statehood criteria. For example, Ukraine and Belorussia 
were constituent republics of the USSR when they applied to the UN and to UN agencies. Both 
entities had limited control over foreign relations and domestic policy and were lacking 
independence, but both gained admittance to the UN and UN agencies. India and the Philippines 
were admitted as members of the UN in 1945. While lacking independence at the time they were 
admitted as members, both gained independence within the following two years.637 Notably, 
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Lithuania was admitted to the UN before attaining individual state recognition by the major 
powers.638 When Bosnia applied and was accepted as a member of the UN, it did not yet have 
effective control of its territory as it had just declared independence from Yugoslavia. Monaco 
represents a unique situation in that it is a microstate with a unique relationship with France, and it 
does not maintain effective control of its territory. However, despite having “few citizens, little 
territory, and little control of domestic or foreign policy,” Monaco has been admitted to the UN and 
its agencies.639 
Even after gaining acceptance as a state to the UN and obtaining further claims to legitimacy, 
many states continue to lack universal recognition by governments. There are many states with 
limited recognition that have gained admittance as a member state of the UN. This is true for the 
State of Israel, which was recognized by 159 of the 193 UN member states in 2012.640 Kosovo is not 
a member state of the UN, but 77 UN member states recognize it and it holds member state status in 
other important international bodies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank. The State of Palestine is in a similar situation to Kosovo. While 91 countries have recognized a 
State of Kosovo, it has not been admitted to the UN.641 
Parallels can be drawn between Israel’s admittance to the UN and Palestinians’ present-day 
quest for UN membership. Israel declared independence on May 15, 1948 and was immediately 
engulfed in war. While some states recognized Israel’s independence and accepted it as a state, most 
notably the US and the USSR, it lacked widespread recognition. Nonetheless, Israel submitted an 
application to the UN in the fall of 1948. It did not receive the required unanimous UN Security 
Council votes to secure membership. Israel renewed its application in the spring and the UN Security 
Council approved the application despite permanent Security Council member Britain abstaining 
from the vote. Despite a requirement of an affirmative vote by all five Security Council members, the 
Security Council recommended the admission of Israel to the UN and presented its application to the 
UN General Assembly for consideration. On May 11, 1949, the UN General Assembly voted and 
Israel narrowly gained the two-thirds votes needed in to be admitted to the UN and the United 
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Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 273 resulting in the acceptance of Israel as a member 
state of the UN.642  
Notably, Israel’s acceptance was conditional upon its acceptance of UN General Assembly 
resolutions 181 and 194, which it accepted but has not yet implemented.643   
 
Applying the Criteria: Is Palestine a State? 
 
When the PLO proclaimed the establishment of the State of Palestine in 1988, it cited UN 
Resolution 181 as granting the Palestinians the right to sovereignty in Palestine and also mentioned 
the League of Nations Covenant of 1919 and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which established the 
provisional State of Palestine. Following the proclamation, the PLO did not yet have control in the 
WBGS, though about 100 countries recognized a State of Palestine. Since the PLO’s declaration of 
statehood in 1988, its claims to the land have been strengthened by exercising control over parts of 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, a right accorded to the PLO through the Oslo Accords.644 Subsequent 
efforts by the PLO brought about further recognition of a State of Palestine by states and 
international bodies of states.  
Initially following the declaration of statehood, the PLO did not have success acting as a 
state. For example, in 1989 the PLO attempted to ratify the four Geneva conventions of 1949 on 
warfare. The International Committee of the Red Cross said its application was not considered "due 
to the uncertainty within the international community as to the existence or non-existence of a State 
of Palestine."645 
Since a significant number of states and international bodies of states have acknowledged and 
accepted a State of Palestine, it is appropriate to review the credentials for a state laid out in the 
Montevideo Convention: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) 
capacity to enter into relations with the other states. Based on these criteria, it appears that a State of 
                                                 
642
 The UN General Assembly voted 37 in favor, 12 against with 9 abstentions of the resolution.  
“United Nations General Assembly Resolution 273 (III).” Jewish Virtual Library. The American-Israeli Cooperative 
Enterprise. May 11, 1949. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/unga273.html (accessed December 1, 
2012).  
(Quigley, Statehood of Palestine 2010, 110-114) 
643
 (UN Resolution 273 (III) 1949)  
UN Resolution 194 affirms that refugees should be permitted to return to their homes and property and UN 
Resolution 181 recommended the partition of Mandate Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab. 
644
 Quigley, John.  The Case for Palestine: An International Law Perspective. Revised and Updated. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2005, 214.  
645
 “International Humanitarian Law: Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.” International Committee of the Red 
Cross. 2005. http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P (accessed January 3, 2013).  
263 
 
Palestine exists.646 While Palestinian refugees and members of the Palestinian Diaspora live 
worldwide, there is and has been for centuries a permanent population in Palestine. While the PLO 
has not agreed on a territorial settlement with Israel, it does have a defined territory with varying 
levels of jurisdiction over the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The PLO manages governance functions 
and serves as the recognized and legitimate government of the Palestinian people, with the PA ruling 
in parts of the West Bank; but Hamas rules with restrictions in the Gaza Strip. Reconciliation 
between Fatah and Hamas and bringing Hamas under the PLO umbrella will enhance Palestinian 
unity and legitimacy. Further, not only does the PLO have the capacity to enter into relations with 
other states, it has done so regularly with the majority of the states in the world. The legitimacy of the 
existence of a Palestinian state is enhanced because it is widely recognized by countries.  
A minority of states are not convinced that a State of Palestine exists. Some governments 
hold that the Palestinian entity does not fully meet all criteria in the Montevideo Convention or argue 
that a State of Palestine can only be achieved through a negotiated peace settlement with Israel. 
Critics cite Israel’s belligerent occupancy over the WBGS as proof that the PA does not fully meet 
the control criterion of a government. Quigley argues that “the level of control exercised by the PNA 
would not need to be total or near total, in order to satisfy the control criterion.” The fact that Israel 
exerts some control does not negate Palestine’s claim to control over the area, according to Quigly.647 
However, the PA’s claim of sovereignty over the land is debatable. While no other countries claim 
sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israel claims East Jerusalem. Further, Israel has 
placed the separation barrier in parts of the West Bank and more than 650,000 Israelis have moved 
into the West Bank and East Jerusalem.648  
The UN has had a unique role in increasing the legitimacy of a Palestinian state. The UN 
General Assembly accorded Palestinians observer status to the UN in 1974, giving the PLO the right 
to participate in the general debate of the General Assembly, a privilege accorded to states.649 The 
PLO recognizes the value in being recognized as a state by the international community and has 
taken steps to increase its recognition. In 2011, the PLO sought to enhance their status by submitting 
an application to the UN to be considered for membership of the UN, which required a vote by the 
UN Security council, and the application was rejected. The process itself increased the legitimacy of 
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the PLO and resulted in increased recognition by states such as Iceland, Uruguay, Peru, Brazil, 
Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Chile.650  
Recognition is an important component in proving the legitimacy of a state. As such, it is 
important to note that as of October 2012, 138 of the world’s 195 independent states recognize a state 
of Palestine.651 Many other states have not accorded formal recognition of a Palestinian state but have 
accorded implicit recognition by engaging in diplomatic relations with the PLO. In addition to 
enjoying recognition by states, the State of Palestine has gained recognition by being permitted to 
join inter-state organizations and to sign onto treaties in the name of the PLO, Palestine or the PA. 
For example, the UN Asia-Pacific Group and the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western 
Asia, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference admitted the State of 
Palestine as a member. Further, the EU agreed to a tariff agreement in the form of a treaty with the 
PLO.652 In October, 2011, a State of Palestine was admitted to the UN Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) after having been denied membership in 1989.653 Most 
significantly, in 2012, the PLO sought to be recognized as a non-member sovereign state of the UN. 
The proposal was voted on by the General Assembly and passed with 138 in favor, 9 against, and 41 
abstentions.654 The UN measure allows a State of Palestine to become party to the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice.655 
As discussed, while the Montevideo criteria are an important set of criteria the international 
community generally references when determining an entity’s statehood status, the decision 
ultimately lies with individual states and organizations.  
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In 1993, through the Oslo Accords, the PLO and Israel committed to bilateral negotiations to 
resolve outstanding issues and bring about a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The 
parties have not come to agreement on outstanding issues and the Israeli occupation of the WBGS 
continues. While a final settlement hasn’t been reached, the international community has increasingly 
recognized a State of Palestine. In an effort to gain legitimacy and strengthen its negotiating position 
with Israel, the PLO has actively adopted a different approach and strategy towards state recognition. 
Instead of solely focusing its efforts on negotiating a settlement with Israel, which has proved both 
difficult and largely unsuccessful, it has actively promoted itself as a state worthy of recognition.  
The new approach of actively engaging the international community, “internationalization,” 
has received positive and negative reactions. Discussing Israel’s resistance to according statehood 
status to Palestinians, Quigley writes: “Palestine statehood removes the leverage Israel seeks to 
exercise over Palestine in negotiations. Israel has set parameters for a negotiated settlement that fall 
far below the minimum that the international community has regarded as permissible. Israel seeks to 
reserve for itself the right to grant Palestine statehood in order to gain concessions from the 
Palestinian side.”656  
Other states see the internationalization of the issue as an opportunity to advance Palestinian 
rights and the peace process. In recent years, the governments of Costa Rica and the Dominican 
Republic extended recognition to a State of Palestine and have displayed an understanding of the 
importance of a balance of power in a negotiated Israeli-Palestinian settlement. Quigley points out 
that in 2008, Costa Rica extended recognition of a Palestinian state and when urging other states to 
follow suit, the Costa Rican Foreign Minister Bruno Stagno Ugarte remarked that further recognition 
would place Palestinians, “in a position of greater symmetry vis-à-vis other parties to the conflict.”657 
The Dominican Republic had already extended recognition of Israel, and in 2009 President Leonel 
Fernandez expressed that his country was extending recognition of a Palestinian state to strike a 
“diplomatic balance” between Israel and Palestine.”658  
However, many of the world’s most powerful states have withheld formal recognition of a 
State of Palestine. Of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, only Russia and 
China have recognized, and established full diplomatic relations with, the State of Palestine. During a 
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November 2012 UN vote to determine of Palestine would become a non-member state of the UN, 
France voted favorably, Britain abstained from the vote, and the U.S voted against the measure. 
Powerful states such as Britain, the U.S. and Germany insist that formal state recognition will only be 
accorded to Palestinians once the PLO has reached a negotiated settlement with Israel.659 
Powerful international organizations have weighed in on the status of Palestinian statehood. 
In 2011, the IMF, World Bank and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the 
Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO) released reports indicating that these institutions do not yet 
recognize Palestine as a state, but have given legitimacy to the PA, relaying that the PA is ready to 
govern a State of Palestine. In 2011, the IMF declared “the PA is now able to conduct the sound 
economic policies expected of a future well-functioning Palestinian State.”660 The World Bank made 
similar declarations of support for a Palestinian State by stating that; “If the Palestinian Authority 
(PA) maintains its performance in institution building and delivery of public services, it is well-
positioned for the establishment of a state at any point in the near future.”661 A UNSCO report 
released in April 2011 showed similar confidence in a Palestinian state, stating: “In the limited 
territory under its control and within the constraints on the ground imposed by unresolved political 
issues, the PA has accelerated progress in improving its governmental functions. In six areas where 
the UN is most engaged, governmental functions are now sufficient for a functioning government of 
a state.”662 In its dealings with these organizations, the PA has earned their stamp of approval with 
respect to statehood, furthering its claims to legitimacy and competency as a governing body of a 
State of Palestine.  
Palestinians have insisted that negotiations have not helped Palestinians secure a recognized, 
independent state, and this, coupled with Israel’s refusal to halt settlement growth in the West Bank, 
is why they are pursuing an alternative course to statehood recognition.663  
 
Israel and the U.S. 
 
Despite the legitimacy accorded to a State of Palestine by a majority of governments, many 
of the world’s most powerful states—the US, Israel, and many European countries—have not yet 
accorded explicit recognition of a State of Palestine. Further, Israel and the US have resisted the 
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PLO's efforts to involve the international community with regards to Palestinian statehood. 
Nonetheless, Palestinians continue to build their case as an entity deserving of statehood 
recognition—by seeking recognition from governments, by seeking membership in inter-state 
organizations and by signing onto treaties, all of which will further their legitimacy and enhance their 
claims to independence.   
As explained in Chapter Two, in 1993, when Israel signed the Declaration of Principles 
(DOP) with the PLO, it recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and 
ceded some but not all control of administration of the WBGS to the PLO. Both parties agreed to 
come to a negotiated peace settlement with a final arrangement on borders and administrative control 
within five years. Drawn out negotiations have  not produced a final arrangement, and in 2011, 
Palestinians publically contemplated reasserting a State of Palestine and their independence in light 
of the failed  negotiations and continued growth of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and 
Jerusalem. Israel countered that a unilateral assertion of independence would make the DOP void. 
Israeli Knesset member Danny Danon remarked that the Palestinian move would relieve Israel of “all 
the diplomatic, security, and economic commitments” that were made in the Oslo Accords and there 
was support within the Knesset for the GoI to extend Israeli sovereignty over all of the WBGS or 
annex parts of the West Bank.664 Israeli policies have supported and enforced this position. The U.S. 
government has been instrumental in supporting Israel’s position and has used its power to 
discourage recognition of a Palestinian state. In 2011 and 2012, the U.S. government warned against 
acceptance of Palestine as a member state to the UN, indicating it would withhold funds to the UN. 
Further, the U.S. has exerted extensive pressure on countries that have not recognized Palestine as a 
state, encouraging European governments to block the Palestinian UN bid.665  
A few examples show Israel’s evolving position on the Palestine statehood issue. In 2007, at 
the Annapolis talks, Israel offered conditional support of a Palestinian state within the limited 
territory that the PA was administering in West Bank and Gaza Strip. Palestinians did not responded 
to the offer favorably, fearing this would compromise their claim to sovereignty to all of the land 
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captured by Israel in 1967.666 Later in 2009, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu offered conditional 
recognition of a Palestinian state. He said, “If we are asked, which we are, to recognize the 
Palestinian state as the nation-state of the Palestinian people—and we are willing to do so—it is only 
natural that we ask our Palestinian neighbors to recognize the State of Israel as the nation-state of the 
Jewish people.”  
This statement reveals the political nature of state recognition. While the GoI implied 
recognition of a Palestinian state, instead of asking Palestinians to recognize Israel as the nation-state 
of Israelis, it made recognition of a Palestinian state conditional on recognition of Israel as a Jewish 
state. While the PLO had already recognized the State of Israel in 1988, it refused to recognize the 
State of Israel as a Jewish state, which would mean recognizing one ethnic group amongst the many 
that make up Israeli society and possibly implying that Palestinians were willing to give up the right 
of return, which Palestinians consider protected under international law.667 This case of conditional 
recognition exemplifies how political considerations can influence a state’s decision to accord 
recognition of a state. In a speech in May 2012, the Israeli Defense Minister said that should a 
negotiated peace settlement with Palestinians “proves to be impossible, we have to consider a 
provisional arrangement or even unilateral action.” 668 Unilateral action could include a withdrawal of 
Israeli forces from parts of the West Bank, “annexation of Israeli settlement blocs in the West Bank, 
military crackdowns and mass arrests.”669 Israel does not want the PLO to seek membership as a state 
to international bodies and insists this action is outside the realm of direct bilateral negotiations to 
bring about a recognized State of Palestine. Nonetheless, as stated earlier, in the fall of 2011, the 
PLO submitted an application to be a member of UNESCO to which Israel reacted by freezing the 
taxes and fees that it collects at the Palestinian borders and transfers to the PA, though it transferred 
them at a later date. This action violates the principles of the Paris Protocol and resulted in the PA’s 
normal revenues being temporarily slashed by two-thirds.670 Per a 1994 US law requiring the US to 
                                                 
666
 (Quigley, Statehood of Palestine 2010, 196)  
667
 (Quigley, Statehood of Palestine 2010, 201) 
668
 Tiebel, Amy. “Israel’s Barak: ‘Unilateral Action’ on the table.” Breitbart. Associated Press. May 30, 2012. 
http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2012/05/30/Israels-Barak--Weigh-unilateral-action (accessed November 2, 
2012). 
669
 (Tiebel 2012) 
670
 Reuters. “Israeli withholding of tax funds incapacitating PA.” The Jerusalem Post. November 24, 2011. 
http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=246899 (accessed December 11, 2012).  
269 
 
withdraw from and stop funding any UN entity which accepts Palestine as a member, in 2011, the 
U.S. withheld funding to UNESCO after Palestine was granted membership.671 
The U.S. has in some cases shown implicit recognition of a State of Palestine, though it has 
explicitly denied Palestinian statehood and uses its power as a world leader to discourage, with 
mixed success, other inter-state bodies and states from recognizing a State of Palestine. The grounds 
on which the US has denied recognition of the existence of a State of Palestine are twofold. U.S. 
courts have ruled that Palestinian statehood does not exist, citing a lack of sufficient control by a 
government (the PLO) and saying that its scope of control is limited by Israel. This is a clear 
reference to Montevideo statehood criteria. For practical reasons, however, the US accepts 
Palestinian passports that the PA issues, which identifies Palestinian nationality and could be viewed 
as implicit recognition of Palestinian statehood. The U.S. also permits a Palestinian General 
Delegation in Washington, D.C.672 
On multiple occasions, the U.S. has used its power and leverage to prevent the PLO from 
being admitted to the UN and other world bodies of member states. When the PLO submitted an 
application to UNESCO in 1989, the US reacted by announcing it would not rejoin UNESCO if 
Palestine was admitted as a state, resulting in UNESCO's decision to defer the consideration of the 
PLO's application. When the PLO tried joining the World Health Organization (WHO) that same 
year, the US threatened to not pay its dues to the WHO if it accepted the PLOs application. Soon 
afterwards, the Arab League proposed a UN resolution to recognize an independent Palestinian State. 
The US reacted by threatening to withhold financing to the UN; thus, the resolution was 
abandoned.673  
In late 2011, the US vetoed a UN resolution condemning Israel’s West Bank settlements. 
Despite agreeing that Israeli settlements in Palestine are illegal, the US holds a position that the UN 
is not the appropriate venue to address the issue. The US Congress threatened to withhold financial 
aid to the Palestinians had the US not vetoed the measure in the UN Security Council.674 
The US has vetoed multiple times UN Security Council resolutions condemning Israeli 
actions as having a negative impact on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and therefore the quest 
for Palestinian statehood. In September 2011, the PLO risked financial retaliation by Israel and the 
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U.S. to pursue membership in the UN. The US vowed it would veto the Palestinian application and 
urged other states to do so as well.675 The US Congress withheld $200 million in promised external 
assistance to the PA for pursuing membership in the UN.676  
In reaction to the 2012 Palestinian statehood bid at the UN, members of the U.S. Senate 
introduced three amendments to the National Defense Act aimed at preventing the PA from using the 
International Criminal Court and to prevent UN members from upgrading the PLO’s status at the 
UN. If passed, the amendments will require that the U.S. cut contributions and aid to the UN and to 
the PA if the aforementioned initiatives are explored at the UN or International Criminal Court.677 
It is clear the U.S. and Israel will go to great lengths to prevent a State of Palestine from 
being recognized outside of the parameters of direct, bilateral negotiations.  
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Foreign Office, November 2nd, 1917. 
Dear Lord Rothschild, 
 
I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following 
declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved 
by, the Cabinet. 
"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for 
the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of the object, it 
being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious' 
rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by 
Jews in any other country". 
I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation. 
Yours sincerely, 




United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 
November 22, 1967 
 
The Security Council, 
 
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, 
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just 
and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security, 
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations 
have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter, 
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and 
lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following 
principles: 
o Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;  
o Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and 
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence 
of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized 
boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 
2. Affirms further the necessity 
o For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;  
o For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;  
o For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State 
in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones; 
3. Requests the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the 
Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote 
agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with 
the provisions and principles in this resolution; 
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts 
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